Water tariffs : Methods for an Efficient Cost Recovery and for the Implementation of the Water Framework Directive in Portugal by Monteiro, Henrique Pedro Currais
U	 T	  L	
I S  E	  G
(ISEG - UTL)
Water Tariffs
Methods for an Efficient Cost Recovery and for the
Implementation of the Water Framework Directive in
Portugal
Henrique Pedro Currais Monteiro
SUPERVISORS
Professor José Manuel de Matos Passos
Professor Maria Catarina Salema Roseta Palma
THESIS COMMITTEE
PRESIDENT:
Dean of the Universidade Técnica de Lisboa
COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Professor Manuel Victor Moreira Martins, Professor, ISEG - UTL
Professor Rui Jorge Fernandes Ferreira dos Santos, Associate Professor, FCT-UNL
Professor Maria Rita Vieira Martins, Assistant Professor, FE-UC
Professor Maria Catarina Salema Roseta Palma, Assistant Professor, ISCTE-IUL
Professor José Manuel Zorro Mendes, Assistant Professor (Agregado), ISEG-UTL
Professor José Manuel de Matos Passos, Assistant Professor, ISEG-UTL
PhD Dissertation in Economics - Final Version
Lisboa, November 2009
i
“We never know the worth of water till the well is dry”
Thomas Fuller, Gnomologia, Adagies and Proverbs, Wise
Sentences and Witty Sayings, Ancient and Modern, Foreign and British (1732)
“Ce qui embellit le désert, dit le petit prince, c’est qu’il cache un puits quelque part”
(What makes the desert beautiful is that somewhere it hides a well)
Antoine de Saint-Exupery, Le Petit Prince (1943)
ii
Resumo
Este trabalho é um contributo para o estudo da melhor forma de atingir os objectivos de
recuperação de custos e eficiência do sector da água em Portugal traçados pela Directiva-
Quadro da Água.
Nele se descrevem as tarifas de água e saneamento aplicadas entre 1998 e 2005 e os
níveis de recuperação de custos nesse período. As receitas tarifárias angariadas pelas
entidades gestoras mostram-se insuficientes para cobrir os custos da sua actividade, espe-
cialmente no que diz respeito ao saneamento e a situação tem vindo a piorar nos últimos
anos.
A literatura sobre modelização da determinação dos preços da água é revista, salien-
tando alguns resultados importantes como o facto de a eficiência exigir que o preço seja
equiparado ao custo marginal, algo que pode não ser possível em simultâneo com restrições
de manutenção de orçamentos equilibrados. Não é evidente qual o melhor tipo de tarifário
a adoptar, a combinação de uma componente fixa com um preço volumétrico constante ou
outro esquema alternativo como os tarifários crescentes por blocos, largamente utilizados
em Portugal.
O custo de escassez é incorporado na definição do tarifário óptimo. Demonstra-se
que quando a procura e a oferta reagem ambas a factores climatéricos, preços marginais
crescentes podem resultar da combinação da escassez de água com a heterogeneidade dos
consumidores em situações em que à componente fixa da tarifa apenas é permitido cobrir
os custos fixos e é exigido à entidade gestora que mantenha um orçamento equilibrado. A
escolha do melhor tarifário depende fundamentalmente do comportamento da elasticidade-
preço da procura.
Neste trabalho estimamos a procura residencial de água em Portugal e mostramos que
a recomendação sobre o melhor tipo de tarifário depende crucialmente da escolha da forma
funcional da procura. Da realização dos testes de especificação adequados, resulta uma
escolha inconclusiva entre as formas funcionais semilogaritmíca (lin-log) e loglinear, o que
não permite provar a superioridade dos preços crescentes por escalões, mas também não
os rejeita.
Estima-se também uma função de custos multi-produto para o sector de abastecimento
de água e saneamento português em baixa. Para a entidade gestora de dimensão média
existem deseconomias de escala e de gama. Os dois tipos de economias tendem a existir
para entidades com maior número de consumidores.
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centes por blocos, escassez de água, recuperação de custos, estimação da procura de água
residencial, economias de escala e de gama na função de custos de água, Directiva-Quadro
da Água e Lei da Água.
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Abstract
This work is a contribution to the study of how the Portuguese water industry can
meet the goals of cost recovery and water use efficiency set out by the Water Framework
Directive.
We describe the Portuguese water and wastewater tariffs implemented from 1998 to
2005 and the cost recovery levels for that period. The tariff revenues collected by the water
utilities are insufficient to meet the financial costs of their activities, especially regarding
wastewater, and the situation has worsened in recent years.
We review the existing water pricing models, highlighting some important results like
the fact that efficiency requires marginal cost pricing, which may not be feasible while
respecting a revenue requirement. It is not evident whether the best scheme is a two-
part tariff or some other pricing mechanism like increasing block tariffs (IBT), which are
abundantly used in Portugal.
We incorporate the scarcity cost associated with insufficient water availability into the
optimal tariff design. We show that when both demand and costs respond to climate
factors, increasing marginal prices may come about as a combined result of scarcity and
customer heterogeneity when the fixed charge is only allowed to cover fixed costs and the
utility is required to maintain a balanced budget. Ultimately, the choice of tariff schedule
design is dependent on the behavior of the price-elasticity of demand.
We estimate the Portuguese residential water demand and show that the resulting
recommended tariff schedule hinges crucially on the choice of functional form. After the
proper specification tests, a choice between a semilogarithmic lin-log and a double-log
specification is left undecided, which does not prove the superiority of IBT, but also does
not enable its dismissal.
We also estimate a multi-output cost function for the Portuguese water industry at the
retail level. We find diseconomies of scale and scope for the average water utility. Both
types of economies are more likely to exist for utilities with a large customer base.
Keywords: Nonlinear Water Pricing and Increasing Block Tariffs, Water Scarcity,
Cost Recovery, Residential Water Demand Estimation, Scale and Scope Economies in the
Water Cost Function, Water Framework Directive and Water Law.
JEL codes: C23, C33, C52, D24, D42, L11, L95, Q21, Q25.
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Preface
In 23 October 2000 the Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and Council
was approved. It is known as the Water Framework Directive (WFD) and it establishes
a framework for an European policy on water resources. The directive was transposed to
the Portuguese Law with the publication of the Law n. 58/2005 of 29 December, known
as the Water Law.
These legal documents contain innovative features regarding their economic aspects,
for example by integrating the perception that water is a scarce resource. The following
requirements are imposed on the Member-States1:
- to perform an economic analysis of the several water uses (art. 5, WFD; art. 29, n.1,
g), Water Law);
- to integrate in the River Basin Management Plans until 2010 a programme of mea-
sures that (art. 9, n. 1, WFD; art. 30, 77 and 83 Water Law):
- takes into account the cost recovery of water services (including environmental and
resource costs);
- ensures that water pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use water
resources efficiently and thereby contribute to the Directive’s environmental objectives in
terms of quality of the water bodies;
- ensures an adequate contribution of the different water users (industry, households,
agriculture) to the recovery of the costs of water services.
This work is a contribution to the study of how cost recovery and water use efficiency
can be achieved in Portugal, thereby complying with the requirements of the WFD and the
new Water Law. It focuses on the role that water tariffs may have in this regard combining
the analysis of water demand and supply as required by proper economic analysis (Roseta-
Palma (2002)). It is not our intention to describe the broader framework of the regulation
of public utilities nor to examine the context of economic regulation of the water industry.
Such a task has already been undertaken and can be found in the works of Cardadeiro
(2005) and Martins (2007) for the Portuguese case and Luis-Manso (2007) and Finger,
1See Roseta-Palma (2002) and WATECO (2003) for a more detailed description of the impacts of the
WFD on the Portuguese economic water policy.
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Allouche and Luis-Manso (2007) in a more European perspective. We deliberately choose
to focus on the cost recovery and efficient/incentive pricing issues. In this preface we
describe the structure of the thesis and the main findings.
We start by describing the Portuguese water and wastewater tariffs implemented in the
period 1998-2005, based on the data provided by the National Water Institute (INAG)
in the National Inventory of Water Supply and Wastewater Systems (INSAAR)2. The
increasing popularity of increasing block tariffs (IBT) for water is reflected in Portugal by
a virtually universal implementation for residential use. We compare the current water
pricing policies with the main criteria used for evaluating a tariff schedule. From this
comparison, we conclude that, halfway between the publication of the WFD and the 2010
deadline for the implementation of efficient pricing policies, there was still a long way to
go.
In Chapter 2, we describe the situation in Portugal in 2005 regarding cost recovery in
the water supply (WS) and wastewater drainage and treatment (WWDT) industry and its
evolution since 1998. We also present a brief historical overview of the presence of the cost
recovery principle in the Portuguese law regarding the industry. The main conclusions that
stand out are: the introduction of the cost recovery principle is prior to the WFD and the
more recent Water Law, although it lacked practical implementation; the level of revenues
collected by the WS and WWDT utilities is insufficient to meet the financial costs of their
activities; the situation is worse for wastewater than for WS systems, revealing evidence
of cross-subsidization within the utilities which manage both systems; the situation has
worsened in recent years; cost recovery levels are lower in the less densely populated and
poorer inland regions; finally, we find no evidence associating cost recovery levels and the
type of utility.
We review the existing water pricing models in Chapter 3, highlighting some impor-
tant results. Efficiency requires marginal cost pricing, a useful tool to restrain demand in
scarcity conditions and to signal the value that consumers attribute to further capacity
2We collected additional information on water tariffs, volumes supplied/collected and number of cus-
tomers through direct contact with all water and wastewater utilities in mainland Portugal which add to
the INSAAR data, mainly by the filling of missing data in the original database.
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expansions as the water supply system approaches its capacity limit. Intra-annual price
changes or customer differentiation to reflect differences in marginal costs can enhance
efficiency. However, pure marginal cost pricing may not be feasible while respecting a
revenue requirement. The most common ways of combining efficiency and revenue re-
quirements are through the use of two-part tariffs, adjusting the fixed charge to meet the
revenue requirement, or through second-best pricing like Ramsey pricing. It is not evident
whether the best scheme is a two-part tariff or some other pricing mechanism. The role
of block rate pricing, increasingly more frequent in actual pricing practices, has not yet
been fully investigated.
In many areas where water is not abundant, water pricing schedules contain significant
nonlinearities. Existing pricing literature establishes that efficient schedules will depend
on demand and supply characteristics. However, most empirical studies show that actual
pricing schemes have little to do with theoretical efficiency results. In particular, there are
very few models recommending increasing blocks, whereas we present evidence that this
type of tariff structure is abundantly used, namely in Portugal. Water managers often
defend increasing blocks, both as a means to benefit smaller users, to signal scarcity and
to achieve revenue neutrality. Naturally, in the presence of water scarcity the true cost of
water increases due to the emergence of a scarcity cost. In Chapter 4, we incorporate the
scarcity cost associated with insufficient water availability into the optimal tariff design in
several different models. We show that when both demand and costs respond to climate
factors, increasing marginal prices may come about as a combined result of scarcity and
customer heterogeneity when the fixed charge is only allowed to cover fixed costs and the
utility is required to maintain a balanced budget. We also investigate the effect that rising
water scarcity in the long run can have on the steady-state amount of capital invested in
water storage and supply infrastructures and obtain some results that are consistent with
the static models.
Because, in the conditions described above, the choice of tariff schedule design is de-
pendent on the price-elasticity of demand and the way it varies with consumption levels, in
Chapter 5 we estimate the Portuguese residential water demand and show that the result-
ing recommended tariff schedule hinges crucially on the choice of functional form. After
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the proper specification tests, a choice between a semilogarithmic lin-log and a double-log
specification is left undecided, which does not prove the superiority of IBT, but also does
not enable its dismissal. Besides the usual determinants found in the prolific residential
water demand estimation literature we find that the proportion of seasonally inhabited
dwellings and a reduced water quality on delivery can have a significant negative influence
on the amount of water households consume.
To improve the situation in the Portuguese water industry regarding cost recovery
either tariff revenues would have to increase or cost savings would have to be achieved. We
estimate the cost function of the Portuguese water industry at the retail level in Chapter
6, testing for the existence of economies of scale and scope, taking into consideration the
amount of water losses and the combination of the water supply and wastewater drainage
and treatment activities. Our results differ from previous research for the Portuguese water
industry in that for the sample average we find diseconomies of scale for water supply and
for utilities combining the water supply and wastewater drainage and treatment activities,
while for wastewater we do find evidence of economies of scale. The size of the utility, as
measured by its customer base, and the control of water losses are found to favour the
existence of economies of scale. Diseconomies of scope are found for the combined activities
of water supply and wastewater drainage and treatment, but the situation improves with
the utility size and for utilities larger than three times the sample average economies of
scope do exist.
Summing up, to the extent that we find no possible cost savings for the average retail
water and wastewater utility can be made from merging neighbouring systems, achieving
cost recovery may have to be achieved through the increase of the water price. Because
two-part tariffs with lump-sum fixed charges are not permitted in Portugal, IBT may be
a second-best alternative to achieve both the goals of water use efficiency and financial
sustainability in a context of increasing water scarcity, although their use must be properly
assessed in a rational manner.
Chapter 1




The European Union has a reasonable level of water availability, although it is unevenly
spread across its Member-States and Portugal is an average country regarding the water
exploitation index1. Figure 1.1 2 shows that Portugal is not considered a vulnerable or
stressed region regarding water resources use.
1Water exploitation index = Total water abstraction per year as a % of long-term freshwater resources
(EEA (2007b), p. 92) (see also EC (2007c), p. 26).
2The source of Figure 1.1 is UNEP (2008). The original source is FAO — Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization of the United Nations and the World Resources Institute.
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Figure 1.1: Freshwater availability, m3 per person and per year (2007)
However, Portugal is one of the five European Union countries where the water ex-
ploitation index has increased from 1990 to 2004 (EEA (2007b), p. 92), resulting in
increased pressure on water resources. Figure 1.2 3 shows that the international river
basins from where Portugal withdraws most of its renewable water are already moderately
or highly exploited.
3The source of Figure 1.2 is UNEP (2008). The original source of is Smakhtin, Revenga and Döll (2004).
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Figure 1.2: Water stress indicator in major river basins (taking into account environmental
water requirements)
Moreover, in Portugal there is a significant variability in the availability of water
resources, with recurrent drought/scarcity situations which are forecasted to worsen in
the coming years due to climate change. Figure 1.3 4 shows that Portugal is included in
the regions where climate change will impose a greater reduction in water availability in
the coming decades.
4The source of Figure 1.3 is UNEP (2008). The original source of is Arnell (2004).
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Figure 1.3: Change in water availability compared with average 1961-1990 (%) 2050 based
on IPCC scenarios A1
Recent reports from the European Environmental Agency on the impact of climate
change indicate that the Iberian Peninsula is one of the European regions where the
increase in temperature and decrease in rainfall and run-off will be most severe (EEA
(2007a), p. 12; EEA (2007b), p. 155; EEA (2008), pp. 93-4, EEA (2009), p. 13), although
because of the increase in the number of extreme weather events, the number of floods is
also likely to increase in many parts of the Peninsula (EEA (2008), pp. 97-8)5. Figure 1.4
6 shows the projected change in precipitation levels in Europe.
5UNEP (2007), p. 126, fig. 4.5 already reflects the declining precipitation in the south of the Iberian
Peninsula as a 1900-2000 trend. Future reductions in precipitation and run-off are also reflected in the
recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports (see Kundzewicz, Mata, Arnell, Döll,
Kabat, Jiménez, Miller, Oki, Sen and Shiklomanov (2007) and Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu and Palutikof
(2008)). See also UNDP (2007), pp. 94-98, and UNEP (2007), chap. 4, pp. 115-156, for a description of
the consequences of climate change on water stress and scarcity in the rest of the world. Arnell (2004) and
Shen, Oki, Utsumi, Kanae and Hanasaki (2008) are more technical references regarding worldwide regional
projections of water availability and water withdrawals, respectively.
6Copyright EEA, Copenhagen, 2007 (http://dataservice.eea.europa.eu/atlas/viewdata/viewpub.asp?id=2788).
Figure 1.4 is Map 3.1. in EEA (2007b), p. 151. The original source of is Schröter, Cramer, Leemans,
Prentice, Araújo, Arnell, Bondeau, Bugmann, Carter, Gracia, de la Vega-Leinert, Erhard, Ewert, Glen-
dining, House, Kankaanpää, Klein, Lavorel, Lindner, Metzger, Meyer, Mitchell, Reginster, Rounsevell,
Sabaté, Sitch, Smith, Smith, Smith, Sykes, Thonicke, Thuiller, Tuck, Zaehle and Zierl (2005). See Map
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Figure 1.4: Changes in annual precipitation for the IPCC A2 scenario (2071—2100 com-
pared with 1961—1990) for four different climate models
Explicitly referring to Portugal, the report points to “a change in the seasonal dis-
tribution of river flows, concentrating in winter months, induced by similar distribution
patterns of precipitation. This trend exacerbates the seasonal asymmetry in the avail-
ability of water in continental Portugal, with a tendency for a reduction in river flows in
spring, summer and autumn” (EEA (2007a), pp. 91-2), and refers that “the relative mag-
nitude of the impact of climate change on river flows increases from the north to the south
of the country” (EEA (2007a), p. 92). For 2030, a scenario is set out where the majority
of the territory in mainland Portugal would face moderate or severe water stress7, with
the more worrisome levels being felt in inland Alentejo (EEA (2007a), p. 15, fig. 1.4)
with consequences such as “diminished water quality, particularly in the south region (...),
falling groundwater tables (...) [and] degradation of river ecosystems which are dependent
on groundwater;” (EEA (2007a), p. 93) just to name a few. Portugal must, therefore,
prepare for these more demanding scenarios8.
3.3. in EEA (2007b), p. 155 for projected changes in annual river discharges.
7A region is considered to be under moderate water stress when water resources abstraction in each year
represents between 20% and 40% of all water availability. Above this threshold the region is considered to
be under severe water stress.
8The most important research concerning adaptation measures to climate change in Portugal is reflected
in Santos, Forbes and Moita (2002) and Santos and Miranda (2006). Cunha, Oliveira and Nunes (2002) also
includes forecasts for the impacts of climate change on the Portuguese water resources; its conclusions are
similar to the ones drawn in the EEA and IPCC reports. The growing political importance of water scarcity
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The management of water resources has been traditionally faced as a problem of in-
sufficient supply to meet the existing and projected water requirements, with demand-side
policies, such as incentive pricing being disregarded. Gradually the situation has been
shifting and the discussion of water pricing policies is now essential.
The intervention of the economic regulator in Portugal (ERSAR - Entidade Regu-
ladora dos Serviços das Águas e Resíduos, I.P. [Regulating Authority on Water and Waste
Services], previously called IRAR - Instituto Regulador de Águas e Resíduos [Regulating
Authority of Water and Waste]) remained limited to the municipal and multimunicipal
concessions up to October 2009 (Baptista, Pássaro and Santos (2003) and Rouse (2007),
p. 32), as established by article 4 of its previous Statutes (MA (1998) and MAOT (2002)),
a situation which left room for the definition of water tariffs based on political criteria,
instead of economic reasons. This is certainly one the main explanations for the diversity
found in the tariffs. On October 2, 2009, the new organic and competences of ERSAR were
approved (MAOTDR (2009)) after the institution itself in its new form having been al-
ready established in articles 5 and 21 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Environment,
Territorial Planning and Regional Development (MAOTDR (2006)). The main change
brought with the change in the statutes of the economic regulator for the water industry
in Portugal was the extension of its power to all water utilities in the country.
Nowadays, the analysis of the tariff policies is particularly important, given the re-
quirements of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) (EU (2000)), which advocates an
adequate integration of cost recovery concerns, including resource and environmental costs,
in the tariff definition (article 9), until 2010, so that there are “adequate incentives for users
to use water resources efficiently, and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives
of this Directive”.
The new Water Law (AR (2005)) transposes the WFD and imposes that “the pricing
policy contributes to an efficient water use” (AR (2005), article 83rd, e)). Article 78
establishes a water resources charge, which constitutes a first step towards the recovery
and drought and the greater recognition of the role of water pricing in Portugal, the European Union and
other international organizations is reflected, for example in the following documents: MAOTDR (2007b);
EC (2006), EC (2007a), EC (2007c), EC (2008a), UN-Water (2007) and UNDP (2006).
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of scarcity/resource costs. The new Water Law also establishes in article 82 a set of
objectives to be achieved with the tariffs, calling for the creation of a new tariff regulation
applicable to all water utilities, which has meanwhile been drafted by ERSAR (ex-IRAR),
but is still lacking final approval and publication by the government, after having been
discussed with the industry stakeholders (MAOTDR (2008b)).
Setting up water tariffs can be a complex task, because this tool is usually meant to
achieve several simultaneous goals, from efficiency in the use of this natural resource to
the collection of enough revenues to guarantee the financial sustainability of the utility
providing the service. Equity is also a concern, namely the definition of the adequate con-
tribution from each type of consumer. The Portuguese water tariffs reflect this situation,
sometimes reaching complexity levels which go beyond the will or capacity of the average
consumer to understand them. The reasons for this complexity may be traced to the fact
that water supply (WS) and wastewater drainage and treatment (WWDT) systems are
typically capital-intensive with large infrastructures reflected in the large weight of fixed
costs. Therefore, they are usually associated with scale economies and are considered local
natural monopolies9. Because the consumer only has access to a single service provider
and resale is tricky it is easy for the utilities to use price discrimination techniques10. The
special nature of the good also causes its supply and treatment to be a service of general
interest11, reflected in obligations of public service like universal coverage, and its demand
is usually rigid12.
9The characteristics of the water industry which render it a natural monopoly, as well as the nature of
the economic regulation for this type of industries, are described by Cardadeiro (2005).
10“Price discrimination involves selling different units of the same good at different prices, either to the
same or different consumers” (Varian (1992), p. 241). We can distinguish three different types or degrees of
price discrimination. First-degree price discrimination or perfect price discrimination consists of setting the
price of each unit sold equal to the each consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for that unit (the consumer
surplus is appropriated by the monopoly). Second-degree price discrimination or nonlinear pricing is the
practice of setting up a price schedule where prices differ for different amounts of the good bought, but not
across consumers, which all face the same price schedule. Third-degree price discrimination is a pricing
method where different consumers are charged different prices but where the unit price is constant for
each customer class (for more details see Varian (1992)). We will see that water tariffs in Portugal are a
combination of second and third-degrees of price discrimination.
11See EC (2003), EC (2004) and EC (2007b) for a definition of services of general interest as opposed
to services of general economic interest. While the latter concept has been present in primary EU law,
the former will be introduced by the Lisbon Treaty through a specific protocol (see EC (2007b) and EU
(2007)).
12Price-elasticity of the Portuguese residential water demand has been estimated to be -0.558 by Martins
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Given the importance of water tariffs, it is odd that there are so few studies analysing
them in Portugal, namely regarding their structure and application. There are a few stud-
ies reporting the average level of Portuguese residential water tariffs, undertaken by the
Portuguese Association of Water Distribution and Drainage13 (APDA (2004) and APDA
(2006)) and reflected in the Annual Reports on the Water and Waste Industry14 pub-
lished by IRAR (IRAR (2008b))15. The National Water Institute (INAG) did try to go
beyond this basic analysis, publishing some information on the two types of tariff compo-
nents (fixed and variable/volumetric) and on the number of blocks used (INAG/MAOTDR
(2007); INAG/MAOTDR (2008); INAG/MAOTDR (2009)). However, none of these pub-
lications examines the impacts that the presence of blocks and the different calculation
procedures may have on the average tariffs or on the marginal price faced by the consumer.
These concepts are nevertheless essential to the study of the incentives transmitted by the
tariffs to the consumer and which may or not lead to an efficient use of this scarce resource.
This chapter seeks to introduce this kind of economic rationality in the analysis of
the Portuguese water and wastewater tariffs, looking in detail into their structure and
its implications for the several types of final customer classes of the retail water utilities.
To accomplish this task we use the data from the National Inventory on Water Supply
and Wastewater Systems (INSAAR) for the years 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2005. Because
this database has some missing data we complemented it with our own direct collection
of information from all water and wastewater utilities in mainland Portugal in order to
significantly fill in the missing data.
The actual water tariffs are compared with the main criteria for choosing a tariff
scheme, emphasizing those which are associated with efficiency and the financial sustain-
and Fortunato (2007). Our own estimation is provided in Chapter 5.
13Associação Portuguesa de Distribuição e Drenagem de Águas (APDA).
14Relatórios Anuais do Sector das Águas e Resíduos (RASARP).
15 IRAR (called ERSAR since October 2009) first used the data provided by APDA on the average
tariff for an annual consumption of 120m3 (IRAR (2007), vol. 1, pp. 27-34) and has now been
reporting their own data using average values obtained by dividing total water revenues from sales
to final users by the volume of water provided to final users (see IRAR (2008b), vol.2, pp. 35-7 and
IRAR/LNEC (2007), p. 50, for the reporting of the formula used). The former approach of reporting tariff
data for specific consumption levels has now been made available for each water utility on the Internet. See
http://www.ersar.pt/xCelcius/ShowXCelcius_PopUp.aspx?FileName=/lib/6/11853C5B6963712724EE4B3F89FEC5F7A3212.
for the 2007 tariffs.
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ability of the utilities. From this comparison, a striking distance between efficiency and
reality emerges.
1.2 Criteria for the analysis of a tariff scheme
Many authors have listed the objectives which guide the tariff policies in the water industry.
Some useful references, which also deal with water tariffs in general are Hanemann (1997b),
Agthe and Billings (2003), Shaw (2005), chap. 4, and Griffin (2006), chap. 8. Other
references are Howe (2005) and Renzetti (2006) together with publications on the subject
from international institutions such as the OECD (see OECD (1999c), OECD (2003a),
OECD (2006) and OECD (2009)) and the UN (WWAP (2006), chap. 12 and UNDP
(2006), chap, 2).
Next, we present the list of criteria for the analysis of a tariff system, taking into
account the specificities of the water industry. Some of them are compatible but others
are contradictory, which frequently imposes delicate choices (on the water utilities or
the regulator). Each criterion is individually presented and in the end some important
conclusions are drawn regarding the balance to be struck between them.
• Cost recovery: it is widely accepted that, in general, water utilities should seek
balanced budgets as a required condition for the financial sustainability of the water in-
dustry. Therefore, the possibility to recover the costs of the activity through the revenues,
from tariffs or elsewhere, is an important criterion of tariff analysis. This is a key ele-
ment in economic regulation. The presence of this cost recovery principle in the current
legislation (AR (2005), art. 3rd, n.1, c)) has become on the one hand more stringent, by
including environmental and resource/scarcity costs, and on the other hand more lenient
by considering only an “adequate” contribution from the different users to achieve cost
recovery (AR (2005), art. 83rd, n.1, c)). To ensure cost recovery, it is necessary that the
average price equals the average cost of providing the service. If it is lower, the water util-
ity loses money and does not assure the future continuity of the service. If it is higher, the
utility would be seizing a rent from its monopoly position, with the known accompanying
welfare loss, particularly regarding the consumers’ surplus.
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• Economic efficiency: This criterion results from the economic nature of the
potable water resource, reflecting its scarcity, i.e., the fact that it is a limited resource,
available in insufficient quantities to meet the entire demand that it would face if it were a
free access good, with a null price. Unlike the previous criterion, here we do not consider
the balance between global revenues and costs, but between the cost of providing addi-
tional units of the good and their respective price, i.e., between the marginal cost and the
marginal price. This is generally the condition which guarantees that net social benefit is
maximized. It is easy to understand the important role that volumetric prices play in the
consumers’ decisions and which makes them an essential part of the price policy. As an
example, compare two alternative tariffs, one where the cost is recovered through a fixed
fee, whatever the amount of water consumed, and another where the cost is recovered
through the charging of a price per m3, where the consumers’ water bills vary with the
amount of water supplied. In the first case there is no indication given to the consumer
about the value of the good, because the price of consuming an additional unit is zero.
Naturally, consumption will be higher than the desirable efficient amount. In the second
case, an incentive is transmitted to the consumer to use only the units from which a ben-
efit can be drawn which is higher than the price charged. This is why a careful choice of
volumetric prices is so important so that the consumer may have the correct signals on
the value of the good being consumed.
It is convenient to clarify some aspects regarding what is considered to be efficient
pricing. First, the efficiency criterion is in general concerned with the social benefit, as
was mentioned above. This means that if there are any effects, which are external to the
transaction between producer and consumer, and which generally do not have a monetary
value associated, the efficiency rule requires that they are quantified and included in the
calculation of the tariff. This is why the inclusion of the environmental and scarcity costs in
the WFD and the corresponding national Water Law merits praise from the point of view
of this criterion, even if the operationalization of these concepts is not straightforward.
A second feature of the efficiency principle is that the actual costs incurred are variable
in time and space, because they depend heavily on the quantity and quality of the water
available in the natural environment. This variability should, in principle, be reflected in
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the tariffs, but the resulting complication of the tariff system may object its consideration.
One possible way of at least covering the cyclical variations in the scarcity of the resource
is to create seasonal prices. Better yet would be their indexation to previously determined
boundaries of water resources availability. In Portugal, the recently created water resources
tax could play this role.
Third, the possible existence of increasing marginal costs does not justify the use of
IBT. It is sufficient that the price equals the cost of the last unit supplied for the signal
given to the consumer to be correct. Other justifications have to be found for the popularity
of IBT in our country and elsewhere in the world16. Some motivations are pointed out
in the 2006 Human Development Report of the United Nations, which states that “Block
tariffs thus create the potential for aligning revenues with the costs of service provision,
facilitating a sustainable financing model, while at the same time providing water for
basic needs at below the cost of operations and maintenance.” (UNDP (2006), pp. 84-5).
Finally, the importance of a unit price does not imply that the existence of fixed charges
is an inefficient practice, given that some of the costs may be specifically associated with
the establishment or maintenance of an additional connection/customer, independently of
the quantity supplied.
• Universal access: this is an easy to understand criterion, given the importance
of water to human life and public health. No citizen should be denied, for economic or
any other reason, the access to potable water and an effective wastewater drainage and
treatment system. Evidently, this principle can be in conflict with the other aforemen-
tioned economic principles, but, in practice, there are many ways to bypass this problem
like the implementation of an initial low priced block or the direct subsidization of low
income families.
• Justice or equity: Cardadeiro (2005), p. 60, states “especially when dealing with
the provision of services of general economic interest, it is totally irrealist to imagine that
a tariff system could be applied, or even conceived, disregarding the issues of equity and
social concerns”17. However, the main difficulty in applying this concept is that it can have
16The growing use of IBT in OECD countries is well documented in these organization’s reports (OECD
(2003a), p.70-73, and OECD (2009), pp. 100-101).
17Services of general economic interest are defined as “economic activities that public authorities identify
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different meanings. One concept of justice frequently presented is that consumers with
similar characteristics should pay similar prices, but if the costs of serving them differ this
would be clearly inefficient and somewhat subjective (should we consider the household
income, the type of housing, the household size or the existence of children and/or elders?).
The use of different political criteria of justice is probably one of the main reasons for the
complexity of the Portuguese water tariffs. Besides, an alternative concept of justice may
be used, one which considers fair that each consumer be charged a price which reflects the
cost of provision. The latter interpretation would be more compatible with the criteria of
efficiency and cost recovery, but significant asymmetries could emerge between different
groups of consumers, for example if they are located in different regions, something which
may be politically undesirable18.
• Simplicity: for tariffs to be understood by consumers, the impact of their deci-
sions on the water bill should be made clear. A large number of blocks, especially combined
with irregular meter readings, demanding adjustments in the water bill, make this com-
prehension more difficult. The existence of a constant unit price, not dependent on the
volume consumed, is evidently the simplest volumetric price that can be implemented and
it may even be efficient if the price is equal to a stable marginal cost. Simplicity is not
only desirable for the consumer but it also facilitates an effective management by the water
utilities, which may be harder to achieve with complex pricing schemes.
Summing up, a way to simultaneously ensure the desirable financial sustainability of
water utilities and the no less desirable efficiency in the use of water resources is to set
the unit price equal to the marginal cost and to adjust the fixed part of the tariff. The
variable part of this two-part tariff provides the incentive for an efficient consumption while
the fixed part would balance the utility’s budget. An alternative, frequently used in the
economic literature, is Ramsey pricing. According to this methodology, prices result from
as being of particular importance to citizens and that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under
different conditions) if there were no public intervention” by the State Aid sub-Group of the Economic
Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP (2006), p.1), which makes a clear association between this
concept and the universal service obligations and explicitly includes water supply in the set of industries
which the concept covers (EAGCP (2006), p. 2).
18For a description of the current political discussion in Portugal regarding the regional differences in
water prices see Lopes (2008).
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the maximization of the social benefit, bounded by the water utilities’ budget balancing
constraint. The solution to this problem consists of the establishment of different prices
for different consumption quantities or types of consumers according to the price-elasticity
of demand. This rule originates more complex tariffs and it may result in decreasing unit
prices, which is not the case in the Portuguese water industry. It may however be especially
useful if the flexibility to adjust the fixed part of the tariff is limited as seems to be the
case in Portugal since the publication of Law no 12/2008 of February 26 (AR (2008)).
Universal access should be achieved with the minimum possible distortions in the prices
charged to the majority of consumers and the final decision on the tariff schedule to be
implemented should always consider the advantages associated with simplicity.
1.3 Portuguese water tariffs
Since 2002, INAG has been making available the INSAAR database. INSAAR compiles
data on the WS and WWDT systems in Portugal. INSAAR differs from previous in-
ventories in that it covers not only the physical infrastructure, stored in geographical
information systems, but it also includes for the first time the main variables with eco-
nomic relevance such as revenues and costs, investments, number of customers, volumes
supplied/collected and the tariffs (Mendes, Avillez, Mendes, Gomes, Martins, Cardoso,
Cardoso, Costa, Mendes, Robalo and Silva (2006)). This new feature tries to solve the
problem identified by the National Water Plan in 2000 which recognized that at the time
“the statistical information supporting the economic analysis of water uses is very poor”
(Alves and Pinto (2004), 8.4).
The tariffs are collected from the water utilities with the necessary detail for economic
analysis, because information is provided on the fixed and variable parts of the tariff, the
existing blocks, their limits and respective prices and the formula used for the calculation
of the final tariff. This is done separately for each of the sixteen types of customer classes
considered. The detail in the database enables the rebuilding of the tariff in its entirety by
the researcher and, for the first time in Portugal, the systematic calculation of marginal
price levels, essential for an economic analysis which does not limit itself to the financial
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sustainability of the industry but that also focus on incentives present in the tariffs, going
beyond the calculation of the average household water outlay. The only shortcoming in
the database created by INAG is the significant amount of missing information resulting
from a non-systematic and incomplete data reporting by the water utilities. Nevertheless,
the mere existence and periodical update of the INSAAR database is a contribution to a
cultural change towards the systematic gathering, storage, publication and availability of
statistical information in Portugal and in the Portuguese water industry in particular.
1.3.1 Water supply tariffs
In this section, we will analyse the characteristics of the tariffs implemented in retail WS
in 2005, based on the INSAAR data, for each of the customer classes available and we
will show their evolution in the last few years. We will focus mainly on the residential
tariffs, given that they represent the majority of the customers and volumes supplied at the
retail level. The remaining customer classes will be analysed with reference to residential
customers.
In fact, households represented 85.4% of the reported water meters19. If we consider
only the meters for which the customer type was reported (which are 91.9% of all meters),
the value rises to 92.9% (Figure 1.5). Residential customers also account for 70.4% of
all reported volume and 75.1% of the volume for which the customer type was specified
(Figure 1.6).
19Water meters are the measure for the number of WS customers in the INSAAR database.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of reported WS customers/meters by customer type (2005)
Figure 1.6: Distribution of reported retail WS volumes by customer type (2005)
In 2005, information on the residential water tariffs was obtained from 263 water
utilities. In 97.5% of the cases, the tariffs were composed of both a fixed and a volumetric
part (Figure 1.7). For the remaining customer types20, the value varied between 82%
20Here we look separately at all 16 customer types considered in INSAAR, but this does not mean that
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(local authorities) and 98% (commercial and industrial customers), with the exception
of the utilities’ own consumptions for which no price is considered in the overwhelming
majority of cases. Tariff exemptions are also found regarding local authorities, firefighters,
education or health services and non-profit organizations, but in a much more reduced
number of cases. Flat rates are also rare and may apply to the same types of customers.
Figure 1.7: Types of tariffs in WS by customer type (2005)
The fixed part of the tariff is an increasing function of the diameter of the pipe in-
stalled. Figure 1.8 shows the average value of the fixed part of the residential tariff by
pipe diameter. It is a weighted average where the weight is the number of residential
meters/customers in each water utility21.
water utilities present this level of detail in their disaggregation of customer classes. Not a single one
does. Only 8.2% separated at least 6 customer classes, while 64.3% used 3 at most. 17.5% of the utilities
used the same tariff for all customer types. Charging the same tariff for the commercial and industrial
customers or even to agricultural, livestock, services and touristic customers is common. Other customer
types which usually face the same tariff are the educational, health and other state or local public services.
The residential customers, temporary connections and own consumptions are the customer types which
more often have their own separate tariff (or no tariff in the case of own consumptions).
21When the first value for the pipe diameter considered in the tariff is higher than 12mm, we assume its
price applies to smaller diameters.
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Figure 1.8: Fixed part of the residential WS tariff (2005) (average weighted by the number
of residential meters)
Using the total number of meters as a common weight22, we compare in Figure 1.9
the fixed part of the tariffs for different customer types relative to the residential tariffs
as a percentage difference. We can see that the residential customers face lower fixed
charges, whatever the diameter of the pipe installed, but more so in the smaller pipe
diameters (which are more frequently used for households). Only own consumptions have
an expected lower result. The other customer types face similar values, due to the fact
that most utilities charge the same fixed charge for all non-residential customers. Due
to some exceptions to this rule, the national average is slightly lower for some types of
customers such as firefighters, local authorities and non-profit organizations or cultural,
recreational and sports associations.
22The total number of meters is used to weight the tariffs of the different water utilities instead of
the number of meters by each customer class, because in INSAAR, while the tariffs are disaggregated
into sixteen different types of customers, the number of meters is only disaggregated into five different
categories, one of them being the residual.
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Figure 1.9: Percentage difference in the fixed part of theWS tariff relative to the residential
customers by pipe diameter (average weighted by the total number of meters) (2005)
In the period 1998-2005, the tariff updates for the fixed part of the WS tariff have been
lower than the inflation rate23 for most customer types in the initial more relevant pipe
diameters, generating a reduction in real terms of the payment for the fixed component
of the tariff for most customers. For larger, less representative, pipe diameters, we find
real increases in the range of 1.5-2.5%. Overall, the tariff updates may prove insufficient
to keep up with inflation. For example, for residential customers, for a pipe diameter of
15mm (the most representative by far, with 73.4% of all residential meters), real prices
fell on average 0.4% a year during the period 1998-2005.
23All monetary variables (expressed in Euros) are shown in 2005 constant prices (we used the Gross
Domestic Product price deflator at market price for Portugal, unit Euro/ECU, provided by AMECO
— Annual Macroeconomic Database, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European
Commission).
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Figure 1.10: Average annual rate of change of the fixed part of the WS tariff by type of
customer and pipe diameter (average weighted by the total number of meters) (1998-2005)
In the variable/volumetric part of the tariff, the use of IBT is common for the customer
types associated with the main economic activities (agriculture, livestock, commercial,
industrial, services and tourism), for households, where they are applied in 98.6% of the
cases, and for temporary connections (Figure 1.11). For the remaining customer types,
which are associated in one way or another to the provision of public services, the use
of a single constant price per m3 is more popular. More complex tariffs seem to be
associated with economic activities which fall for the most part in the private sector and
with households (the main customers of the public water supply network), while simpler
tariffs are implemented for customer types with a strong presence of public entities and
non-profit organizations.
When the variable part of the tariff is made up of consumption blocks, the majority
of the water utilities charge the volumes consumed at the price within each block. Nev-
ertheless, in many cases, to compute the total value of the water bill, the price of the
highest block reached is applied to all the volume consumed. This happens in 18% of the
cases for households (including the water utilities which use a combination of calculation
procedures). This way of computing the tariff does not seem to respond to any of the
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previously mentioned criteria for the definition of a water tariff scheme, except maybe
the collection of additional revenues in a way which is less perceptible for the consumer.
Efficiency and resource conservation are not promoted by this practice, because it does
not reflect in the price the marginal cost of each unit consumed.
Figure 1.11: Types of volumetric components of WS tariffs by customer type (2005)
The average number of blocks used for residential customers is five, which is also the
statistical mode, but many water utilities use a higher number of blocks which can be as
high as thirty (Figure 1.12)! For the remaining customer types the average is between 1
and 2.3 and we find no case with more than nine blocks. The use of IBT may be an effective
way to recover costs (in combination with the fixed part of the tariff), especially if the
customers within each type are heterogeneous, but the reason why households must face
more complex tariffs is not evident. The recent proposal for a tariff regulation establishes
the use of a four blocks multi-part tariff for residential customers and a two-part tariff for
the other customer types (MAOTDR (2008b), art. 17-25).
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Figure 1.12: Number of blocks in the variable part of the WS tariff by customer type
(2005)
We have seen in Figure 1.11 that one out of every six water utilities charges the
price of the highest consumption block reached to all the volume consumed by residential
customers. The use of this calculation procedure renders the marginal price faced by the
consumer very irregular, with large spikes at the lower block limits. The marginal price
for the first m3 in each block may be several times higher than the previous and the
subsequent m3, because it includes not only its block rate also the difference between the
rates of the current and the previous block multiplied by all the volume up to the lower
block limit.
Table 1.1 shows this effect. It includes two similar hypothetical tariff structures, with
the same number of blocks, with the same block ranges and the same price in each block.
The only difference is the process used to compute the final value of the tariff. In tariff A,
each m3 is charged within the respective block of consumption while in tariff B the price
of the highest block reached is charged to all the volume consumed.
We can see that the marginal price of the 6th m3 is almost three times higher than is
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Table 1.1: Comparison of two different calculation procedures for a block tariff
Tariff Blocks and prices Marginal price (MP)









€/m3 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.50 0.80 0.80







The price of the highest
block reached is
charged to all volume
€/m3 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.50 2.30 0.80
the case in tariff A, because it includes not only the €0.8 corresponding to the block price
but also the price increase from the first to the second block multiplied by the first five
cubic meters of consumption. This effect is not necessarily clear to the consumer from the
information available in its water bill or even from the publicized tariff.
Figure 1.13 shows the weighted average for the average24 and marginal prices practiced
in the WS tariffs in mainland Portugal. The spikes in the marginal price are a result of
the impact of the tariffs where the all volume is charged at the price of the highest block
reached. The large number of spikes is due to the fact that the block limits are not
necessarily coincident for all utilities. For the first few m3 of consumption the average
price is decreasing, due to the existence of the fixed part of the tariff, but the growing
influence of the increasing variable part of the tariffs quickly renders the average price also
increasing for higher levels of consumption (the inflexion point is at 10 m3). Figure 1.13
also shows the weighted averages of the average tariff per m3 disaggregated into its fixed25
and variable part.
24The weight used to obtain the average values for the average and marginal prices in mainland Portugal
was the retail volume of water supplied by each water utility. The previous qualifications regarding the
different disaggregation levels in INSAAR for the customers relative to the tariffs also apply to the volumes.
25We use the 15mm pipe diameter to find the value for the fixed part of the tariff. This is the more
frequently installed pipe diameter and it is the value used by APDA and INAG in their reports on the
average Portuguese water tariff (APDA (2004), APDA (2006); INAG/MAOTDR (2005), INAG/MAOTDR
(2007), INAG/MAOTDR (2008) and INAG/MAOTDR (2009)).
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Figure 1.13: Marginal and average tariff for residential customers weighted by the retail
volume of water supplied (2005)
Figure 1.14 and Figure 1.15 illustrate the shapes of the average and marginal tariffs for
two typical water utilities (with five consumption blocks), which differ in the way the final
tariff is computed (one charges each volume within its block while the other applies the
price of the highest block reached to all the volume consumed). Comparing both figures
we can have a more correct idea of the size of the spikes in the marginal price caused by
the tariff calculation procedure. Unlike Figure 1.13, where the spikes are mitigated by the
averaging of all utilities, in Figure 1.15 we can see that the spikes increase exponentially
with the volume consumed and make the marginal price for the units at the lower block
limits several times larger than the block price.
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Figure 1.14: Marginal and average tariff for a typical water utility (5 blocks and the
volume charged within the block - the corresponding block price is charged to each m3)
(residential customers 2005)
Figure 1.15: Marginal and average tariff for a typical water utility which charges all the
volume at the price of the highest block reached (residential customers 2005)
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Some WS tariffs include seasonal variations, which should not be surprising in Portugal
given that the weather conditions, namely rainfall, show a significant seasonal variability.
Besides, a large part of the Portuguese territory suffers frequent drought periods. How-
ever, only 2% of the water utilities use seasonal variations in the residential WS tariffs.
Moreover, they are mainly located in the North and Centre regions of the country and
many of them in the west coastal areas, which is odd given that it is in the South and
East (inland) regions which face the more severe seasonal problems of water scarcity and
droughts. In the tariffs which do have a seasonal differentiation, the summer tariff usually
starts somewhere between May and July and lasts until September or October. The sur-
charges are between 30% and 50% of the base tariff, although in some extreme cases and
in specific blocks they can be more than 3 times the base tariff. Usually, the lower blocks
(the first 10 or 25 m3) are exempted from the surcharge, which applies more commonly
to the higher consumption blocks, which is not unreasonable given that lower volumes are
associated with essential consumptions with little seasonal variation and which are much
less price responsive.
Adding to the presence of blocks and the possible existence of seasonality in the tariffs,
water tariffs may have some additional complications, such as the existence of initial blocks
with fixed charges, the implementation of formulas within each block, the existence of
additional charges which are fixed within the block, but which vary between blocks and
the existence of special contracts, such as social tariffs, for example.
Figure 1.16 demonstrates the impact caused by the use of formulas. In the case shown,
there is a price of €0.18 for the first block (which covers the first five m3). From then on26
a formula of the type V × (X + (V − Li)× Y ) applies (see the meaning of the variables
used in Figure 1.16), whose objective is to make the marginal price increasing with con-
sumption, generating a tariff which grows exponentially and which strongly discourages
larger consumptions. This is an example of the implementation of continuous nonlinear
pricing within this 2nd block27. The implementation of this type of tariffs is rare.
26The spike in Figure 1.16 results from the process of charging all the volume consumed at the price of
the highest block reached.
27The use of blocks is already a form of nonlinear pricing, because the price is not the same for all the
units. However, the price is constant within each block. This is not the case in Figure 1.16, where we have
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Figure 1.16: Marginal and average tariffs for a tariff schedule with the implementation of
the formula V*(X+ (V-Li)*Y) (residential customers 2005)
The complexity in the tariffs led the National Water Institute to state that “it would
be important to establish some guidelines which would help to harmonize the tariff com-
puting methods” (Alves and Pinto, 2004, 8.4). This task was undertaken by IRAR (now
called ERSAR), which put forward a proposal for a tariff regime, with the objective of
standardizing and simplifying the existing tariffs (Santos (2006)). The new regulation
will be applicable to all Portuguese water utilities (MAOTDR (2008b), art. 2) “public
or private, concessionaries or otherwise, responsible for the management and operation of
the municipal public water supply systems and/or public wastewater sewerage, as well as
the entities responsible for approving the tariffs” (Santos (2006)).
The existence of special contracts for specific customers is not a rule, but is also not
rare and it is easy to find examples of its use (Table 1.2 and Table 1.3)28. These types
of contracts affect more frequently the variable part of the tariff. The customer types
nonlinear prices even within the blocks. This is what we are terming continuous nonlinear pricing.
28Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 refer to the year 2002, because this is the year were INSAAR provides more
complete and detailed data. Our additional efforts to fill in missing data were focused on the normal tariffs
and not on special contracts.
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which are benefited more often are the educational establishments for the first cycle of
basic education (primary schools, up to the 4th grade) and the residential customers (with
a few exceptional situations for the employees/officials of the water utility, for urbaniza-
tions or customers outside the municipal county’s borders and exemptions for the first m3
consumed). For the remaining customer types we find the most varied examples of special
contracts, from tariffs differentiated by civil parish to special tariffs for hotels, restaurants,
churches and sanctuaries, fairs and expositions, cemeteries, railways, private social soli-
darity institutions, State institutions, or soccer clubs. Specifically regarding the variable
part of the tariff, a special tariff for water breaks is common.
Table 1.2: Frequency and motive for the use of special contracts regarding the fixed part
of the retail WS tariff (2002)





Local authorities 2 Street washing; pools
Firefighters 0 -
Commercial 1 Tariffs differentiated by civil parish
Own consumption 0 -
Residential 6
Tariffs differentiated by civil parish;
municipality officials; urbanizations; areas
outside the municipal county’s borders
Educational establishments 14 1st cycle of basic education (up to the 4th grade)
State and other
public organizations




Industrial 1 Tariffs differentiated by civil parish
Temporary connections 3 Tariffs differentiated by civil parish; fairs; expositions
Non-profit organizations 0 -
Livestock 0 -
Services 2 Tariffs differentiated by civil parish; railways
Tourism 2 Tariffs differentiated by civil parish; specific hotel
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Table 1.3: Frequency and motive for the use of special contracts regarding the variable
part of the retail WS tariff (2002)
Customer type Number of cases Motives




Sports associations; for-profit organizations;
specific soccer club; breaks
Local authorities 12
Civil parishes; street washing; pools;
irrigation of public gardens; breaks
Firefighters 0 -
Commercial 8
Tariffs differentiated by civil parish; food and
beverage establishments and the like; breaks
Own consumption 0 -
Residential 35
Tariffs differentiated by civil parish;
officials from the municipality, civil parish or the
autonomous municipal services; private garages;
exemptions for the first 5-130 m3; patios; breaks;
rural; urbanizations; areas outside the municipal
county’s borders
Educational establishments 65





Military bases; Regional Agricultural Office;
public companies; security forces;




1 Exemption for the first 13 m3
Industrial 18
Tariffs differentiated by civil parish;
wine cooperatives; raw water; agri-food
industry cooperatives; olive oil mills;
breaks; industrial units located in
industrial parks
Temporary connections 11
Tariffs differentiated by civil parish;
fairs; expositions; markets; cemeteries
Non-profit organizations 16
Churches; institutions of public utility of any kind;
private social solidarity institutions (IPSS);
exemption for the first 26 m3; breaks;
Santa Casa da Misericórdia; sanctuary
Livestock 2 Breaks
Services 3 Tariffs differentiated by civil parish; railways; breaks
Tourism 3 Tariffs differentiated by civil parish; specific hotel
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We take a look now at the average weighted value29 of the average variable part of
the tariff applied to each customer type and compare it with the values for the residential
customers’ tariffs. Figure 1.17 shows that for the initial 10 m3 only own consumptions
show a lower value than the residential customers. In fact, besides facing a lower charge
in the fixed part of the tariff (as we have seen in Figure 1.9), residential customers also
benefit from lower unit prices for the initial m3 of water consumed. Even customers like
cultural, recreational and sports associations, non-profit organizations, firefighters and
local authorities face average volumetric tariffs which may be up to 25%, 27%, 22% and
38% higher, respectively. For the remaining customer types the difference may be even
larger (up to 85%-118%). There is a clear intention to provide the residential customers
with a minimum amount of water at a more affordable price. From the 5th m3 (which is
usually the upper limit for the first residential block) onward, the impact of the increasing
block prices makes its impact felt more intensively for residential customers and their
advantage regarding other customer types begins to wane and is even inverted for higher
levels of consumption.
29The weight used is the total retail WS volume of water supplied by each water utility.
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Figure 1.17: Percentage difference in the variable part of the WS tariff relative to the
residential customers (average weighted by the total volume supplied) (2005)
The existence of a fixed part in the water tariffs makes the average tariff strongly
decreasing in the first 10m3 (Figure 1.18), after which the average residential tariff becomes
significantly increasing. This decreasing trend is eventually also inverted for the customer
types associated with private economic activities like agriculture, livestock, commercial,
industrial, services and tourism (with inflection points between 30 and 50 m3), but the
inversion is much more pronounced in the residential tariffs due to the greater number of
blocks.
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Figure 1.18: Average tariff per m3 in WS by customer type (2005)
Figure 1.10 showed the average annual rate of change in the period 1998-2005 in the
fixed part of the WS tariff. Figure 1.19 does the same for the variable part for the several
types of customers. We can see that, with few exceptions the real growth rates in this
part of the tariffs were between 0% and 1% a year. Temporary connections had slightly
higher price increases, while firefighters, own consumptions and cultural, recreational and
sports associations benefited from real price reductions. Regarding residential customers
it is noticeable that price increases were slightly lower for the initial m3 of consumption.
Overall, there seems to be some stability in the level of WS tariffs, with slight increases in
the variable part compensating small decreases in the fixed part for relevant pipe diameters.
Nevertheless, the tariffs do not seem to have kept up with cost increases as INAG reports
cost recovery levels in WS to have changed from 99% in 2002 to 87% in 2005, 89% in 2006
and 84% in 2008 (INAG/MAOTDR (2005), INAG/MAOTDR (2007), INAG/MAOTDR
(2008) and INAG/MAOTDR (2009))30.
30We must caution that the INSAAR calculations refer to a different time period, also include bulk water
suppliers and obviously also consider the cost side of the water supplying activity, so that our 1998-2005
growth rates calculation may have very little association with the variation in the cost recovery levels
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Figure 1.19: Average annual rate of change of the variable part of the WS tariff by type
of customer (average weighted by the volume of retail water supplied) (1998-2005)
The approach followed so far of basing the analysis on the entire rate structure has
enabled us to go beyond the traditional approach of computing the average tariff for pre-
established consumption levels, but this latter approach also has its advantages, namely for
regional analysis. We shall focus here on the residential customers, considering the usual
reference values: average monthly consumption of 10 m3 uniformly spread throughout
the year, and a pipe diameter of 15 mm. The final results for the NUTS III subregions
are obtained using the retail volume of water supplied by each water utility as a weight.
Figure 1.20 shows that the higher tariffs are found in general in the urban coastal regions
to the north of the Sado river (namely around the two metropolitan areas of Lisbon and
Oporto) and in Beira Interior. The regional disparity in the tariffs is one more motive
besides their complexity calling for the implementation of a tariff regulation. This is
recognized in European reports, when they state that “there are great disparities in tariffs
for urban supply, throughout the municipalities, but the Institute for Regulation (IRAR)
is establishing a reference model for tariff revision, taking into account principles of cost
recovery and equity” (EEA (2007a), p. 94).
reported by INAG. Chapter 2 presents a detailed analysis of cost recovery levels in Portugal.
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Figure 1.20: Average tariff for a monthly consumption of 10m3 by a residential customer
disaggregated at the NUTS III sub regional level (1998-2005)
Table 1.4 presents the results of the same method applied to compare the average tariffs
for the several types of water utilities. The highest average tariffs are found in autonomous
municipal services, followed by private companies. The lowest values are practiced by the
municipalities. Public and municipal companies have intermediate values. Because the
autonomous municipal services constitute a type of management in-between the operation
of the service by the municipality itself and the creation of public companies to run it or
even the concession of the service to privately owned businesses, we are unable to find
conclusive evidences regarding any type of relationship between the type of utility (type
of management and ownership) and the average value of the tariff faced by the residential
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customer. The differences in the values for the average residential tariffs seem to be more
associated with the location of the utilities than with their management type (the types
of utilities which have higher tariffs are also the ones which are predominantly located in
the more urban and densely populated regions (autonomous municipal services, private
companies, municipal companies)31. Table 1.5 shows the large ranges of variations in the
tariffs implemented by each of the types of utilities.
Table 1.4: Average tariff for a regular monthly consumption of 10 m3 by residential
customers disaggregated by type of utility (2002-2005)
Type of water utility
Average monthly tariff (€/m3)
for a monthly consumption of
10 m3 by residential customers
Average annual tariff (€/year)
for a regular annual consumption
of 120 m3 (10 m3/month)
by residential customers
2002 2005 2002 2005
Municipality 0.61 0.62 72.9 74.3
Autonomous
Municipal Services
0.95 0.94 114.0 112.7
Municipal or
Intermunicipal Company
0.76 0.71 91.2 85.5
Public Company 0.69 0.70 82.5 84.6
Private Company 0.89 0.90 107.1 107.7
Table 1.5: Range of variation of the tariff for a regular monthly consumption of 10 m3 by
residential customers disaggregated by type of utility (2002-2005)
Type of water utility
Average monthly tariff (€/m3)
for a monthly consumption of
10 m3 by residential customers
Average annual tariff (€/year)
for a regular annual consumption
of 120 m3 (10 m3/month)
by residential customers
2002 2005 2002 2005
Municipality 0.13 — 1.16 0.09 — 1.22 15.0 — 139.7 11.1 — 146.3
Autonomous
Municipal Services
0.48 — 1.15 0.52 — 1.19 57.7 — 138.5 62.5 — 143.0
Municipal or
Intermunicipal Company
0.13 — 1.30 0.49 — 1.38 15.0 — 156.0 58.5 — 165.8
Public Company 0.35 — 0.92 0.37 — 0.91 42.5 — 110.2 44.3 — 109.1
Private Company 0.27 — 1.32 0.29 — 1.22 32.4 — 158.5 35.1 — 146.4
Total 0.13 — 1.32 0.09 — 1.38 15.0 — 158.5 11.1 — 165.8
31For an example of a more thorough empirical investigation into the relationship between utility own-
erhip and the water price level for the Spanish case see Martínez-Espiñeira, García-Valiñas and González-
Gómez (2009). This study does find a positive and significant effect of private ownership on prices.
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1.3.2 Wastewater drainage and treatment tariffs
For the analysis of the tariffs to be complete we must also look at the sewerage tariffs
which appear in the water bill together with the tariffs charged for the water supply.
The WWDT charges bring additional complexity to the tariffs, namely the fact that the
calculation of the value of the tariff may sometimes depend on factors other than the
volume of wastewater drained or the volume of water supplied does not enable us to carry
out the analysis with the same level of detail as we did for WS tariffs. In particular, we
will not compute the average WWDT tariff because the result could be biased if we chose
to do it only with the utilities which base their tariff on the water consumption values.
Nevertheless, we will describe the main characteristics of the Portuguese WWDT tariffs.
Like we did for the water supply, we shall focus on residential customers, because they
represent the large majority of customers and volumes drained reported to INSAAR and
disaggregated by type of customer by the wastewater utilities. We can see from Figure
1.21 that 60.7% of the reported WWDT customers were disaggregated by customer type
by the utilities. Of those, 92.3% were households.
Figure 1.21: Distribution of reported WWDT customers by customer type (2005)
Households were also responsible for 83.7% of the wastewater drained reported to
INSAAR and disaggregated by customer type, which accounts for 60.7% of the total
(Figure 1.22).
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Figure 1.22: Distribution of reported wastewater volume drained by customer type (2005)
From Figure 1.23, we can see that in 2005 the most common situation for WWDT
tariffs was the inclusion of only a variable part of the tariff by around 1/3 of the utilities
for every customer type, with the exception of own consumptions which are for the most
part exempt. The situation which we consider more correct of applying both a fixed and a
volumetric part is also applied in a reasonable proportion of utilities (26%-28% of utilities
in all customer types, except own consumption, which is a significant increase regarding
the values for 1998 which were lower than 15%). 14%-16% of utilities only include a fixed
part in the WWDT tariff and a very significant percentage of utilities did not charge
anything for the sewerage service (21%-28%, according to the customer type, with the
exception of own consumption).
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Figure 1.23: Types of WWDT tariffs by customer type (2005)
Generally, the fixed part of the WWDT tariff can be a fixed charge or it can depend on
the water pipe diameter, the gross or usable construction area, the taxable income or the
real estate value of the building being served (Table 1.632). Certain special contracts may
make this part of the tariff dependent on the number of employees for certain economic
activities, on the household size or the number of bedrooms or beds for households. The
number of days of use can also be a base for the fixed part of the tariff concerning pre-
treated industrial wastewater.
To compute this part of the WWDT tariff, a specific coefficient is multiplied by the
value of the base variable, but the presence of blocks is not uncommon, with different
coefficients for different ranges of the base variable.
32SC stands for special contracts.
42

























X X X X - -
Local authorities X X X X - -
Firefighters X X X X - -
Commercial X X X X - -
Own consumption X X X - - -
Residential X X - - X -
Educational
establishments
X X X X - -
State and other
public organizations
X X X X - -
Hospitals and other
health services
X X X X - -
Industrial X X X X - X
Temporary
connections
X X X X - -
Non-profit
organizations
X X X X - -
Livestock X X X X - -

















- X (only SC) - X X
Local authorities - - - X X
Firefighters - - - X X
Commercial - X (only SC) - X X
Own consumption - - - X X
Residential X (only SC) - X (only SC) X X
Educational
establishments
- - - X X
State and other
public organizations
- - - X X
Hospitals and other
health services
- - - X X
Industrial - X - X X
Temporary
connections
- - - X X
Non-profit
organizations
- X (only SC) - X X
Livestock - - - X X
Services and Tourism - - - X X
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The solution most widely implemented by the WWDT utilities is to set a fixed charge
per billing period without a reference variable (Figure 1.24). The use a fixed charge in-
creased in the period 1998-2005. However, the use of taxable income or the real estate value
of the property as a reference variable can also be found in many cases. The remaining
possibilities are rarer.
Figure 1.24: Base variables for the fixed part of the wastewater drainage and treatment
tariff (2005)
The variable/volumetric part of the tariff, when implemented, is more often made
dependent on the amount of water consumed (83%-88% of the cases, according to the
customer type). Just like in the WS case, some utilities may include consumption blocks
in the WWDT tariffs, and they may use the previously mentioned methods for computing
the final tariff: charging the volumes within each block or charging the price of the highest
block reached to the entire volume of wastewater produced. Nevertheless, in the great
majority of the cases a constant price per m3 is applied. In 13%-17% of the cases, according
to the customer type, the value of the variable part of the WWDT tariff is computed as
a percentage of the value of the WS tariff. The percentages used vary from 10% to 65%.
There are two other possibilities, which are the use of the amount of wastewater drained
or the pollutant load of the effluent as a reference variable, but these cases are rather rare
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and are usually the subject of special contracts for specific industries.
We can also find in the wastewater tariffs several cases where special contracts are
established for the most varied reasons as Tables 1.7 and 1.8 document33. Some of the
motives are similar to what we have seen for the WS tariffs, like the establishment of special
contracts for the employees of the water utilities, for private social solidarity institutions,
State organizations and others. Other motives are specific to the sewerage activity, the
most common of them being the separation of the WWDT customers which do not benefit
from the WS service (we have seen before that most of the times the WWDT tariff
is indirectly based on the WS tariff). Sometimes there are also special contracts for the
cases where the wastewater is discharged into the public system with some level of previous
treatment.
33Tables 1.7 and 1.8 refer to the year 2002, because this is the year were INSAAR provides more complete
and detailed data. Our additional efforts to fill in missing data were focused on the normal tariffs and not
on special contracts.
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Table 1.7: Frequency and motive for the use of special contracts regarding the fixed part
of the retail WWDT tariff (2002)





Local authorities 1 Customers without WS service
Firefighters 0 -
Commercial 12
Customers without WS service;
food and beverage establishments;
commercial areas with a covered surface
greater than 200 m2
Own consumption 0 -
Residential 15
Customers without WS service;
urbanizations; areas outside
the municipal county’s borders




Customers without WS service;





Customers without WS service;
treated water; pre-treated water;
only domestic effluents
Temporary connections 2
Customers without WS service;
fairs; expositions
Non-profit organizations 3
Customers without WS service;
churches; private
social solidarity institutions (IPSS)
Livestock 0 -
Services 0 -
Tourism 3 Customers without WS service; hotels
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Table 1.8: Frequency and motive for the use of special contracts regarding the variable
part of the retail WWDT tariff





Local authorities 0 -
Firefighters 0 -
Commercial 2 Direct discharge in the wastewater treatment plant
Own consumption 0 -
Residential 8
Officials from the municipality, civil parish
or the autonomous municipal services;
urbanizations; areas outside the municipal
county’s borders














Temporary connections 2 Fairs; expositions; markets; cemeteries






The main conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of the Portuguese water and wastewater
tariffs is that they are far from simple, especially regarding the residential customers. Nev-
ertheless, the tariffs also underperform their roles of promoting efficiency and adequately
reflecting the costs of the service provider, because tariff revenues are still insufficient to
cover the operation and investment costs and to assure the financial sustainability of the
water/wastewater utility. To these costs will be added, starting in 2008, the new water
resources charge, associated with the recovery of scarcity and environmental costs, which
will imply an additional effort to update the tariffs to more sustainable levels. The preva-
lence of increasing blocks and ad-hoc formulations in the calculation of the total amount
to be paid hinders the comprehension of the true value of water without contributing to
the objective of efficiency. The implementation of seasonal surcharges, which could be
deemed as a more reasonable complication, from an economic point of view, is rare and
does not coincide with the regions traditionally associated with the periodical scarcity of
the resource.
One question which is usually mentioned as an obstacle to the implementation of
efficient tariffs in water supply and sewerage is the financial capacity of households to
pay the actual price of the service. For example, the Dublin Statement on Water and
Sustainable Development states in its principle 4 that “it is vital to recognize first the basic
right of all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable
price” (ICWE (1992)). However, the same principle states that “Managing water as
an economic good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of
encouraging conservation and protection of water resources” (ICWE (1992)). Roseta-
Palma, Monteiro, Meireles, Mestre and Sugahara (2006) report that the water outlays of
an average Portuguese family with the WS and WWDT services is less than 1% of the
average household income. This should therefore not be a major obstacle to the reform
of water tariffs in Portugal, although we should always consider the existence of specific
poorer regions or the situation of households with lower incomes. In general, the incentive
for the consumer to understand its water bill is small, given the low weight of the average
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water bill on the average income.
The distance between the actual tariffs and efficient pricing seems evident. In 2005,
the last year covered by our analysis, half the time between the publication of the WFD
and the 2010 deadline to implement efficient pricing had elapsed. We can say that by 2005,
little seemed to have been done to adapt the Portuguese WS and WWDT tariffs to the
new European legal requirements, which have already been transposed to the Portuguese
Law by the new Water Law (AR (2005)) and the new Economic and Financial Regime for
Water Resources (MAOTDR (2008a)). We hope that the future publication of the tariff
regulation (MAOTDR (2008b)) and the current expansion of the powers of the Regulating
Authority to all water/wastewater utilities may contribute to a change in the industry and
a faster adaptation to the new legal framework.
Chapter 2
Evolution of Cost Recovery Levels




Cost recovery for water services is not a consensual recommendation across the world.
While some international organizations from the developed world tend to recommend it
as being essential for the financial sustainability of water utilities (OECD (2006); OECD
(2009)), that is not the case for some worldwide reaching organizations such as the United
Nations, which is more concerned with the impact such a principle would have on the
poor, leading it to recognize the role that subsidization may have on the improvement of
population provision levels in water supply and sewage drainage and treatment (UNDP
(2006), WWAP (2006) and WWAP (2009)). This may be due to the fact that in devel-
oped countries, the water outlays represent a very small portion of the average household
income, as we have seen for the Portuguese case in the end of chapter 2 (p. 47), whereas in
developing countries the implementation of full cost recovery would put greater stress on
households’ budgets. Foster and Yepes (2006), for example report that in Latin America’s
“lower-income countries (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay), reaching cost re-
covery tariffs would represent a significant affordability problem for around half of the
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population” (ibid., p. 34). They compare these results to India and Africa where around
70% of households could be expected to face difficulties in paying full cost recovery tar-
iffs1. Even when affordability is a real issue, the use of water consumption subsidies as
a poverty alleviation measure can be controversial, not only because of their perverse ef-
fects on economic efficiency and the financial health of water utilities (Ruijs (2009)), but
also because their efficacy is also questionable. For example, Komives, Wodon, Foster,
Abdullah and Halpern (2006) find in their study that “most common forms of residential
utility subsidies - quantity-based consumption subsidies such as increasing block tariffs -
are highly regressive. Most poor households are excluded from these subsidies, and the
majority of benefits accrue to the non-poor” (ibid., p. 3). Dahan and Nisan (2007) and
Bithas (2008) provide further evidence on the unintended consequences of IBT pricing
policies regarding the equity objective.
In theory, this is not an open debate for Europe, where, since the publication of the
WFD in 2000, cost recovery in the water supply and sewage industry (including scarcity
and environmental costs) has been a main focus of concern (despite the recent surge in
interest in the notion of disproportionate costs from article 4 as a reason for exempting a
region from compliance with WFD requirements). Although the document’s main focus
is the enhancement of the quality of Europe’s water bodies, the introduction of specific
sections dealing with economic and financial requirements and instruments has sparked a
lot of debate, reports and action all over the European Union.
The WFD (EU (2000)) takes up the principle of cost recovery in water services in its
article 9, requiring the economic analysis of water uses in article 5. WATECO (2003),
Ribeiro, Serra and Cunha (2006) and Ribeiro (2007) provide an excellent overview of the
economic implications of the WFD, its deadlines and the institutional settings in which it
came about. For the purpose of our document it suffices to say that article 9 establishes
2010 as the deadline for the establishment of an adequate contribution of the several water
users (at least households, agricultural and industrial users) for the implementation of cost
1For an example between these two extremes, see Fankhauser and Tepic (2005), a study of the impact
by income group of implementing cost recovery prices in the energy and water industries in Eastern Europe
and the countries which were once Soviet Republics.
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recovery for the water industry. We assess the cost recovery situation in Portugal in 2005,
halfway between the publication of the WFD and the meeting of the established deadline,
considering the evolution since 1998. To our knowledge, this is the only independent
assessment of cost recovery levels for the water industry outside the analysis performed
by the Portuguese official institutions (Alves and Pinto (2004), INAG/MAOTDR (2005),
INAG/MAOTDR (2007), INAG/MAOTDR (2008) and INAG/MAOTDR (2009)).
2.2 Cost recovery in Portuguese Law
In Portugal, the cost recovery principle has gained legal recognition, even though many
times it still lacks practical implementation. This section describes the evolution of Por-
tuguese Law regarding the cost recovery principle in the water industry, of which we
present only a synthesis2. The remaining sections will assess its implementation.
The awareness about the need to raise revenues from the water supply activity to help
finance infrastructure building can be found in Portuguese Law as early as 1892. The
decree of 19 December 1892, regarding the hydraulic services of the Ministry of Public
Works, defines in its article 21 the revenues of the water districts, assigning them to the
public works to be performed in the district, including tariff payments for irrigation water,
sand removal or license fees for the use of water surfaces to name a few (Ribeiro (2007),
p.126).
According to Ribeiro (2007), p. 131, the requirement that the beneficiary should pay
for public works improvement of water supply can also be found in the 1930’s, where
increased State intervention in the development of hydraulic works for agriculture is ac-
companied with the payment of an Irrigation and Improvement Charge (a fixed annual fee
per hectare), which could be paid in money or in land. Regarding urban water supply, the
Administrative Code of 1936 states in article 165 that water tariffs should be set “so as
to cover the operation and management costs and to allow the formation of the necessary
reserves” (ibid, p. 132). It was by this time also that water supply became one of the main
2More details on the history of the cost recovery principle in Portuguese legal documents are presented
by Ribeiro (2007) and APDA (2006). See Unnerstall (2007) for a description of the introduction of the
full cost recovery principle in the European environmental law and in the WFD.
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tasks of the municipalities. Despite this evidence that revenue collection from users was
important, this is far from pointing to full cost recovery. Just as an example, the invest-
ments in water and sewage infrastructure have always been subsidized by the State (and
from 1986 onwards by European funds also). This is also pointed out by the Portuguese
Association of Water Suppliers and Wastewater Drainage by stating that “the legal regime
has always faced the difficulty intrinsic in the distance between the legal stipulations and
their effective implementation. Examples can be found in the several attempts of the
legislator to impose the economic balance of the services (. . . ) also present, since the 40’s,
in the requirement that municipal services should have tariffs which covered the costs of
operation and allowed the formation of the necessary reserves” (APDA (2006), p. 22).
Nevertheless, the principle that, at the very least, the service should not be free has
been deeply entrenched in Portuguese legislation. The Decree-Law n. 70/90, which regu-
lates the previous Framework Law for the Environment (approved in 1987 to update the
Portuguese environmental law to the European Community standards, to which Portugal
had just joined), also states that beneficiaries of water supply and sewage infrastructures
should pay for their services. The several laws published since 1979 regulating the finances
of the municipalities have always included water and sewage tariffs as part of the munici-
palities’ revenues3. Furthermore, they established that the tariffs should cover operation
and investment costs4 (although this has not always been the case in practice as we shall
demonstrate). This legal principle also covers the State-owned companies like EPAL5 and
3The current version of the Law of Local Finances (for municipalities) is Law n. 2/2007 of January 15.
Fees are established as legal revenue in article 16 whereas water and sewage tariffs/prices are established
in article 17. Previous versions were: Law 1/79 of January 02; Decree-Law n. 98/84 of March 29; Law n.
1/87 of January 06; Law n. 42/98 of August 06.
4For example, article 9 of the Decree-Law n. 98/84 of March 29 stated that tariffs “should not be less
than the forecasted operation and management expenditures plus the necessary amount for equipment
amortization”. This principle is still maintained in the current Law n. 2/2007, where article 16 n.1
reads “The prices and remaining payment instruments set by the municipalities regarding the services and
goods supplied by the municipal organic units, either through direct management or through [autonomous]
municipal services, should not be less than the cost directly or indirectly incurred with the activity of
supplying those goods and services” (AR (2007)).
5EPAL is the water supplying company for the country’s capital, Lisbon, and it also supplies bulk water
to some neighbouring municipalities. APDA (2006), pp. 32-33, cites some examples regarding the presence
of the cost recovery principle in the legislation regulating this company from 1974 onwards as it changed
from a 100% State-owned public company to a Public Limited Company with share capital held by the
State’s holding company for the Water and Waste industry, AdP - Águas de Portugal.
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the private concession services (which had been forbidden between 1977 and 1993).
The Economic and Financial Regime for theWater Resources published in 1994 (Decree-
Law 47/94) introduced the polluter pays principle and the user pays principle in the Por-
tuguese Law regarding the use of water resources (Ribeiro (2007), p. 138). It also includes
the definition of charges for water withdrawals according to the water availability in the
basin and wastewater effluent discharges into the environment according to the treatment
cost for each pollutant type. The revenue raised in this way should have accrued to the
budgets of the National Water Institute and the Regional Environmental Public Offices,
but they were never implemented in practice for lack of subsequent regulation.
In 2005, a new Water Law was published transposing the WFD into Portuguese Law
(AR (2005)). Its chapter VII brought with it a new economic and financial regime for
water resources. The economic principles of the WFD are fully reflected in this law, which
recognizes the economic value of water as a scarce resource and the principle of cost re-
covery for water services, including scarcity and environmental costs (ibid, articles 3 and
77). It also creates a water resources charge for the activities of water withdrawal, effluent
discharge, sand removal and occupation of state-owned land or water surfaces. The rev-
enues from the water resources charge must be used to promote water use efficiency, water
resources quality and the improvement of water bodies and ecosystems and to finance
the necessary infrastructures and administrative system. The water resources charge is a
step forward in the internalization of scarcity-related opportunity costs and environmen-
tal costs. The implementation of cost recovery regarding the investment, operation and
maintenance costs is left for the water tariff policy set by the water utility (ibid., article
82). Naturally, water tariffs must reflect the scarcity and environmental costs internalized
by the water resource charge paid by the water utilities to the State6. Because cost re-
covery is surely impossible without the proper knowledge of the costs incurred, article 83
determines that it is the National Water Authority’s task to perform economic analysis of
water resource use at the river basin level.
Unlike the water resources charge set up in 1994, but which never saw the light of day
6Our analysis of cost recovery in this chapter is limited to its financial aspects as we do not consider
scarcity and environmental costs.
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due to the lack of subsequent legislation concerning its implementation, the new charge has
already been in place since July 2008, after the publication of the Decree-Law 97/2008 of
June 11, which establishes the new Economic and Financial Regime for Water Resources.
The cost recovery principle (including scarcity and environmental costs) is assumed from
the outset, within the spirit of the new Water Law and the WFD. Three instruments
are established to meet the goals of sustainable water management through the promo-
tion of water use efficiency, water conservation and water quality standards set up in the
Water Law: the aforementioned water resources charge; water tariffs; contracted funding
programs. The document not only determines the actual calculation procedure for the
water resources charge, but also the division of the revenue generated between the Na-
tional Water Institute, the recently created River Basin Authorities and a water resources
protection fund to be created in a subsequent Decree-Law with the aim of promoting the
rational use and protection of water resources. The articles concerning the water tariffs
(chapter III, articles 20-23) set up the principles of cost recovery, financial sustainability
of the water utility, water use efficiency and transparency in billing, but the details are
referred to a later Decree-Law which will bring a new regime for water tariff setting, on
which ERSAR has been working with the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and
Regional Development (MAOTDR (2008b)). Finally, the contracted funding programs’
aim is to support investment in information and management technologies for water sup-
ply and pollution control, infrastructure building and the maintenance of water courses
and adjacent shores (MAOTDR (2008a), article 25).
2.3 Methodology
The data on which we rely for this chapter was mainly provided by the Portuguese Na-
tional Water Institute — INAG, which makes available on request its database from the
National Inventory of Water Supply and Wastewater Systems (INSAAR). INSAAR peri-
odically collects data on costs, revenues, investments, tariffs, volumes of water supplied
and wastewater drained and management type. We have data for the years 1998, 2000,
2002 and 2005 (information on the type of management is for the last two years only, while
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the investment series has annual information starting in 1987). INSAAR is expected to
be updated annually in the future.
Our work will only focus on mainland Portugal, for which reliable data was available
at the time of our study7. However, there was still a significant amount of missing data,
so we gathered additional information, namely on the volumes supplied and drained and
the number of customers served, by directly requesting this information from the more
than 300 Portuguese water and wastewater utilities.
Our analysis is made separately for WS systems and for WWDT systems, although
the water utility providing them is often the same in each municipality. The analysis also
separates retail and bulk water services, using the amount of water supplied/drained to
allocate some of the costs faced by the water utility, when necessary.
The reference year for this study is 2005. This chapter updates results published for
2002 by Monteiro (2007). The main methodology followed there is maintained. Namely,
the analysis of the evolution of the several indicators considers only those utilities with
enough information for the period being analysed.
The calculation of annual investment costs involves the computation of the correspond-
ing annuities from a deflated time-series of investments8, using a 30 year maturity term
and a 5% discount rate, which is the value recommended by the European Commission
(EC (2008b), p. 14 and 33) for the discount rate to be used in cost-benefit analysis of long-
term investment in infrastructures. This value is close to the 5,3% estimated by Evans
and Sezer (2005) for the social discount rate in Portugal and similar to the 1987-2005 real
profitability rates of long-term Portuguese Treasure bonds. Alves and Pinto (2004) also
used a 5% discount rate for the economic part of the National Water Plan.
For reasons of statistical secrecy, regional analysis is performed at the NUTS III sub-
regional administrative level.
7Mendes et al. (2006), p. 38, reports the later expansion of INSAAR to the Madeira and Azores
archipelagos.
8The investment series from INSAAR does not include investments in the construction of dams.
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2.4 Brief description of water and wastewater utilities
The 2005 INSAAR update altered the number of utilities covered by the inventory from 610
(515 withWS services and 326 withWWDT services) to just 319 utilities (293 withWS and
299 with WWDT). The excluded utilities were of very small size, consisting of civil parishes
(freguesias) or self-organized neighbourhoods, which seldom reported information anyway.
All water utilities responsible for supplying water or draining and treating wastewater in
each of the 278 municipal counties of mainland Portugal were kept, as well as all relevant
bulk water and wastewater players. Nevertheless, this change makes the results from this
study not strictly comparable with those from Monteiro (2007).
2.4.1 Nature of the service
Most Portuguese utilities present in INSAAR 2005 simultaneously provideWS andWWDT
services (Figure 2.1). Only 6% were exclusively dedicated to WS and 8% dealt with
WWDT only. As expected, 91% of these water utilities provide services directly to the
consumer (households, industrial, commercial or agricultural businesses, public entities,
among others), while the rest are focused on bulk water provision or wastewater drainage
and treatment (6% doing it exclusively and 3% operating on both markets).
Figure 2.1: Classification of utilities by the nature of the service provided (2005)
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2.4.2 Type of utility
Water utilities have been classified into 7 different types according to their ownership and
management (Figure 2.2). In 2005, 70% of the Portuguese water utilities were munici-
palities, which have traditionally been providing the service in most cases. This figure is
nevertheless down from 74% in 2002, reflecting the slow, but steady trend for municipali-
ties to create autonomous entities to run the service or to concede it to private operators.
This can be also seen from the increasing proportion of municipal companies (3% in 2002,
5% in 2005) and private companies (4% in 2002, 6% in 2005). The increasing number of
public companies is mainly due to the creation of bulk water companies by the state-owned
holding AdP, together with the municipalities involved.
Figure 2.2: Type of water utility/management (2002-05)
The different types of water utilities can be found in different locations across the coun-
try serving municipal counties with very different population sizes. In a careful analysis,
one must, therefore, also look at their relative importance concerning the number of cus-
tomers and the amount of water supplied/drained. The relative weight of municipalities
for example, greatly diminishes in all kinds of services once such criteria are taken into
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account. They are responsible for WS and WWDT services all over the country, but it’s in
the smaller rural municipal counties that this type of management arrangement is almost
universal. In larger, more urbanized municipal counties, the types of water utilities and
management systems are more varied (Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6).
Autonomous municipal services (which have an autonomous management within the
municipality, although they are not an independent juridical entity), municipality-owned
companies, private and public companies, on the other hand, have a greater importance
in retail service if we look at other indicators besides the number of companies of each
type, like the number of customer or the volumes supplied/drained. Although this reflects
the growing importance of professional management in the industry, it hasn’t yet implied
a trend towards greater privatisation (private companies represented only for 4% of retail
WS utilities and 3% in retail WWDT, serving 9% and 8% of customers, respectively).
In bulk WS and WWDT the situation is quite different. Public companies dominate
the market. They are usually formed with a majority capital share from AdP, the state
holding company, and a minority share from the municipalities they are intended to serve.
In the ensuing cost analysis to be presented, average values are always weighted by the
volume supplied/drained by each water utility.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of retail WS utilities by type (2005)
Figure 2.4: Distribution of bulk WS utilities by type (2005)
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of retail WWDT utilities by type (2005)
Figure 2.6: Distribution of bulk WWDT utilities by type (2005)
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2.4.3 Geographical distribution
We now look at how the different types of retail water and wastewater utilities are located
across Portugal. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show that the great majority of the country is served
by municipalities. It’s in the more populous urban west coastline (or in some medium-
sized inland cities, like district capitals, or in the Algarve, in the south) that we find
alternative management arrangements. The traditional alternative was the autonomy of
the municipal services within the municipality itself (without creating a distinct juridical
entity) with the creation of specific management boards, usually separated from the city
council members. In recent years, some municipalities, especially in the more densely
populated cities have chosen to create municipal companies to run the services or even
to concede it to private operators. This trend is visible in the maps below, even though
they only show a 3 year difference. We also find some cases where the water utility is
a state-controlled public company, but they have no regional pattern. We found no case
of associations of municipalities operating at the retail level. This was expected, because
these entities are created to deal with bulk water/wastewater. Recently, the government
has been trying to create incentives (through the AdP holding and the management of
contracted funding programs) for intermunicipal companies or associations to operate at
the retail level, in order to seize economies of scale, but the impact of this policy will only
be noticed in the future (Serra (2009)). It is important to note that some water systems
are not confined to the municipal borders, so that Figures 2.7 and 2.8 always consider
the predominant operator. Some water utilities supply two municipalities which have
been divided after the system was created. Some systems may supply some population in
adjacent counties. Finally, some inframunicipal operators exist, like tourist resorts, user
associations, small neighbourhood organizations or civil parishes working under contracts
for task decentralization with the municipality.
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Figure 2.7: Geographical distribution of the main retail WS utilities in each municipal
county (2002 and 2005)
Figure 2.8: Geographical distribution of the main retail WWDT utilities in each municipal
county (2002 and 2005)
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2.5 Costs
In this section we look at the water utilities’ cost amount and structure for WS andWWDT
systems. Cost information comes from INSAAR 2005, as does the base information for
the weights used (number of meters/customers and volumes supplied/drained). As noted
earlier, additional information was gathered for the weight variables, in order to reduce
the amount of missing data, through direct contacts with all retail water and wastewater
utilities. We separate long-term investment costs from operation costs and also consider
separately the costs of bulk water purchase/wastewater drainage, financial outlays and
general administrative costs. The data is treated separately for WS and WWDT and for
retail and bulk water activities9. Data is for the years 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2005 for all
variables, excluding investments, which come from an annual time-series for the period
1987-2005. Where missing data might represent a problem, results are given considering
only those utilities with enough information for the indicators at hand and for the relevant
period being analysed and reporting the proportion of the volume supplied/drained they
represent10. All monetary values use constant 2005 prices11.
2.5.1 Total costs
The costs of WS and WWDT systems in Portugal in 2005 amounted to 1566 million Euros.
Figure 2.9 and Table 2.1 report the distribution of the different types of costs by the four
types of systems (WS and WWDT, bulk and retail).
9Volumes supplied/drained are used as weights to allocate costs between bulk and retail activities when
they are both present for the same utility.
10This procedure avoids, for example, the distortion that would be introduced by the fact that small
utilities have lower data reporting levels for the first years under study. The missing data is much less of
a problem in the data for customers and volumes than for costs and revenues.
11We used the deflator for Portuguese GDP at market prices, unit Euro/ECU, supplied by AMECO —
Annual Macroeconomic Database of Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN)
of the European Commission).
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Figure 2.9: Total costs declared for WS and WWDT systems (2005)
The retail level was responsible for the large majority of the costs declared to INAG
(72%) especially in WS (Table 2.1). WS represented 65% of the costs, while WWDT
accounted for the remaining 35%. Two reasons may explain this difference: the delay
in wastewater system expansion and the fact that not all water supplied is returned as
wastewater to the sewage system (although in Portugal the lack of separate sewage systems
for urban wastewater and rain water runoff means that it is possible that more water arrives
at the wastewater treatment plant than the amount of water supplied).
Investment costs have a significant weight on the cost structure (24%), but the value
is not as high as it could be expected (probably due to the fact that dam construction
is excluded from the investment data) in an industry which is a flagship for the concept
of natural monopoly, due to its capital-intensive nature. Nevertheless, if we add financial
outlays like interest rate payments and general administrative costs (which can be consid-
ered for the most part as fixed costs), we reach the figure 57% of total costs. Operation
costs account for the remaining costs, and it is noticeable that bulk water purchases rep-
resent 21% of all costs for retail WS, while wastewater drainage by bulk utilities represent
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only 8% of the costs of retail operators, reflecting the delay in the implementation of a
bulk wastewater system in Portugal. In fact, bulk WS systems represented already 20%
of the industry’s costs (31% considering only WS), while bulk WWDT accounted for only
8% (23% considering only WWDT). This delay is also a feature of retail WWDT systems.
Table 2.1: WS and WWDT systems’ costs (2005)
€103 Retail WS Bulk WS Retail WW Bulk WW Total
Operation costs (total excluding bulk water
purchase / wastewater drainage)
232 645 75 202 142 840 38 971 489 658
Bulk water purchase /
wastewater drainage costs
147 766 11 085 335 545 40 192 445
General administrative costs 166 820 109 738 102 021 49 478 428 057
Financial expenditures 14 946 35 565 9 204 16 256 75 971
Investment costs 138 277 85 192 134 442 22 244 380 155
Total 700 455 316 782 422 061 126 989 1 566 287
% of total by system type Retail WS Bulk WS Retail WW Bulk WW Total
Operation costs (total excluding bulk water
purchase / wastewater drainage)
33.2% 23.7% 33.8% 30.7% 31.3%
Bulk water purchase /
wastewater drainage costs
21.1% 3.5% 8.0% 0.0% 12.3%
General administrative costs 23.8% 34.6% 24.2% 39.0% 27.3%
Financial expenditures 2.1% 11.2% 2.2% 12.8% 4.9%
Investment costs 19.7% 26.9% 31.9% 17.5% 24.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of total by cost type Retail WS Bulk WS Retail WW Bulk WW Total
Operation costs (total excluding bulk water
purchase / wastewater drainage)
47.5% 15.4% 29.2% 8.0% 100.0%
Bulk water purchase /
wastewater drainage costs
76.8% 5.8% 17.4% 0.0% 100.0%
General administrative costs 39.0% 25.6% 23.8% 11.6% 100.0%
Financial expenditures 19.7% 46.8% 12.1% 21.4% 100.0%
Investment costs 36.4% 22.4% 35.4% 5.9% 100.0%
Total 44.7% 20.2% 26.9% 8.1% 100.0%
2.5.2 Operation costs
The INSAAR 2005 data made available by INAG enables us to look into the structure of
operation costs, although the proportion of those whose disaggregation was not reported
by the water utilities is quite significant (Figure 2.10). Bulk water purchases represent a
large proportion of operation costs for retail WS systems (39%). In retail WWDT, on the
other hand, bulk operations still stand for only 19% of operation costs. The bulk systems’
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cost structure is somewhat different as this kind of expenditures are much less significant,
with all other categories like outsourcing services, personnel or electricity having their
weight on costs proportionally increased. It is interesting to notice that, even for bulk WS
systems, the costs of buying water from other water utilities account for a non-negligible
13% of costs, which may be reflecting the impacts of local/regional water scarcity.
Figure 2.10: Distribution of operation costs reported in WS and WWDT (2005)
2.5.3 Investment costs
The investment time-series and their annual investment costs counterparts (obtained by
calculating the corresponding annuities using a 30-year maturity term and a 5% discount
rate) show a clear upward trend (Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12). It is hard to point out the
exact cause of the temporarily sharp decline in more recent years. It may be due to lack of
reporting by the utilities for the years between surveys, but the fact that WS investment
is already seen declining for 2002 (a survey year) may suggest that there may be a real
cause (beyond the statistical one) for the decline in investment. It may be due to the
transition between European structural funds support framework programmes. The 3rd
period of European fund support for Portugal terminated in 1999 and the subsequent one
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was meant for the period 2000-2006, so the decline in investment in the first years of a
support framework programme may be something to be expected given the bureaucracy
and delays usually associated with the setting up of the program and all the process of
opening and deciding applications. In spite of all caution to be taken with these values,
the upward trend matches the knowledge of increased public investment in the Portuguese
water industry in recent years12 spurred by large investment programs like PEAASAR
2000-200613.
Figure 2.11: Evolution of investment costs in WS (1987-2005)
12The upward trend of the investment costs series is mathematically necessary given the 30-year maturity
term considered and the less than 30-year length of the series.
13PEAASAR - Plano Estratégico de Abastecimento de Água e Saneamento de Águas Residuais [Strategic
Plan for Water Supply and Wastewater Sewage] is a government backed plan to support infrastructure
building by the industry, within the overall Community Support Framework seizing European structural
funds for the period. A new plan (PEAASAR II) has already been designed and is being implemented for
the period 2007-2013 (MAOTDR (2007a)).
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Figure 2.12: Evolution of investment costs in WWDT (1987-2005)
The distribution of investment between WS and WWDT systems has changed signif-
icantly since 1987. In 1987, WS systems received 63% of the investment in the industry,
while in 2005 the situation was more balanced with WWDT already comprising 51%. The
proportion of the corresponding investment costs in WWDT increased from 38% to 42%
during the period.
2.5.4 Costs per utility and unit costs
We now turn our attention to the cost per utility and the unit costs14 in WS and WWDT
systems. We will look into the costs per customer and per cubic meter of water sup-
plied/wastewater drained.
We can see from Figure 2.13 that, as expected, bulk operators face rather larger costs
than retail utilities, with €7.5 million on average for WS and €5 million for WWDT.
Wastewater systems face an average total annual cost which is about 2/3 of the corre-
sponding water supply system.
14The concept of unit cost used here is equivalent to the economic concept of average cost. We calculate
average (unit) costs per customer and per m3. We do not calculate marginal costs.
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Figure 2.13: Average cost per utility in WS and WWDT systems (2005)
Figure 2.14 shows that the cost of providing the retail WS and WWDT service to a
customer is on average €261.6/year (€153.7/year for WS and €107.9/year in WWDT).
The difference is probably due to the fact that the population coverage is still insufficient in
WW drainage and even lower in WW treatment. According to INAG/MAOTDR (2009),
p. 55, 79 and 84, while 92% of the population was served by WS in 2006, only 80% had a
wastewater drainage system and only 70% were served by wastewater treatment plants.
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Figure 2.14: Annual unit cost per customer in retail WS and WWDT systems (2005)
In 2005, in Portugal, supplying 1 m3 of drinking water had an average cost of €1.22
(Figure 2.15), while the drainage and treatment of 1 m3 of wastewater cost €0.91. For
WS, the cost for bulk water is significantly lower (€0.79/ m3), which is something to be ex-
pected, given the economies of scale that a larger water utility can take advantage of while
supplying water to a number of retail operators. Bulk water providers are also expected to
maintain a smaller network length, not having to reach every single final customer. Retail
operators, on the other hand, buy bulk water and have additional distribution costs on
top of that. The situation is more balanced for WWDT where draining and treating 1
m3 of bulk wastewater costs nearly the same (€0.92/ m3) as for retail wastewater. This
may be a statistical effect of averaging those retail operators that still have insufficient
coverage and treatment levels with the ones which are more advanced in completing the
system. As required treatment levels are upgraded for all WWDT utilities we can expect
the unit cost of retail WWDT to increase.
The 2006 Annual Report on Water and Waste Industry in Portugal (RASARP) cites
“international research, according to which the average service providing cost for 1 m3 of
water is around €1, the cost of sewage for 1 m3 of wastewater being significantly higher”
(IRAR (2007), vol.1, p. 32). Our results are similar, only differing in the fact that it is
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the WS cost which is found to be higher. The higher unit cost for WS may be due to the
small size of WS systems in Portugal, something that the government has been trying to
change in recent years.
Figure 2.15: Average unit cost per m3 in WS and WWDT systems (2005)
We can look now at the geographical distribution of unit costs at NUTS III level. The
regional distribution of costs per utility follows closely the distribution of the population
as expected. The water/wastewater utilities facing the greatest costs are located mainly
in the west and south coasts, especially around the two metropolitan areas of Lisbon and
Oporto (Figure 2.16).
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Figure 2.16: Average cost per utility in retail WS and WWDT by NUTS III (2005)
Analysing unit costs per customer can be more complex, because lower unit costs
can be due to greater efficiency in the service or to the existence of scale economies, but
can also be a product of a lower investment in the quality of the service provided, for
example in the treatment of drinking water or wastewater before being released into the
environment15. Figure 2.17 shows no evident regional pattern.
15ERSAR’s (ex-IRAR) annual reports (IRAR (2007)) provide detailed information on water quality (for
all WS utilities) and water service quality (for concessions). Our suspicion seems to be confirmed by
the statement that “Utilities’ performance, regarding sampling frequency failures and mandatory quality
parameters failures, still reflects the Portuguese regional development inequalities. Indeed, it’s in the
inland regions, with greater lack of human, technical and financial resources, that failures to comply are
concentrated, something that hapens mainly in supply zones with less than 5000 inhabitants” (ibid., vol. 4,
p. viii). APDA (2006) also reports data on sampling frequency failures and mandatory quality parameters
failures.
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Figure 2.17: Average unit cost per customer in retail WS and WWDT by NUTS III (2005)
The same can be said about Figure 2.18, regarding the possible confusion between
efficiency and low service quality as reasons for lower costs. Nevertheless, a patter can
be found, because unit cost per m3 seems to be higher in the northeast inland part of
the country, probably due to the more rugged terrain that can be found in that region or
the more diffuse nature of population settlings. Those are hardly the reasons to explain
the fact that unit costs are also high in south Alentejo, a plain land with low population
density, but with population being concentrated in few villages and cities.
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Figure 2.18: Average unit cost per m3 in retail WS and WWDT by NUTS III (2005)
Figure 2.19 shows the regional distribution of the population density (map to the left)
and the difference between the maximum and the minimum altitude (map to the right)
in each region. It shows that the greater population density in the west coast of Portugal
and the plainer landscape in the west and in the south could be reasons for lower unit
costs in these regions.
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Figure 2.19: Population density and altitude variation by NUTS III (2005)
Figure 2.20, on the other hand, presents data from ERSAR (ex-IRAR) on water quality
indicators and shows that they are lower in the northern inland part of the country (and
in the south of Alentejo), which could result from lower investments in water quality in
these regions. These two conflicting trends may explain the mixed results in Figure 2.17
and Figure 2.18.
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Figure 2.20: Water quality indicators: sampling frequency failures and mandatory quality
parameters failures by municipality (2005)
We now take a look at the distribution of unit cost by type of utility/management (Ta-
ble 2.2). Municipalities are the type of water utilities with fewer costs on average because
they are responsible for providing the services of WS and WWDT all over the country, not
just in the big cities. They are the predominant type of utility in less densely populated
and less urbanized regions. The other types of utilities, which are more commonly found
in urban areas are several times larger and therefore face higher total costs.
Municipalities and municipal companies have the lowest unit costs per customer (to-
gether with the autonomous municipal services in WWDT), which is something that we
would not be expecting if we considered only the possible economies of scale16. However,
autonomous municipal services show high unit costs. This prevents us from making any fi-
16We do not rigorously assess in this chapter if there are economies of scale or not, nor do we try to
estimate an optimal size for the water/wastewater utilities. That kind of analysis for Portugal was done
by Martins, Coelho and Fortunato (2008), who conclude “the industry seems to exhibit economies of scale.
There are, therefore, pro-aggregation arguments, especially for small and medium sized local water supply
systems” (ibid., p. 23). Chapter 6 presents our own estimation and some conflicting results.
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nal judgement on the issue of whether a transition towards more professional management
and more privatisation of services leads to higher costs or not (and to a correspondingly
higher service quality).
Table 2.2: Unit cost by type of utility in retail WS and WWDT (2005)
Average cost per
utility (2005) (€)






Retail WS Retail WWDT Retail WS Retail WWDT Retail WS Retail WWDT
Municipality 960 250 853 225 115. 0 105. 2 1. 03 0. 92
Autonomous
Municipal. Services
9 262 797 6 015 463 180. 9 105. 6 1. 46 0. 98
Municipal or
Intermunicipal Company
4 999 084 3 768 359 141. 8 106. 9 0. 86 0. 74
Public Company 9 156 634 3 310 183 158. 5 137. 4 1. 10 0. 66
Private Company 7 526 761 4 628 116 237. 5 121. 6 1. 68 0. 89
Total 2 575 230 1 611 120 153.7 107.9 1.22 0.91
2.5.5 Rates of change in costs
The INSAAR data on costs and revenues is somewhat affected by a non-negligible amount
of missing data which requires the calculation of rates of change to be made and interpreted
with some caution. For the case of cost totals one must take into account the fact that
some years may be lacking more information than others, so that simple rates of change
would reflect the entrance and departure of utilities from the database at least as much
as the actual change in costs. To prevent this effect we calculate the rates of changes
between any two years considering only those utilities which reported data for the two
years at hand for the cost category being analysed. The results are qualitatively similar
to those obtained if we considered only the utilities which had information for all 4 years,
but the amount of utilities/information discarded is much less.
Table 2.3 17 presents the results. The overall main result that stands out is the signif-
17The following cost categories have a significant amount of missing data: Bulk water purchase / waste-
water drainage costs; General administrative costs; Financial expenditures. For tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5
we only considered the information explicitly reported by the water/wastewater utilities (we only con-
sidered those which had information on costs for the two years under consideration, the % of volume
supplied/drained in the latter year by the utilities being considered is shown in parenthesis). To keep
missing data from preventing the calculation of cost recovery ratios, the rest of the document will follow
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icant real cost increases in all types of systems throughout the period (in 2005 constant
prices), reflecting the expansion of the systems that occurred. This can also be seen by
the increase in investment costs18 and financial expenditures (subsidies only support part
of the investment). In general, the expansion of the bulk water/wastewater systems is
already being reflected in the increase in cost with water purchases/wastewater drainage
for retail operators. With few exceptions, the several cost categories show very significant
real growth.
the assumption that missing data is due to a lack of reporting of null values for these three cost categories
and will interpret them as such. We do not follow this procedure here because this would overestimate
growth rates for these specific categories of costs. The same procedures are followed in the section for
revenues.
18 It is possible that the investment costs’ growth rates are somewhat overestimated due to the fact
that the length of the time series is inferior to the maturity term considered in the calculation of the
corresponding annuities.
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Table 2.3: Average annual rate of change in costs in WS and WWDT (1998-2005)











































































































































































Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show a significant real increase in unit costs throughout the period
(with occasional exceptions for WWDT in specific years). This happened in spite of some
economies in unit operational costs, especially in more recent years. Investment costs have
increased in the beginning of the period, but show a slight decrease in 2002-05 due to the
decline in investment in those years (which picked up in 2005). General administrative
costs seem to have suffered a widespread increase for all operators. It is also noticeable
that the costs with bulk water purchases/wastewater drainage show a steady growth. The
representativeness of the results may vary according to the missing data in the database.
Overall, the utilities used in the calculation represent a very satisfactory proportion of the
market in terms of volumes supplied/drained, but because this may not happen in some
specific cost categories in specific years, we show the representativeness of the results (% of
volume supplied/drained in the latter year by the utilities being considered) in parenthesis
in the tables.
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Table 2.4: Average annual rate of change in per customer unit costs in WS and WWDT
(1998-2005)





























































































Table 2.5: Average annual rate of change in per m3 unit costs in WS and WWDT (1998-
2005)











































































































































































Even though the unit costs are seen to be raising above the inflation rate (probably
due to more stringent quality requirements and new investments) the growth rates for unit
costs are more moderate than the ones for total costs as can be seen if we compare Table
2.3 with Table 2.4 and 2.5. This reflects some possible economies of scale being seized as
the systems expand their coverage and provide higher volumes.
2.6 Revenues
In this section we analyse the revenues of Portuguese water and wastewater industry, from
the data reported to INSAAR for the period 1998-2005. We will use the same division of
the systems into bulk and retail and WS and WWDT. Revenues will be divided into non-
tariff and tariff revenues from services provided to the final customers or from transactions
between water/wastewater utilities. Investment subsidies will also be taken into account19.
Non-tariff revenues (excluding investment subsidies) are exclusive features of retail water
operators in the INSAAR database. Unlike the situation for the cost analysis, here all
revenues have a clear association with one of the 4 types of systems considered, so that
no weighting criterion was needed to distribute them between retail and bulk systems in
the cases where the same utility has activity in both.
2.6.1 Total revenues
The revenues in the WS and WWDT industry in 2005 amounted to €1035 million (Figure
2.21), a figure well below the one reported for the total costs (Figure 2.9) as we will
see in the section for cost recovery ratios. For now, we will look more carefully into the
revenue structure of the industry, which according to INSAAR is mainly comprised of tariff
revenues. The weight of non-tariff revenues and investment subsidies in the revenue totals
is rather small, although we do suspect that investment subsidies are very understated in
19Although the INSAAR database does include investment subsidies and we do consider them as revenues
in our analysis, the amounts reported to INSAAR by the water utilities are virtually negligible and do
seem to be very far away from the actual level. Investment subsidies are treated here as revenues in the
same fashion as investment costs, i.e., they are calculated annuities from the actual investment subsidies
time-series using a 30-year maturity term and a 5% discount rate.
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the database due to lack of reporting20.
Figure 2.21: Revenues in WS and WWDT systems (2005)
The great majority of the revenues are raised in the WS systems, which account for
74% of all revenues. Retail WS receives 60% of revenues and bulk WS the remaining 14%.
On the other hand, WWDT systems receive only 26% of all revenues, 22% in the retail
activities and 4% in bulk wastewater. WWDT systems receive 27% of the retail revenues
and 23% of the bulk water/wastewater revenues. These are lower proportions for WWDT
than we found for the costs, especially in retail activities, which is a first evidence of the
existence of cross-subsidization between both activities.
Focusing on the division between retail and bulk water/wastewater activities, we see
that the latter account for less than 1/5 of the revenues (18%). The proportion is smaller
20For example, the total amount of subsidies reported to INSAAR (at current prices) for the period 2000-
2005 is around €250 million, while Roseta-Palma et al. (2006) report that € 506.7 million were planned in
the Cohesion Fund alone to be applied in the industry’s investments between 2000 and 2006 (ibid., p. 17,
table 3). To this value we must add the €621.8 million from the European Regional Development Fund
to get a total of €1128.5 million of planned European funds to be applied as investment subsidies in the
industry in this period (Portuguese governmental funds would had to these values). We must note that,
for the Cohesion Fund, by 2004, although €405.4 million of funding had already been approved, only €86
million had been executed. Nevertheless, if we take into account the fact that the amount of investments
reported to INSAAR for the period 2000-2005 reaches €3113 million (current prices) and that the share
of European funding on supported investments reached 67% on average (IRAR (2007), vol. 1, p. 88, table
14), we must take some caution with the data on subsidies reported to INSAAR.
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for WWDT, whose bulk activities represent 16% of the total WWDT revenues while the
figure for bulk WS is 19%.
2.6.2 Tariff revenues
The fixed component of the tariff has a very significant weight on the tariff revenues,
especially for WWDT (Figure 2.22), due to the importance of investment costs for the
industry (Table 2.1 showed that investment costs amount to between 18% and 32% of all
costs, according to which system we are looking at).
This is in accordance with the position of the Portuguese regulator for the industry
(ERSAR, ex-IRAR) which states that “water and waste services imply large investment
and maintenance costs, usually long-term highly sunk assets, therefore their tariffs should
be composed of an availability part and another one for the use. The latter depends on
actual consumption (volume of water supplied or wastewater and waste collected), covering
the variable costs associated with the service use level, while the former intends to support
mainly the fixed costs originated by the continuous availability of the service which do not
depend on the level of utilization” (IRAR (2008a)). There was some controversy prior to
the publication of Law 12/2008 of February 26 (legislation regarding the protection of the
customers of essential public services), due to the fact that it prohibits charging a rent for
the water meter (it was a usual practice in Portugal to name the fixed component of the
tariff as a water meter rent, which was a property of the water company). Some thought
this would mean forbidding the existence of a fixed component in the tariff (permitted by
the article 22 of the Decree-Law n. 207/94 of August 06)21, but the law that was published
does allow for the fixed component to exist because, although it prohibits charging for
minimum consumption levels it does say in article 8 n. 3 that “for the purpose of the
present article, fees and tariffs due to construction and maintenance of public water,
sewage and solid waste systems are not considered minimum consumptions” (AR (2008)).
In Portugal, most water utilities use both a fixed and a variable component in the
tariffs for water for the several types of customers. We have seen in chapter 1 that, for
21Decree-Law n. 207/94 of August 06 contains the legal regime for creating and exploring public and
private systems of water distribution and wastewater drainage. Article 22 regulates billing procedures.
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example, 97.5% of the water utilities included both components in the tariffs for resi-
dential customers in 2005 (for wastewater it is more common to use only one of the two
components).
Figure 2.22: Distribution of retail WS and WWDT tariff revenues (2005)
2.6.3 Non-tariff revenues
Figure 2.23 shows the several types of non-tariff revenues collected in the WS activity.
More than 1/3 consists of payments for the execution of connection extensions. If we
add the fees for the connection of private networks to the public connection extensions we
already account for more than half of the non-tariff revenues (except for the year 2005, but
that is due to a lower level of disaggregation in the data reported). Other revenues in this
category are the charges for the establishment of contracts, the final payments to terminate
them, payments to install or remove meters, for repairs, inspections or registration of
contracted technicians.
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Figure 2.23: Disaggregation of non-tariff revenues in WS (1998-2005)
Figure 2.24 shows the disaggregation of WWDT non-tariff revenues. Little more than
half of them have been disaggregated in INSAAR. The revenues we find are again payments
for the execution of public connection extensions or to connect private networks to them,
payments for the establishment or the termination of contracts and inspections. We also
find revenues originated from the activities of clearance of sewer networks, or cleaning
private septic tanks and other collectors.
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Figure 2.24: Disaggregation of non-tariff revenues in WWDT (1998-2005)
2.6.4 Revenues per utility and unit revenues
The average amount of revenues from bulk WS activities accruing to a water utility was
€3.9 million, while the figure for WWDT was €3.2 million (Figure 2.25). The average
amount of revenues per utility was, as expected, much lower for retail activities, €2.3
million for WS and €0.9 million for WWDT. We confirm the finding that, not only are
bulk operators larger than retail ones, but also that WS systems collect significantly more
revenue than the systems for WWDT, especially at the retail level where on average a
WWDT utility collects more than 60% less revenue than the corresponding retail WS
utility. The revenues declared to INSAAR are mainly composed of tariff revenues in any
of the four types of systems considered.
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Figure 2.25: Average revenue per utility in WS and WWDT systems (2005)
These facts can also be seen from the unit revenues collected per customer in re-
tail WS and WWDT systems. While for WS the annual revenue per customer collected
is €139.6/customer/year, the number for WWDT is only €60.9/customer/year (Figure
2.26). These values are insufficient to cover the costs reported in Figure 2.17 as we will
conclude in the section regarding cost recovery levels.
Figure 2.26: Annual unit revenues per customer in retail WS and WWDT systems (2005)
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The amount of revenue collected from each m3 of retail water supplied was on aver-
age €1.09, while the revenue collected for each m3 of retail wastewater drained was only
€0.50 (Figure 2.27). The numbers for bulk activities were €0.39/m3 in WS and €0.43/m3
in WWDT. The lower values for bulk activities are to be expected because a minimum
requirement for revenue collected at the retail level is that it covers the amounts paid to
bulk operators for supplying water/draining wastewater to/from retail operators. To this
requirement we have to add the need to cover the retail activities’ own water distribu-
tion/wastewater collection costs.
Figure 2.27: Average unit revenue per m3 in WS and WWDT systems (2005)
The regional distribution of utilities’ turnover in WS and WWDT follows closely the
population distribution, as expected, due to the association between retail operators and
the country’s municipal administrative divisions (Figure 2.28). The larger utilities are
therefore located in west and south seacoasts, with the largest ones concentrating in the
two metropolitan areas around Lisbon and Oporto.
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Figure 2.28: Average revenue per utility in retail WS and WWDT by NUTS III (2005)
Unlike the results for the geographical distribution of costs per customer (Figure 2.17),
we do find a clear pattern in the regional distribution of revenues per customer (Figure
2.29). The highest values are found in the more densely populated regions in the west
seacoast, especially around the largest cities. In fact, there does not seem to be a clear
correspondence between higher costs (due to differences in altitude or in the investments
in water and service quality) and higher revenues. Revenues per customer seem to be
more related with population density (see Figure 2.19) and income levels (Figure 2.30)22,
which are higher in the more densely populated west coast regions, than with unit costs.
This conclusion is suitable for both WS and WWDT systems, but one should notice the
difference in scale in Figure 2.29, because WWDT revenues are much lower than in WS.
22Purchasing power index shown in Figure 2.30 were obtained from the National Statistics Institute
(INE), while the household disposable income per capita is obtained from the data provided by the Min-
istery of Finance and Public Administration on household taxable income and taxes collected.
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Figure 2.29: Average unit revenue per customer in retail WS and WWDT by NUTS III
(2005)
Figure 2.30: Purchasing power index and household disposable income per capita (2005)
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The same can be said about the unit costs per m3, which are much lower in WWDT
than in WS. The use of the WS scale in Figure 2.31 for WWDT would turn most of
the country to red in the right hand map, clearly showing the difference in the collection
of revenue between both systems, but preventing the regional analysis in WWDT unit
revenues. For this reason, we chose to have different scales for each type of retail system.
From Figure 2.31 we can see that, in general, there is a division between the west coastal
regions where revenue collection per m3 is higher and the inland regions where it is usually
insufficient.
Figure 2.31: Average unit revenue per m3 in retail WS and WWDT by NUTS III (2005)
Similar to the case for costs, we do not find a clear association between the revenue
collection amounts and the type of water utility. Table 2.6 shows the unit revenues in retail
WS and WWDT systems disaggregated by type of utility. Municipalities are confirmed
to have on average a size which is several times smaller than all the other types, both
in WS and in WWDT, reflecting their predominance throughout the country, while the
alternative management arrangements are more commonly found in the urban centres.
The types of utilities with higher average revenues are the public companies (this is a
result of the influence of Lisbon, where EPAL23 manages the WS systems, in a type which
23EPAL — Empresa Pública de Águas Livres is a Public Limited Company, whose share capital is held
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exists in few municipal counties) and the autonomous municipal services (because they
are mainly found in large cities).
Results are not so clear regarding the unit revenues per customer and per m3. Private
and public companies and autonomous municipal services are the types of utilities with
higher unit revenues in WS, while municipal companies and municipalities show lower
levels of revenue collection. On the contrary, for WWDT, municipalities have some of
the highest figures. Public companies show high unit revenues per customer but low unit
revenues per m3 in WWDT, while autonomous municipal services on the other hand show
low unit revenues per customer, but not so per m3. Overall, we do not find an ordering
we can clearly associate to a transition from public to private, or from the public service
type of management to a more business-like type of management.









Retail WS Retail WWDT Retail WS Retail WWDT Retail WS Retail WWDT
Municipality 762 564 506 590 91.3 63.2 0.78 0.54
Autonomous
Municipal Services
8 704 821 3 168 946 170.0 55.3 1.38 0.51
Municipal or
Intermunicipal Company
4 816 430 1 997 263 136.6 56.2 0.79 0.39
Public Company 11 249 743 2 187 172 194.7 90.8 1.34 0.43
Private Company 5 545 739 2 263 946 175.0 59.5 1.21 0.42
Total 2 338 926 900 929 139.6 60.4 1.09 0.50
2.6.5 Rates of change in revenues
The revenues have experienced significant real growth rates in all four types of systems
(Table 2.7 24). The evolution of total revenues is naturally determined by the evolution of
entirely by AdP- Águas de Portugal, the public holding company for the industry.
24The following cost categories have a significant amount of missing data: non-tariff revenues and invest-
ment subsidies. For tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 we only considered the information explicitly reported by the
water/wastewater utilities (we only considered those which had information on revenues for the two years
under consideration, the % of volume supplied/drained in the latter year by the utilities being considered
is shown in parenthesis). To keep missing data from preventing the calculation of cost recovery ratios,
the rest of the document will follow the assumption that missing data is due to a lack of reporting of null
values for these two revenue categories and interpreted them as such.
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tariff revenues, because of their weight on total revenue. With the exception of bulk water,
the computed average annual growth rates for revenues fall short of their counterparts for
costs. This anticipates an eventual decline in the cost recovery levels, which we will look
into in the following section.
Table 2.7: Average annual rate of change in revenues in WS and WWDT (1998-2005)

























































































Non-tariff Revenues - - -










Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show that unit revenues for WS systems have even declined in
real terms (after inflation is taken into account) during the period 1998-2005, due to a
decrease in the real value of the tariff revenues, which reveals that tariff updates have
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been insufficient on average to prevent the erosion effect of inflation on tariffs. The gap
between revenues and costs for WS systems is thus expected to have increased during the
seven-year period being analysed.
WWDT revenues, on the other hand have been increasing at a rate greater than the
inflation rate. This effect benefits in part from the fact that some utilities which did not
use to charge for the WWDT service have begun to do so. If we compare with the growth
rates for unit costs from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 we see that even these increases in unit revenues
have been insufficient to keep up with the large increase in unit costs for the case of retail
WWDT. For bulk WWDT, the situation is inverted, and the very significant growth in
revenues does enable the gap between revenues and costs to be partially diminished.
Table 2.8: Average annual rate of change in per customer unit revenues in WS andWWDT
(1998-2005)





























































Table 2.9: Average annual rate of change in per m3 unit revenues in WS and WWDT
(1998-2005)

























































































Non-tariff Revenues - - -











2.7 Cost recovery levels
In this section we take the information on revenues and costs, described in detail in the
previous sections, and compute the cost recovery ratios for the retail and bulk WS and
WWDT systems in mainland Portugal. We only show the results for the years 2002 and
2005, where we consider that the available information is enough to perform the analysis.
For the previous two years, the information available is much poorer, representing less
than 50% of the volume supplied/drained by the utilities in most types of systems. For
the latter years of 2002 and 2005, the amount of data reported improves significantly and
the utilities on whose data the results can be calculated represent always more that 72%
of all volume supplied/drained.
Table 2.10 25 shows the results for the several types of systems considered. There are
three main conclusions to be taken. The first is that cost recovery falls short of 100% in
all types and all periods. The revenue collected, mainly through the tariffs is insufficient
to cover the costs of the activity. Financial sustainability of the WS and WWDT systems
implies the reduction of unit costs, or alternatively the increase in unit revenues. In
Portugal there could be efficiency gains that can be seized for example from increasing
the scale of the systems by merging neighbouring utilities (see Martins et al. (2008), on
the existence of economies of scale for the Portuguese water industry and chapter 6 for
conflicting evidence). However if the possible cost reductions are insufficient and if we
exclude the possibility of subsidization, due to the legal requirements described in the
Section 2 (the user pays-principle in short), we have to conclude then that tariff levels
must surely rise to meet the WFD and Water Law requirements of cost recovery in the
industry.
The second conclusion is that the situation is less severe in retail WS. This may,
however, be an evidence of cross subsidization between the activities of WS and WWDT
25The calculated cost recovery ratios in Table 2.10 only consider those utilities for which there is in-
formation on all the cost and revenue categories for the two years under consideration (the % of volume
supplied/drained in the latter year by the utilities being considered is shown in parenthesis). For non-tariff
revenues, investment subsidies, bulk water purchase/wastewater drainage costs, general administrative
costs and financial expenditures we followed the assumption that missing data is due to a lack of reporting
of null values and interpreted them as such.
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Table 2.10: Cost recovery levels for mainland Portugal by type of system (2002-2005)



















which are usually managed by the same utility at the retail level.
The third result is that, for the 3-year period (2002-2005) for which an analysis is
possible, while the situation for WWDT has improved, the contrary has happened for
WS. On the one hand, this may reveal a decrease in the cross-subsidization levels, but
on the other hand we do not see any evidence that water/wastewater utilities came any
closer to full cost recovery as we approach the 2010 deadline set by the WFD (see also
Table 2.12).
This results are particularly surprising regarding the bulk water operators. Given
that their activity has always been under the supervision of IRAR (now called ERSAR),
we would expect them to perform better concerning their financial sustainability levels.
Recent conference presentations by one of ERSAR’s directors provide the answer to this
puzzle (Pires (2007a) and Pires (2007b)). Pires (2007a) states that "IRAR’s assessment
is that the financial sustainability of wholesale water service operators is “challenging”
in one third of the cases and another third is “unsustainable” unless significant change
is implemented". It also provides an explanation by reporting that although "structural
factors such as scale and demographic concentration play a key role, they do not tell the
whole story (...) lack of investment on the retail side means that wholesale operators are
not being able to sell the volumes for which they sized their infra-structure and, not only
are they selling less, but their customer receivables are also building up (. . . )" and that
"the financial bottleneck lies at the retail (municipal) level" where "end-users not being
charged the full service costs".
Table 2.11 adds more information about the level of cost recovery in the Portuguese
water and wastewater industry, namely regarding the % of utilities which have levels of
cost recovery greater than or equal to one.
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Table 2.11: Percentage of water/wastewater utilities and corresponding volumes sup-
plied/drained with cost recovery ratios above and below unity in WS and WWDT (2002-
2005)
Retail WS Bulk WS Retail WW Bulk WW
2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005
% of the water/wastewater
utilities with a cost
recovery ratio ≥ 1
27.8% 33.1% 18.3% 4.9% 6.2% 6.7% 12.5% 14.3%
% of the water/wastewater
utilities with a cost
recovery ratio < 1
72.2% 69.9% 81.7% 95.1% 93.8% 93.3% 87.5% 85.7%
% of the volume supplied/drained
reported by the utilities with
a cost recovery ratio ≥ 1
53.3% 50.2% 2.7% 0.0% 23.6% 25.6% 31.2% 8.8%
% of the volume supplied/drained
reported by the utilities with
a cost recovery ratio < 1
46.7% 49.8% 97.3% 100.0% 76.4% 74.4% 68.8% 91.2%
We can see that in 2005 only 33.1% of all retail WS utilities collected an amount
of revenues sufficient to cover their costs, according to the data reported to INSAAR.
Nevertheless they represented 50.2% of the volume supplied. This seems to indicate some
degree of association between the size of the utility and the level of cost recovery.
This is also true of retail WWDT, where only 6.7% of the wastewater utilities recover
their costs through the revenue, but they represent 25.6% of the volume drained. The
same cannot be said of bulk activities where this association is not always so clear. This
result is in accordance with Martins et al. (2008), which claims that economies of scale for
the Portuguese water industry are mostly found in small and medium-sized utilities.
Overall the conclusions remain that only for WS do we find some evidence of possible
financial sustainability of the systems (we must bear in mind our suspicion regarding the
underreporting of investment subsidies) and that there is no evidence that the situation
has improved.
Our study is not strictly comparable to the official cost recovery calculations per-
formed by INAG/MAOTDR (2005), INAG/MAOTDR (2007), INAG/MAOTDR (2008)
and INAG/MAOTDR (2009), because they may have different assumptions or focus on
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different aspects of the problem (for example, INAG calculates cost recovery levels for
residential customers, while we disaggregate between retail and bulk activities26). It is
nevertheless instructive to look at the official results.
INAG started off by including the results for cost recovery levels in the river basin
regions reports required by article 5 of the WFD (INAG/MAOTDR (2005)) and has
subsequently reported them in the regular INSAAR reports (INAG/MAOTDR (2007),
INAG/MAOTDR (2008) and INAG/MAOTDR (2009)). Table 2.12 shows the results for
WS and WWDT separately and in conjunction.
Table 2.12: Cost recovery levels in mainland Portugal in WS and WWDT (2002-2006)
% WS WWDT WS+WWDT
2002 99 54 82
2005 87 57 76
2006 89 46 74
2008 84 50 72
Source: INAG/MAOTDR (2005), INAG/MAOTDR (2007),
INAG/MAOTDR (2008) and INAG/MAOTDR (2009)
We find here the same three conclusions drawn before: cost recovery levels fall short of
100%, the situation is worse for WWDT and cost recovery levels have been deteriorating
instead of improving. The overall measure computed for the industry sums up the worri-
some proof that the Portuguese water and wastewater industry came no closer to meeting
the WFD of cost recovery in the past few years. On the contrary, the gap between revenues
and costs has increased from 18% to 26% in four years.
The people who intervene in the industry are aware of the problem. Take for example
the statement of a former president of the National Water Institute and current president of
AdP: “the tariffs for the several water services (drinking water supply, sewage, irrigation
and industry) do not reflect totally the costs involved. In many cases, the difference
26One possible explanation for some of the differences between our study and the INAG reports regarding
the computed cost recovery ratios may be in our separation between retail and bulk activities. For our
purposes, it is relevant to consider the costs/revenues from bulk water/wastewater transactions between
retail and bulk operators. For INAG, on the contrary, these categories cancel themselves out due to the
aggregate nature of their problem for WS or WWDT. It is, thus, expectable that both studies report the
same qualitative conclusion but with differences in the exact measure of the deficits found.
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between tariffs and costs is immense, up to the point where the financial sustainability
of the service is not assured, despite the fact that the investments in infrastructures have
been financed with government subsidies” (Serra (2001), p. 284).
Figures 2.32 and 2.33 reveal the regional differences in the cost recovery ratios for retail
WS and WWDT respectively, for the years 2002 and 2005. The lowest values for the cost
recovery ratios are found in the northeast inland part of Portugal and more recently also
in the southern inland part of Alentejo. We have shown previously that, while for the
northern regions, the rugged terrain and the dispersion of population settlings may partly
explain this results, it is mainly the low revenue collection that is responsible for the low
ratios. Political reasons regarding the concern with the income levels of the population
in these regions may be the reason for the low levels of the water and wastewater tariffs.
The cost recovery levels are higher for the west and south coastal regions, which are more
urbanized, more densely populated and have in general higher income levels.
Cost recovery levels are to a great extent lower in the WWDT systems, where only
the Lisbon area is found to have a ratio of cost recovery greater than one on average. The
overall scenery is dreadful, with a large number of regions presenting cost recovery ratios
lower than 0.2. This is natural if we think that one third of the utilities in Portugal did
not charge for wastewater at all (see chapter 1). Wastewater activities benefit from the
fact that the same utility usually manages both systems, so that cross-subsidization of the
WWDT activity is possible.
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Figure 2.32: Cost recovery ratios in retail WS by NUTS III (2002-2005)
Figure 2.33: Cost recovery ratios in retail WWDT by NUTS III (2002-2005)
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If the cost recovery principle from article 9 of the WFD (already reflected in the new
Water Law and in the recent Economic and Financial Regime for the Water Resources)
is to be complied with then revenue collection must surely rise in the great majority of
the municipal counties for retail activities and also in bulk water and wastewater systems.
This means that average tariffs will certainly have to increase, something that is even
truer of the systems and utilities located in the less densely populated and poorer inland
parts of the country. The fact that this may contribute to the worsening of the regional
imbalances, has led to the inclusion in PEAASAR II (Strategic Plan for Water Supply and
Wastewater Sewage 2007-2013) of the possibility of creating a Tariff Balancing Fund, which
would try to keep tariffs of multi-municipal systems supplying bulk water within a price
band considered reasonable, through the subsidization of the systems with greater costs27.
Although the objectives of economic cohesion can have their merit, this type of instrument
must be used cautiously to say the least, because this kind of cross-subsidization between
different territorial systems can cause losses of efficiency, something that is recognized in
PEAASAR II which states that “the existence of an equalization mechanism of this kind
can work as a disincentive to the optimization of each system individually considered”
(MAOTDR (2007a), p. 79).
Looking into the cost recovery levels by type of utility (Table 13), once again we find
no evidence of an association between a more private/public ownership or a more or less
business-like management and cost recovery ratios. Public companies have the highest fig-
ures for this indicator (except for WWDT in 2002), followed by the autonomous municipal
services and the municipal companies in WS and by the municipalities in WWDT. On the
other hand private companies show low levels of cost recovery in both types of activities.
The types of utilities associated with the municipalities have different results in WS and
in WWDT. Municipalities themselves have low ratios in WS but have some of the highest
27PEAASAR takes advantage of art. 9, n. 1, of the WFD which states that “Member States may (. . . )
have regard to the social, environmental and economic effects of the recovery as well as the geographic and
climatic conditions of the region or regions affected” to attempt some convergence in the tariffs, “without
nevertheless intending to equalize tariffs in the all country” (MAOTDR (2007a), p. 79). It’s stated in
PEAASAR that “efficiency is not, however, the only value at stake, nor is «full cost recovery» the only
principle that can be applied. Equity, regional and individual, is another value to defend and universality
and accessibility are also objectives to be achieved” (ibid.).
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in WWDT (even though they are still very low). The autonomous municipal services and
the municipal companies have high ratios for WS and low ratios for WWDT. Overall no
conclusion can be taken from these results regarding the advantages and disadvantages of
business-like management and private ownership.
Table 2.13: Cost recovery ratios by type of utility in retail WS and WWDT (2005)
Cost recovery ratio Cost recovery ratio
in retail WS in retail WWDT
2002 2005 2002 2005
Municipality 0,78 0,79 0,57 0,59
Autonomous Municipal Services 1,02 0,94 0,51 0,53
Municipal or Intermunicipal company 1,07 0,96 0,41 0,53
Public Company 1,16 1,23 0,50 0,66
Private Company 0,81 0,74 0,43 0,49
Total 0,95 0,91 0,52 0,56
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we updated the results of Monteiro (2007) regarding the analysis of costs
and revenues for the Portuguese water and wastewater industry for 2005, halfway between
the publication of the WFD and the 2010 deadline for the implementation of adequate
cost recovery levels and efficient water pricing, and assessed their evolution between 1998
and 2005. We also presented a brief historical overview of the presence of the cost recovery
principle in the Portuguese law regarding the industry.
Overall four main conclusions stand out. First, the need to collect revenues from
the users to cover the costs of the service has been present in the Portuguese law for
decades and the introduction of the cost recovery principle is prior to the transposition
of the WFD through the more recent Water Law. Nevertheless, it always lacked practical
implementation. The novelty from the new legislation is the inclusion of scarcity and
environmental costs in the set of costs to be recovered through revenue collection and not
so much the cost recovery principle in itself. Second, the level of revenues collected by the
WS and WWDT utilities is still currently, on average, insufficient to meet the financial
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costs of their activities (we do not assess here the scarcity and environmental costs).
Third, the situation is worse in the case of WWDT than in WS revealing evidence of
cross-subsidization within the utilities which manage both systems. Fourth, the situation
has worsened in recent years.
The lowest cost recovery ratios are found in the northeast inland part of the country
and in the southern part of Alentejo. While in the former reasons can be found in the
rugged terrain and the disperse nature of the population settlings to justify higher unit
costs, the same cannot be said of the latter. Nevertheless the main reason for the deficits
found is mainly the lack of enough revenue collection through the tariffs in both cases.
Political concerns with the low levels of income in these regions may be behind the low
levels of tariffs for water and wastewater.
If the cost recovery principle from article 9 of the WFD (already reflected in the new
Water Law and in the recent Economic and Financial Regime for the Water Resources)
is to be complied with, then revenue collection must surely rise and average tariffs will
have to increase. This is even truer of the systems and utilities located in the less densely
populated and poorer inland parts of the country. Caution should be used in the use of
instruments such as the Tariff Balancing Fund mentioned in PEAASAR II to promote
regional economic cohesion, as it distorts incentives to optimize the systems and generates
efficiency losses.
We find no clear evidence of an association between the cost recovery levels (or the unit
costs or revenues) and the type of utility. The results do not seem to favour neither public
nor private ownership, nor do they shed light on the best management model (public
service vs. business-like management).
The new Water Law and the corresponding Economic and Financial Regime of Water
Resources transposed the full cost recovery principle (including scarcity and environmental
costs) from the WFD. The new water resources charge, in force since July 2008, is a step
forward towards the internalization of the scarcity and environmental costs and will have
to be reflected in the tariffs consumers face. For adequate cost recovery to be achieved by
2010, additional tariff increases will have to happen, so that unlike previous legislation,
the new legal regime for water resources should be applied this time.
Chapter 3
Water Pricing Models: a Survey
3.1 Introduction
There is an abundant literature on water pricing. Several studies on the impact of the
water price on water demand are published every year. Articles comparing the properties
of different price schemes or pointing out the difficulties in implementing more efficient
pricing rules are also frequent, with a diversity of case studies on implementing water
pricing reforms. However, theoretical water pricing models are scarcer and more disperse
in the scientific literature. They are important to the water utility manager or to the water
supply industry regulator who have to present precise water pricing schemes to customers
in the specific conditions they operate in. Furthermore, the Water Framework Directive
approved in 2000 requires that by 2010 (art. 9, n. 1) a price policy must be defined not
only to recover the costs of the resource, but also to provide incentives for consumers to
use water efficiently, contributing to the established environmental targets. This chapter
attempts a systematic review of the existing literature on water pricing models.
Most issues dealt with here are not specific to the water sector. Marginal cost pric-
ing (Dupuit (1844), Coase (1946) and Coase (1970)), capacity constraints and peak-load
pricing (Boiteux (1949)), revenue requirements (Allais (1947)) and nonlinear pricing (Wil-
son (1993)) are subjects which have been researched in the more general framework of
regulated public utilities for a long time now. Brown and Sibley (1986) present the first
systematic exposition of the previous contributions to the theory of public utility pricing.
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3.2 Existing water pricing schemes
There is a bewildering diversity of actual water prices and rate structures implemented by
different water utilities, even within areas where geographical conditions are similar.
The customer may be required to pay a connection fee to gain access to the water
supply system. A service charge is often required to cover costs that are not related to the
quantity consumed (like metering cost; in fact, service charges are also frequently called
meter charges) or to guarantee cost recovery in situations where price differs from average
cost.
A quantity-related price is a consensual requirement for efficiency but in reality vol-
umetric pricing can be implemented in a variety of ways. The utility may implement a
uniform rate, which in turn can be based on the average or on the marginal cost of water
supply. This uniform price may be combined with rebates or discounts to assure that no
excessive profits are generated in the cases where marginal cost related prices exceed aver-
age costs. Another frequent solution is the implementation of nonlinear pricing with block
tariffs (tiered pricing). Decreasing block tariffs (DBT) may be supported where a natural
monopoly is recognized, while increasing block tariffs (IBT) are often associated with the
implementation of marginal cost pricing with equity or poverty alleviation concerns, or
simply to signal potential scarcity or capacity constraints.
Other possible variations are the differentiation of price structures according to cus-
tomer classes or seasons. Even the adoption of time-of-day pricing has been advocated for
the water industry, although it is more frequent in the electric power industry.
A frequent solution is the adoption of a two-part tariff, which consists in the combi-
nation of a service charge with a uniform volumetric price, but other water pricing and
allocation methods are possible.
Surveys of water pricing schemes and water rates are often published by the national
institutes concerned with the environment in general or the water industry in particular.
A few examples can be pointed out:
- in 2006, the American Water Works Association (AWWA) together with Raftelis
Financial Consultants, Inc. surveyed the water and wastewater rates, fees and charges of
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230 U.S. water utilities and 164 wastewater utilities1;
- in 2002, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published the report
"2000 Community Water Systems Survey" with operating and financial information for
approximately 2000 water utilities in the USA;
- Environment Canada is preparing an update for 2006 of its periodical Municipal
Water and Wastewater Survey (MWWS), which includes data on water use and pricing;
- The Water Services Regulation Authority in England and Wales (OFWAT) publishes
yearly reports on water and wastewater charges;
- the Portuguese National Water Institute (INAG) has implemented in 2002 a periodic
National Inventory on Water Supply and Wastewater Systems (INSAAR), which includes
data on the water pricing schemes and for which updates for 2005 and 2006 and 2007 have
already been released.
Studies on actual water pricing schemes are also available. For example, Hewitt (2000)
describes the pricing methodology supported by the AWWA, Montginoul (2007) and Gar-
cia and Reynaud (2004) describe the French water sector, Embid-Irujo (2005) presents
water pricing practices in Spain, Bakker (2001) reports pricing practices in England and
Wales, Howe (2005) describes the water pricing institutions in the United States and in
Canada, Garrido (2005) surveys the major case studies and practical applications of wa-
ter pricing in Brazil and Bithas (2008) describes the water pricing policies in the cities
of Athens, Amsterdam, London, Seville and Tel-Aviv. OECD (1999a), OECD (2003a)
and OECD (2009) review water tariffs in OECD countries. Other case studies for specific
countries are often easy to find.
3.3 Water pricing models
The articles surveyed present theoretical water pricing models which concentrate on par-
ticular questions of water pricing. The questions addressed are varied and numerous.
Table 1 sums up the main ones and the papers that deal with each one.
We now discuss in greater detail the most important issues referred to in Table 3.1.
1An update of this bi-annual survey has been released for 2008.
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3.3.1 Average vs. Marginal cost pricing
The oldest debate in the literature on water pricing is whether to price water by its average
cost (based on financial reasons of cost recovery) or by its marginal cost (based on the
economic reasoning of promoting an efficient use of the resource). As we will see, this is a
closed debate by now, if not in actual practice, at least among economists.
Essentially, a resource is considered to be used efficiently if the benefit for society from
consuming the last or marginal unit of the resource is the same as the cost of obtaining
it (including the opportunity cost of foregoing other alternative uses). If the price of the
resource is equal to its marginal cost, then the consumer can adequately compare the
benefits she obtains with the costs she imposes with her consumption decision. If the
unit price differs from marginal cost, consumption levels will be either too high (for prices
below marginal costs) or too low (for prices above marginal costs) in relation to the socially
optimum level of consumption.
Hirshleifer et al. (1960) support the use of marginal cost pricing of water, opposing the
practices of average cost pricing, for the efficiency reasons mentioned above. They also
support price differentials for on-peak and off-peak demand. For example, seasonal peaks
in water demand in the summer would require the introduction of a summer peak-load
differential or surcharge in price. This question is dealt with in further detail in the next
section.
The case of a public water agency supplying a set of irrigation districts was considered
by Brown and McGuire (1967). The water agency takes the decision about how much
bulk surface water to buy, how to price irrigation districts for the water distributed and
how to price groundwater withdrawals within the districts to assure an efficient water use.
The pricing policy that results from maximizing the system’s welfare (the water agency’s
profits plus the irrigation districts’ benefits from water use) is one of the first marginal cost
pricing rules derived in a complete water model. Surface water price must be equal to the
marginal distribution cost in each district plus the unit cost of purchasing bulk water and
groundwater price must be equal to the direct marginal cost of pumping plus the sum of
the discounted marginal effects on future pumping costs via future pumping lifts. Average
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cost pricing is not even considered in this early article. The only expressed concern about
the financial viability of the water agency is the allocation of the groundwater pumping
revenues to cover the deficits of the marginal cost pricing policy, but the balancing of the
budget is not guaranteed in the model.
Riordan (1971a) compares typical average cost pricing techniques with her proposal
of multistage marginal cost pricing, where price is equated to short-run marginal cost
and varies accordingly with demand increases and the several stages of optimal capacity
expansion. She finds that the latter is able to provide a 10-20% increase in total net
benefits.
Dandy et al. (1984) analyze a constrained water pricing method (where there are
constraints on the magnitude of price changes allowed in a change from average cost
pricing to an optimal marginal cost pricing rule). They find that such a scheme, while
being less efficient than the optimal water pricing derived in their model, can still increase
benefits to society when compared to actual average cost pricing practices.
Zarnikau (1994) develops a model of spot market pricing for water (short-run marginal
cost pricing), based on previous work done for the electric power industry. Again, this
water pricing system is more efficient than average cost pricing, especially when short-run
marginal costs vary over time or when water becomes scarce and rationing methods have
to be found. This system would also provide information about the customers’ valuation of
system enhancements or capacity increases through the amounts they actually pay when
capacity constraints are binding.
Irrigation water pricing is considered again by Brill et al. (1997) who compare both
pricing policies in the context of an irrigation water district facing a balanced budget
constraint and heterogeneous farmers and confirm the superiority of marginal cost-pricing
regarding efficiency. Their article goes beyond this objective, however, by assessing the
efficiency of block-rate pricing and water trading schemes.
Chambouleyron (2004) compares both pricing schemes under different metering regimes
(universal metering and optimal metering). He also shows that marginal cost pricing is
always the most efficient pricing regime.
Finally, Briand (2006) uses a sequential dynamic computable general equilibriummodel
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to arrive at the same result, in the specific case of the Senegalese economy. She simulates
an initial phase of capacity expansions followed by increasing resource scarcity due to
climatic shocks and concludes that marginal cost pricing mitigates the negative effects
from water shortages and improves the household’s welfare (the resulting deficit in the
water utility’s budget is assumed to be financed by the government).
3.3.2 Seasonal or temporal variations
Having seen that marginal cost pricing is common sense in the literature nowadays, the
next question is how to deal with time-related variations of marginal cost and whether
they should be reflected in the water price.
Gysi and Loucks (1971) extend the analysis made by Riordan (1971a) about the
investment-pricing decisions of a monopolistic public utility by considering block rate
water tariffs and seasonal variations in prices. They disaggregate nonlinear demand func-
tions for five residential sectors, based on the dwelling value. Their results point out the
advantages of an increasing block rate schedule combined with a summer price differential.
The spot-market pricing system developed by Zarnikau (1994) derives prices that vary
with location and time (including time of day). Some additional charges may be customer
specific. Short-run marginal costs must include, besides operating costs, the costs imposed
by capacity constraints or by the scarcity of water resources, to ration the available water
to the highest value uses.
The author also points out some questions regarding an actual implementation of the
system. Additional charges related with capacity constraints or water scarcity should
be set at a level which assures that existing demand at such prices can be met by the
existing water supply. This requires the knowledge of the price-elasticity of demand. Price
changes would be very frequent (including different charges for different periods of the day
with frequent price changes in a single day). However, such frequent changes may cause
instability in the long-term decisions of customers like investing or not in water saving
technologies. The author does not address this issue. The adoption of this kind of pricing
system would require the implementation of a communications system to keep customers
permanently informed of the possibly frequent price changes, as well as more frequent
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meter readings, possibly through remote meter reading technology using telephone lines
or cable television. Consumers are expected to respond to time-of-day-pricing or spot
market pricing by changing their consumption from periods with higher prices to periods
with lower prices.
Finally, it should be noted that the model developed by Zarnikau (1994) ignores the
implementation costs of this water pricing system. For spot-market water pricing system
to be worth implementing its benefits must outweigh its costs. The author uses an analogy
with implementation practices in the electric power industry to suppose that it might only
be beneficial to implement this water pricing system in the class of large water users such
as industrial or commercial users or golf courses. The residential class could remain with
other more traditional water pricing systems. For this dual pricing system to be effective,
curtailment premiums (additional charges due to capacity constrains or scarcity) imposed
on large users would have to be overstated, because residential customers would not be
given the same price signals.
The optimal irrigation water pricing found in Beare et al. (1998) incorporates cyclical
variations of water inflows and moisture needs and a stochastic process representing un-
certainty about those inflows and water availability. They also consider the role played
by capacity constraints of river dams and distribution channels and by the existence of
environmental flow requirements. They use simulation techniques on a hydroeconomic
model of the Murrumbidgee catchment of the southern Murray Darling Basin in southeast
Australia. Their main result is that seasonal uncertainty affecting both water demand and
availability raises the average opportunity cost of water use over the irrigation season, due
to storage capacity constraints.
Schuck and Green (2002) develop a model of water pricing with the ability to reflect
variations in water supply on the price of water (supply-based water pricing model) and to
consider the revenue constraints of the water providing agency. It does so in the context
of a conjunctive use system with stochastic surface water flows. The model combines
the techniques of conjunctive use systems management and second-best (Ramsey) water
pricing. It considers the case where water is an input in the activity of farmers, and it also
allows for the possibility of recharging the aquifer with excessive surface water in bountiful
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years, although not without a cost. The authors assess the impact of the pricing policy on
water use, acreage (land use) and energy use, through an application to a water district
from California using simulation techniques.
The social planner’s model that is developed indicates the existence of a U-shaped cost
curve with higher cost in times of drought (due to pumping costs) and times of plenty (due
to recharging costs). They conclude, however, that while the pumping costs incurred by
the irrigation district in periods of drought should be added to the remaining usual costs in
average supply periods, the recharging component of the costs should be subtracted from
the remaining costs in the determination of the water price to encourage growers to use
more surface water. This would avoid the costs of recharging the water in the aquifer. This
argument seems to make sense at first, but the fact that it is not mathematically consistent
with the cost equations and the marginal cost pricing rule raises the question of its actual
correctness. Maybe the argument is erroneous in thinking only in the short-term. The
problem in the paper is one of dynamic optimization, therefore, the short-term argument
that the irrigation district will try to avoid the cost of having to recharge the aquifer in
times of plenty, may be wrong because it is not considering the value in the future of
having water in the aquifer to pump in times of drought. By introducing the possibility
of recharging the aquifer, the authors created also a storage problem that is not entirely
dealt with in the paper. Notice that, instead of recharging and facing the corresponding
costs, the district could waste the excessive water, thus not needing to lower the price to
avoid the recharging costs! The problem in this paper is twofold: recharging the excessive
water is faced as an obligation and not as a possibility; in the recharging decision the
authors are only considering the present costs and not the future value of greater aquifer
height (reducing future pumping costs in periods of drought).
The results indicate that the adoption of the supply-based pricing policy proposed
reduces water demand and energy use and increases fallowing (leaving the land unculti-
vated) in periods of drought, adjusting agricultural activities to the water supply of each
period. However, future research would have to validate these conclusions after correcting
for the problem mentioned above and considering the value of storage in smoothing water
supply over time. The development of this kind of seasonal water pricing methods must
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explicitly take into account the possibility of water storage.
3.3.3 Capacity constraints or expansion decisions
The determination of water price when facing capacity constraints has been an issue of
research for a long time now, not only for water supply, but also for other public utilities
like electric power supply. This decision is usually studied together with the decisions to
expand the system. One important conclusion is that peak-load pricing (charging long-run
marginal costs to peak consumers and short-run marginal costs to off-peak consumers) may
delay investment in system expansion in relation to other more inefficient pricing schemes.
Riordan (1971a) develops a model of optimal water pricing and investment by a pub-
licly owned or regulated monopoly called multistage marginal cost pricing. The model
is based on a short-run marginal cost pricing rule. When supply approaches capacity
the price necessarily rises, keeping demand within capacity constraints. Dynamic pro-
gramming techniques are employed to derive the optimal capacity expansions and their
adequate timing. Riordan (1971b) applies the model to urban water supply treatment
facilities.
Riley and Scherer (1979) deal with the issue of peak-load pricing when supply and
demand are both seasonal and there is the possibility of storage. They apply it to water
pricing where seasonal supply and demand are out of phase. The article combines the
literatures of peak-load water pricing and reservoir planning and operation.
Manning and Gallagher (1982) extend the model developed by Riley and Scherer (1979)
to treat two additional problems ignored in the latter article: the importance of discounting
(time preferences) to pricing policies and the derivation of an optimal discrete approxi-
mation to optimal continuous pricing policies. To do so they use the concept of arbitrage
between different periods of time enabled by water storage. The arbitrage possibility is
not so much based on the stochastic nature of water inflow, they argue, but more on its
seasonal pattern. Arbitrage would be profitable in periods when there is an increase of
the natural price of water (the price that continuously equates time varying supply and
demand). Water storage would be more worthwhile the more price-inelastic is the demand
for water.
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They find that, in the absence of storage capacity limits and direct costs of water
storage (other than the opportunity cost of keeping the water in storage instead of selling
it), the price of water held in storage must rise at the rate of interest and the effect of
discounting is to cause a cycle in the price of water (the initial price of water is set to
equate total water inflow and total water demand over the cycle). If p(t1) is the price
at which we could be selling an additional unit of water at time t1, p(t2) is the price at
which we will be able to sell it at time t2 if we keep it in storage from t1 to t2, and r is
the interest rate, then is must be that p(t2) = p(t1)er(t2−t1), otherwise arbitrage would
be possible between the two periods (remember it has been assumed there were no direct
storage costs).
The authors consider that the rule created by Hotelling (1931) for the optimal price
of an exhaustible resource available in a fixed quantity is just a limit case of the kind of
storage problem they face, with the inflow of resource limited to an initial endowment in
the first period and with no limit on the ability of storage capacity to carry this quantity
over to the following periods.
The authors also find that if there are limits to storage capacity, water prices can
rise faster than the interest rate when the capacity constraints are binding (when the
water storage facilities are full). The optimal water storage capacity derived will depend
negatively on the price-elasticity of demand and positively on the planning horizon length.
The model developed by Dandy et al. (1984) to determine optimal water pricing and
optimal magnitude and timing of capacity expansions is an extension of the work done by
Hirshleifer et al. (1960) and Riordan (1971a). As mentioned above, they consider also the
political feasibility of the optimal rule derived.
This type of simultaneous decision models about the optimal water pricing and optimal
capacity expansion decisions was translated into a general equilibrium framework by Dixon
(1990) and applied to the context of water supply in Melbourne.
Some authors have attempted to estimate the welfare gains from applying efficient
prices when faced with capacity constraints. Swallow and Marin (1988) are critical of pure
short-run marginal cost pricing in the presence of capacity constraints due to the induced
price fluctuations and point out that using a weighted average of the annual marginal
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short run and capacity expansion costs to create a constant price results in 98.5% of the
net benefits produced by the efficient pricing policy. Renzetti (1992) on the other hand
estimates a 4% gain in welfare, but he compares the inefficient average cost pricing policy
with peak-load pricing in a situation of seasonally differentiated demand (Ramsey pricing
is also considered but produces less efficient results because it does not include a fixed
charge).
3.3.4 Scarcity
Scarcity is a more recent concern than capacity constraints, reflecting the fact that the
usual approach to rising water demand in the past was to expand the water supply system.
Moncur and Pollock (1988) deal with the problem of determining the scarcity rent of
water. They consider the case of a water utility with groundwater as its only source, and
use a nonrenewable resource efficient extraction model to determine the scarcity value and
the efficient path of price in the future. They calculate the scarcity value through the
consideration of the future increase in costs originated by the necessity to use costly back-
stop technologies (such as desalination or trans-basin diversions) to satisfy water demand.
They apply their model to Honolulu and find the scarcity value to be approximately twice
the current water charge. An efficient price would have to equal marginal cost and the
latter should include not only accounting costs but also opportunity costs reflected in the
scarcity rent for water. This implies that efficient pricing of water in Honolulu would
require its current price to triple.
Elnaboulsi (2001) and Loehman (2004) use a constraint on the water available which,
when binding, allows the determination of the shadow value of water resources. This
opportunity cost is reflected in the price charged.
Griffin (2001) demonstrates that the price should also include nonaccounting opportu-
nity costs such as: marginal value of raw water (surface and fully renewable ground water
sources, in scarcity situations); marginal user cost (to take into account the sacrifice of
future uses in unrenewed groundwater supplies); marginal capacity cost (when the water
supply enabled by the capacity installed is less than the water demand).
In the computable general equilibrium model of Briand (2006), scarcity is included
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in the model, after a first phase of water availability increase to reflect supply enhancing
policies, through the consideration of a decrease in water availability due to climatic shocks,
generating hydrologic deficits when coupled with demand and demographic growth.
3.3.5 Revenue requirements
Marginal cost pricing does not ensure that the water utility generates enough, and just
enough, revenues to cover costs (including a reasonable amount of profit to guarantee the
involvement of private firms in the industry). Some authors, like Zarnikau (1994), warn us
that marginal costs may fall below average costs, which is the situation to be expected in
capital-intensive industries like water supply. Others, like Collinge (1992) point out that
despite the fact that water utilities are commonly viewed as a natural monopoly due to
capital costs, it is not straightforward that the marginal cost falls below the average cost.
Because cheaper sources of water are naturally used before other more expensive sources,
marginal cost can rise above the average cost of water supply. Therefore, marginal cost
pricing can raise a problem to the water utility and its regulators, not because of insufficient
revenue, but because it would generate excessive profits. Using marginal cost pricing in a
situation where average cost is lower than marginal cost can be an efficient way to raise
revenues. Nevertheless, it is generally not allowed, namely because it has a "regressive
incidence", hurting the poor the most, since water expenses have a greater weight on their
budget. Balancing the budget of the water utility is therefore an objective on the same
level of importance as achieving economic efficiency.
Hirshleifer et al. (1960) consider five alternatives to ensure the financial viability of the
water utilities which adopt marginal cost pricing in a situation of natural monopoly (with
declining average costs): government subsidies; voluntary contributions from customers to
ensure water supply; declining block-tariffs; two-part tariffs; separation of customer classes
which face different prices (not all necessarily equal to the marginal cost). The authors
favor the adoption of declining block tariffs first and two-part tariffs as a second choice.
Freedman (1986) develops a model with the aim of keeping the water utility’s budget
close to zero. Although the title claims this is an article on water pricing, in fact the model
developed only deals with the profit the water utility should target in each year, saying
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nothing about the prices or tariff structures it should implement to reach the intended
profit.
Collinge (1992) proposes a solution to price water efficiently without generating ex-
cessive profits for the water utility or excessive burdens for the consumers. The proposal
is based on a system of tradable discount coupons ("marketable rights to buy water at
prices below marginal replacement costs") with expiration dates, issued by a single water
supplying agency. They give the consumer a discount with a value equal to the difference
between the marginal and the average cost of water supply (assuming that the average
cost falls below the marginal cost). One of the biggest advantages of this proposal is the
fact that it only requires information about the cost of existing and additional supply
sources, without requiring information on consumer demand (this is a general advantage
of water trading schemes). Moreover, the implementation of marginal cost pricing would
ensure efficiency, while the issuing of a limited number of discount coupons could balance
the water utility’s budget.
Zarnikau (1994) mentions some other measures pointed out in the literature to fulfill
the revenue requirement, even if sacrificing efficiency in part. These measures are to add
(or subtract) a fixed charge to the water bill, to multiply the prices by a fixed factor
or to adjust the prices in inverse proportion to the customer’s price elasticity of demand.
The latter is called Ramsey pricing. When average price is higher than marginal price, the
remaining revenue, not ensured by marginal cost pricing is obtained in this method through
additional charges/higher prices on the customers with less elastic demand functions.
Kim (1995) derives second-best optimal prices for water supply by a water utility with
two products: residential water and nonresidential water. A second-best Ramsey pricing
rule is used to assure the balancing of the supplier’s budget. The author associates the
estimation of a translog multiproduct joint cost function for the water supply industry with
given price elasticities of demand for both products, avoiding a simultaneous estimation
of both the demand and supply functions.
The results point to a higher price for residential water, which has a lower price elas-
ticity of demand, therefore the budget balancing task falls mainly on residential users.
The actual prices are found to be close to the second-best prices derived in the article (no
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more than a 10% increase in prices would be needed to turn actual prices into second-best
prices). The author also finds some evidence of the existence of economies of scope.
García-Valiñas (2005a), Elnaboulsi (2009) and Diakité et al. (2009) also use Ramsey
pricing to consider revenue requirements in their water pricing models. García-Valiñas
(2005a) uses Feldstein’s proposal (Feldstein (1972)) to adjust Ramsey pricing by using the
marginal utility of income to weight individual surpluses in order to reduce the regressiv-
ity associated with IBT. Diakité et al. (2009) also deals with equity issues through the
introduction of an additional "restriction that a minimum amount of water be supplied at
the lowest marginal price possible".
Brill et al. (1997) consider a balanced budget constraint on the construction of their
water payment function and use historical water use rights to “redistribute” the excess
profit that marginal cost pricing (above average cost, given the models assumptions) would
generate.
The application of Ramsey pricing on a general equilibrium model was carried out
by Decaluwé et al. (1999) in a model for the Moroccan economy. Although Ramsey
pricing does not outperform marginal cost pricing regarding efficiency results, it does
allow the elimination of water subsidies to the water agency with a positive impact on
water conservation.
Griffin (2001) proposes a tariff structure for water that aims both at efficiency and
revenue neutrality of the water utility. He focuses on water supply, setting aside the issues
of wastewater, reliability, peak loads, different customer classes, different service capacities
and seasonality. The author examines three type of decisions: water consumption by
each customer; continuation of service by existing customers; enrollment decisions by
prospective new connections. For each of these decisions the author derives the efficient
level, which maximizes the present value of net social benefits.
Afterwards, the author proposes a rate structure that achieves these efficient levels
while keeping the utility’s budget balanced. The rate structure consists of a two-part
tariff with a fixed meter charge per period plus a volumetric charge based on the marginal
cost of water to achieve efficiency. A connection fee is also charged. In order to achieve
revenue neutrality, a water consumption threshold is determined. Consumption below the
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threshold generates a credit to the consumer that may turn into a payment to the customer
if the credit exceeds the meter charge. The correct parameterization of the threshold (and
remaining price-related parameters) enables the balancing of the budget.
The author claims that the tariff structure he proposes is more general than the usual
two-part tariff because: it does not assume a structure for the cost function (decreasing
or increasing); it separates the problems of efficient allocation of water resources and
nonwater resources (associated with distribution and metering).
3.3.6 Metering
Barrett and Sinclair (1999) investigate whether the policy of allowing households to choose
if their water consumption will be metered is optimal or not. This policy has been adopted
by some countries like the United Kingdom. In their model, the authors also determine
optimal water volumetric and fixed charges. The authors conclude that it may be efficient
not to meter every customer and to have a dual system where the customer chooses if he
should be metered or not (with unmetered customers paying higher fixed charges).
Chambouleyron (2004) combines the analysis of optimal water pricing and metering.
Consumers are heterogeneous due to the variation in the numbers of household members.
Four revenue collecting regimes are compared:
- Rateable Value System (no metering is installed);
- Universal Metering;
- Optimal Metering (the socially efficient number of meters is determined in a central-
ized fashion; the number of meters installed is the solution to a social planner’s problem
maximizing welfare and not the water company’s profits);
- Decentralized Metering (the optimal number of meters is determined in a decentral-
ized way by the company, which seeks to maximize profit, and in this case it coincides
with the socially efficient level).
Universal metering is only advisable if metering costs are compensated by the gain
in welfare from the difference between water company’s cost savings and consumer sur-
plus losses (resulting from the decrease in consumption by the consumers that were not
metered under Optimal Metering but are so under Universal Metering). When the previ-
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ous condition is not fulfilled the two regimes proposed by the author, Optimal Metering
and Decentralized Metering, are able to determine the socially efficient number of meters
(respectively in a centralized or decentralized but regulated way).
3.3.7 Efficiency of block tariffs
As mentioned above, Gysi and Loucks (1971) point out the advantages of an increasing
block rate schedule combined with a summer price differential. Brill et al. (1997), on the
other hand, show the inefficiency of a two-block tiered pricing policy in a balanced budget
context with marginal cost above average cost and customer heterogeneity. The inefficiency
stems from the reduced price in the first block which induces low demand consumers to
use more water than the efficient level. Castro-Rodríguez and Delicado (2002) show how
a two-part tariff can increase efficiency regarding IBT without compromising the revenues
raised (a balanced budget is assumed) nor increasing global consumption. On the contrary,
Loehman (2004) discards block tariffs for being inferior to "variable unit pricing", a form
of nonlinear pricing where the unit price varies linearly with the quantities used2.
Cardadeiro (2005) develops a model of optimal pricing with customer heterogeneity
and claims the use of a two-block multi-part tariff may be efficient in the presence of
a public health external benefit stemming from the consumption of the first few cubic
meters of water, justifying the adoption of a lower price on the first block. None of these
studies seems to be conclusive as to the benefit or inconvenience of adopting nonlinear
water tariffs (for example, they all impose a predetermined number of blocks on the water
tariff limiting the generality of the results obtained).
Elnaboulsi (2001) develops a model of optimal nonlinear pricing of water and wastewa-
ter services. He considers the issues of temporal variation, capacity constraints, scarcity
and consumer heterogeneity. The author concludes that the optimal water tariff design is
a two-part tariff (to recover operating/variable and fixed costs). If consumers are homo-
geneous a single two-part tariff should be implemented. In the presence of heterogeneous
consumers a menu of two-part tariffs (with trade-offs between the fixed charge and the vol-
umetric charge) must be implemented. Additional charges should be included in the unit
2See Loehman (2008) for applications of the method to real world situations.
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price to reflect the scarcity value of water (in case there is a water shortage) or capacity
constraints in any of the water supply and wastewater disposal facilities and transport sys-
tems. The utility should offer the consumers quantity discounts, resulting in a decreasing
marginal price (not considering the additional charges).
The impact of consumer heterogeneity is an issue yet to be fully investigated in the
water pricing literature. It is usually regarded by more general pricing literature as a
reason to apply nonlinear pricing schedules (Wilson (1993)). Schoengold and Zilberman
(2009) is an example of the ongoing discussion about the potential of tiered pricing to
simultaneously achieve the goals of efficiency, cost recovery and equity when customers
are heterogeneous. In chapter 4 we develop a water pricing model which explicitly takes
customer heterogeneity into account.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the articles which present models to determine the water pricing
scheme to be adopted and the water prices to be charged. After briefly pointing out some
results on existing pricing schemes, the main questions addressed by the water pricing
models were systematized and the major results from these studies were presented.
The most consensual result from the water pricing literature is that efficiency requires
marginal cost pricing. While this may be common sense for anyone with a minimum mi-
croeconomics background, it has stirred up a lot of articles demonstrating the advantages
of marginal cost pricing in relation to the widely used average cost pricing practices of
many water utilities.
Although not many articles present a seasonal analysis of prices, it does not seem
to be problematic to recognize that, if marginal cost has significant seasonal variations,
intra-annual price changes to reflect that variation would enhance efficiency. Assuming
continuously changing prices to be unfeasible, the optimal frequency of the price changes
would have to be studied. Some authors do try to analyze optimal discrete approxima-
tions of price changes to continuously time-varying marginal costs. When the pricing
and investment decisions are taken simultaneously and it is possible to separate peak and
125
off-peak consumption, peak-load pricing increases welfare.
A similar problem is that of reflecting in each customer’s water bill the specificity of
the costs it imposes on the water utility. While the efficiency of doing so is not questioned,
the information requirements may be considerable obstacles to this refinement of marginal
cost pricing.
The inclusion of the opportunity cost of water in the price when facing capacity con-
straints has been the subject of many studies, which besides deriving the optimal prices
for water also obtain the optimal timing for the expansion of the water supply system. It
is consensual that marginal cost tends to rise as the water supply system approaches its
capacity limit. If a marginal cost pricing mechanism is in place, the actual water bought by
customers may signal the value they attribute to further capacity expansions by revealing
their willingness to pay for additional units of water.
Pure scarcity of the resource has become a concern only in more recent studies, reflect-
ing the shift from the engineering perspective of increasing supply to satisfy demand to
the economic perspective of also managing demand through pricing to efficiently allocate
the existing quantity of water supply.
Only a few studies have focused on the question of whether it is optimal to meter every
customer, but they are unanimous in saying that, at least, there are conditions in which
leaving some connections unmetered may be efficient.
It is also accepted that pure marginal cost pricing may not be feasible or even desir-
able because of fairness, financial, political or legal reasons. Those concerned with fairness
worry that marginal cost pricing could impose an undue burden on the poorest. In situa-
tions where the marginal cost falls below average cost, the revenue generated by marginal
cost pricing may not be enough to recover the costs leading to financial losses by the water
company. On the other hand, if marginal costs rise above average costs, excessive profits
made through monopoly supply of what is perceived to be an essential good may not be
acceptable to the public opinion or by legal standards. This raises the question of aiming
at efficiency while respecting a revenue requirement. The most common ways of combin-
ing these two objectives are through the use of two-part tariffs, adjusting the fixed charge
to meet the revenue requirement, or through second-best pricing, collecting the necessary
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extra revenue where it can be done more efficiently, that is to say, from customers with
less elastic demands. These constrained versions of marginal cost pricing would still be
preferable to other pricing schemes. It is not determined if the best way to do it is through
two-part tariffs or some other pricing mechanism. The role of block rate pricing, increas-
ingly more frequent in actual pricing practices, is yet to be fully investigated. In chapter
4 we investigate whether block rates can be derived from efficiency arguments, taking into




In many areas where water is not abundant, water pricing schedules contain significant
nonlinearities. When adequate distribution networks exist, utilities tend to be local nat-
ural monopolies, consumers cannot choose multiple connections and resale is tricky. Thus
it is easy, and often politically expedient, for utilities to undertake extensive price discrim-
ination, both for distinct types of consumers (residential, industrial, agricultural, and so
on) and for different levels of consumption within each consumer type. Many utilities use
two-part tariffs, with fixed meter charges and a constant unit price, or multipart tariffs,
which combine fixed charges and increasing or, less often, decreasing blocks. Occasionally,
seasonal price variations are employed to reflect changes in water availability throughout
the year. Less common is the imposition of a scarcity surcharge during drought periods,
regardless of the season. In extreme droughts water rationing is generally preferred.
Chapter 1 presented some relevant characteristics of existing water tariffs, focusing on
the Portuguese case. As expected, tariffs are usually composed by both a meter charge and
a volumetric price, but the latter almost always consists of increasing block tariffs (IBT).
More surprisingly, considering the well-known significant seasonal differences in water
availability in the country, seasonal surcharges or seasonal price variations are not common
in Portuguese water tariffs. Moreover, the few that do exist seem to be uncorrelated
with regional characteristics in terms of seasonal water scarcity. It was also emphasized
that many utilities incorporate a number of further complications in their water rate
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calculations, enabling us to say that complexity is definitely the prevailing feature of
water tariffs in Portugal. For other countries, the trend towards increasing blocks is also
present, as noted in several publications.
It seems that the reasons why most water managers continue to defend increasing
blocks are their ability to benefit smaller users and their potential role in signalling scarcity.
Although, in the presence of water scarcity, the true cost of water increases due to the
emergence of a scarcity cost, it is unclear whether increasing block tariffs are the best way
to make consumers understand and respond to water scarcity situations, especially when
the resulting tariffs are very complex.
In contrast, most results found in the literature on efficient tariff design do not generally
recommend increasing price schedules. Only part of the abundant literature on water
pricing provides efficiency results, since most studies either compare the properties of
different possible price schemes, estimate water demand, or point out the difficulties in
implementing more efficient pricing rules. Chapter 3 summarized the main efficiency
results, indicating justifications for increasing block rates whenever they appeared, none
of which was directly related to scarcity.
Current analysis of this issue is specially relevant considering that the Water Frame-
work Directive requires that by 2010 (art.9, n.1) pricing policies in the European Union’s
member states not only recover the costs of the resource (including enviromental and
scarcity costs) but also provide adequate incentives for consumers to use water efficiently,
contributing to the attainment of environmental quality targets. In particular, the prob-
lem of water scarcity is now recognized by the European Commission as an increasingly
relevant one in the face of the increased frequency of extreme climate events that may oc-
cur because of climate change, as can be seen in a recent Communication that was issued
on the topic (EC (2007a)).
This chapter proposes different models of efficient and second-best nonlinear prices
under scarcity constraints, and concludes that, when both demand and costs respond
to climate factors, increasing marginal prices may come about as a combined result of
scarcity and customer heterogeneity under specific conditions, even if nonlinear pricing
is a consequence of customer heterogeneity and not of water scarcity. Finally, we use
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a dynamic model to analyze the simultaneous decision on pricing and investment by a
public utility and to investigate the effect that rising water scarcity, brought about for
instance by global warming, can have on the steady-state amount of capital invested in
water storage and supply infrastructures, and conclude that some results are similar to
the ones from the previous static models.
4.2 Existing water tariffs
In 2005, the Portuguese National Water Institute (INAG) released results for the National
Survey on Water and Wastewaster Systems for 2002 (recently updated for 2005). While
previous surveys had focused only on the water and sewage infrastructures, this one began
a systematic gathering of economic information. The INSAAR database contained at the
time of our study economic data on the management model followed by water utilities,
on investments for the period 1987-2005, and on costs, revenues, prices and quantities of
water delivered (to customers or to other water utilities) for the years 1998, 2000, 2002
and 20051. This section recalls the description of economic data from chapter 1 for the
year 2005, focusing on the domestic water supply component2.
The data indicated that 97.5% of water supply tariffs in Portugal are composed of a
fixed charge and a volumetric rate. The fixed charge is dependent on the diameter of the
pipe. All the 278 water utilities responsible for public water supply at the municipal level
and which provided information on tariffs have volumetric rates in their tariffs. Moreover,
all but three of the them apply IBT (a few self-supplying organizations and tourist resorts
also practice flat rate volumetric prices). The average number of blocks is 5, but it can
be as high as thirty in some extreme cases. The majority of utilities using block tariffs
charges the volume within each block. Nevertheless, 16.5% of them use a different way to
calculate the final tariff, by charging all volume at the price of the last block reached by
metered consumption in the period3. This causes the marginal price faced by the consumer
1Updates have already been released for the years 2006 and 2007.
2Because the INSAAR database suffers from a strong presence of missing values, additional data has
been requested by the authors directly to the water utilities to fill in the information gaps. The statistics
reported in this document already reflect such data collection and improvement.
3An additional 1.4% combine both calculation procedures in the tariff schedule applying one or the
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to have significant peaks at the block limits. In this pricing system, the first cubic meter
within a block can cost a consumer several times the price of the previous and the next
unit, something that will hardly be clear to the average consumer from the information in
the water bill.
The popularity of increasing block tariffs is not a Portuguese peculiarity. Hoffmann,
Worthington and Higgs (2006) mention “the trend in most OECD economies towards
metering, increasing block prices and reduced subsidies for residential water supply”, as
reported by Dalhuisen, Groot and Nijkamp (2001) to the European Commission in 2001.
The OECD itself not only reports the growing use of IBT by stating that “there is evi-
dence that the use of such tariffs [IBT] is increasing” (OECD (2003a)), but also seems to
support their use by saying that “there seem to be clear potential benefits from increasing
block tariff structure” (OECD (2003a)). Bartoszczuk and Nakamori (2004) point out that
“the strong tradition of low tariffs for households and increasing block rates is present in
Belgium, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and US”. With the Belgian exception, we find
very similar climate conditions in these countries (or parts of them, given the size of the
US). The use of IBT in these and other countries is also well documented in several OECD
reports (OECD (1999a), OECD (1999b), OECD (1999c), OECD (2003b), OECD (2003a),
OECD (2006) and OECD (2009)). One of the advantages of IBT, pointed out by several
authors and also in the OECD reports, is related with affordability for poorer households.
Nonetheless, we noted in chapter 1 that in Portugal water expenses fall below 1% of
average disposable income (Roseta-Palma et al. (2006)). Furthermore, the affordability
argument cannot explain the use of a large number of blocks.
One feature we would expect to see in Portuguese water tariffs given the variable
weather conditions, which include significant seasonal weather differences, namely in rain-
fall, and the existence of drought-prone regions, is seasonal surcharges. However, chapter
1 showed that no more than 3% of water utilities use such tools in their water tariffs.
Moreover, their location seems to be unrelated to the water availability problems in the
country, with most of them being located in the wetter regions of the coastal northwest of
Portugal. The few seasonal surcharges we do find are in place during the summer months
other according to the block of consumption reached.
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and typically raise the price of the higher blocks between 30%-50%.
It is clear that simplicity is not a prevalent feature of Portuguese water tariffs. The
calculation process of the IBT (volume charged within each block or at the price of the
last block) can be mixed in some utilities, depending on the consumption block. Tariffs
can combine blocks with flat (nonvolumetric) fees within some blocks with volumetric
rates for others. Specific formulas are sometimes applied within the blocks to find the
unit price. Water availability charges that are fixed within each block, but variable among
blocks, are sometimes levied and added to the price. Some utilities practice social tariffs
for disadvantaged households or, apart from the usual tariff differentiation by customer
class, propose special contracts with different prices to various types of specific consumers
(from farmers, factories or services to schools, sporting clubs or nonprofit organizations,
to name a few). Furthermore, additional complications can be found in wastewater price
schedules.
Finally, we noted that the 84% value for the national cost recovery level for water
supply falls below 100% (considering only financial costs), and the situation is even worse
for wastewater drainage and treatment services with a value of 50% (INAG/MAOTDR
(2009)). This can be explained by the fact that some utilities do not charge for wastewater
at all, while others make the payment dependent of variables such as apartment area;
number of inhabitants/beds/rooms, real estate value of the house or building or taxable
income. The majority of wastewater utilities levy at least some of their charges based on
water consumption levels, so that both payments are part of the water bill.
4.3 Scarcity in a simple model
A simple view of the main aspects of efficiency in water prices is presented by Griffin
(2001) and Griffin (2006). His model includes three pricing components: the volumetric
(ie. per unit) price, the constant meter charge and the one-off connection charge. The
latter is meant to reflect network expansion costs and will not be considered in our model.4
4Access to water supply networks is nearly universal in Portugal by now, with connection rates
reaching 92% in mainland Portugal, 99% in the Azores and 97% in Madeira (INAG/MAOTDR (2009);
APA/MAOTDR (2008)) (and virtually 100% in urban areas).
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We focus on the volumetric part of the tariff, not taking into account the two-part tariff
case5. On the other hand, he assumes a single volumetric price and does not allow for
more general nonlinear prices, as neither consumer heterogeneity nor purchase size cost
dependency are taken into account. In fact, Griffin (2001) stresses "the inefficiencies of
block rate water pricing" (pp. 1339 and 1342).
A static model for different (identified) consumer groups, with a scarcity constraint,
shows that the marginal cost pricing rule still holds. Define Bj(wj) as the increasing and
concave monetized benefit of water consumption for consumer group j, with j = 1, ..., J
and C(w) as the (convex) water supply costs6, which depend on the total water supplied,
ie. w =
∑J
j=1wj. Water availability is limited, with the maximum amount denoted as W.

















+ µ ∀j (4.2)
J∑
j=1
wj ≤ W, µ ≥ 0, µ(W −
J∑
j=1
wj) = 0 (4.3)
where µ is the Lagrangean multiplier and it is assumed that all wj are positive (every
consumer requires a minimum amount of water). The efficiency result, expressed in equa-
tion (4.2), indicates that the marginal benefit of water consumption should be equal to
marginal costs (including scarcity costs if the constraint is binding). Also, the marginal
benefit needs to be the same across consumers, since marginal cost is the same. Finally,
5We assume that the fixed charge is calculated so as to cover exactly the fixed costs of the water supply
activity, which is a situation similar to what is recognized as legally admissible in Portugal, since the
publication of Law N. 12/2008 of February 26 (Legislation for the Protection of the Customers of Essential
Public Services) (AR (2008)).
6We do not explicitly consider fixed costs for simplicity, because they do not change the conclusions.
7There are no cross effects in demand, ie. dBj
dwi
= 0 for i = j.
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as in Griffin (2006).8 The lower the W the tighter the constraint, meaning that price
should rise to reflect increasing scarcity. However, this rule does not ensure that the
water utility’s budget is balanced, namely if there are fixed costs or if marginal cost is not
constant. Although a fixed meter component could be adjusted to reflect such concerns,
for the aforementioned reasons we disregard this possibility and the second-best pricing
rule is obtained by imposing a breakeven constraint such as (4.7) on problem (4.1). This
is known as Ramsey pricing. Note that pj(wj) is now the inverted demand of consumer j.
J∑
j=1
pj(wj)wj −C(w) = 0 (4.7)

















where ξj is the absolute value of the price elasticity of j’s demand and λ is the Lagrange
multiplier of (4.7). This is a version of the so-called Inverse Elasticity Rule, which states
that the mark-up of prices over marginal cost will be inversely related to the demand
elasticity, so that consumers with lower demand elasticities will pay higher prices and
vice-versa. The only new term is µ1+λ , which reflects the scarcity cost. It adds to the price
faced by the consumer the opportunity cost of using a scarce resource, but it does not
affect the shape of the price schedule. Nonlinear prices may arise in this model because
8The same result can be obtained with the more complicated pricing formula from Griffin (2001). In
that case the bill paid by each consumer is given by Billj =M + p(wj −w), where M is the meter charge
and w is a budget-balancing parameter.
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of heterogeneity in the consumers’ preferences (different price-elasticities), not because of
scarcity. Nonlinear prices would be increasing if the absolute value of price-elasticities
decrease with higher optimal consumption choices and decreasing otherwise. It should
be noted that if the scarcity cost is defined as a tax which the supplier collects but does
not keep, along the lines of what is already done in some European countries, the model
will have to be changed accordingly. This is particularly important when several suppliers
share available water, since none of them will adequately provide for external scarcity
costs.
4.4 Scarcity with a distribution of consumer types
In this section a more complete model is presented, explicitly characterizing demand be-
havior through the definition of a continuum of consumer types. Model development is
based on Brown and Sibley (1986) as well as Elnaboulsi (2001). A new parameter, θ, is
introduced to reflect differences in consumer tastes, which can encompass a number of
variables, including income, family size, or housing. A consumer with tastes given by θ
will now enjoy net benefits of B(w, θ)−P (w), where P (w) is the total payment for water
consumption. It is assumed that B(0, θ) = 0 and that higher values of θ imply higher
consumption benefits (∂B∂θ > 0,
∂2B
∂θ∂w > 0). The distribution of θ throughout the consumer
population is described by a distribution funtion G(θ) and the associated density function
g(θ). Maximum and minimum values for the taste parameter are represented by θ and θ,
respectively, so that G(θ) = 1 and G(θ) = 0.







which is similar to condition (4.5) except the right-hand side represents the slope of the
total payment function, i.e. the marginal price pm. The only restriction to the shape of
P (w) is that, if concave, it must be less so than the benefit function to ensure that the
decision is indeed a maximizing one. Using the consumer’s choice, w(θ), the value function
is
V (θ) = B(w(θ), θ)− P (w(θ)) (4.10)
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To find the properties of the optimal payment function with a scarcity restriction, or rather


















where the first component of the objective function represents consumer surplus aggregat-
ing all consumer types, and the second component is profit. Some manipulations yield a
more tractable version of the problem. Substituing P (w (θ)) using equation (4.10), noting
that G(θ)− 1 =
∫
g(θ)dθ and using the envelope theorem to see that ∂V∂θ =
∂B
∂θ , consumer
surplus can be rewritten using integration by parts
θ∫
θ






and the Lagrangean that must be maximized is





(1−G(θ))dθ + (1 + λ)
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θ
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For the case where V (θ) = 0, which is the most relevant, the consumer with the lowest
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(1−G(θ))− µg(θ) = 0
Using equation (4.9), a mark-up condition similar to the one from the previous model















where ξ(w, θ) represents the absolute value of the price-elasticity of demand in each in-
cremental market (see Appendix A). As expected, the same conclusions as in the discrete
case apply to this model regarding the role of customer heterogeneity (here represented
by different θ) in generating nonlinear prices, while the scarcity cost does not affect the
price schedule’s shape, but only its level.
4.5 Scarcity in demand, cost and availability
The previous sections have shown that scarcity, represented as a quantity constraint, has
a direct effect that can be seen as an increase in real marginal cost, so that even when
coupled with a budget balancing constraint it cannot in itself explain a preference for
increasing rates. In order to evaluate other effects of scarcity in a more general sense, this
section introduces into the previous models exogenous weather factors, φ, which affect
water availability as well as consumer benefits and supply costs. It is assumed that a






(water demand increases, for example due to irrigation or swimming pools), ∂C∂φ > 0,
∂2C




Introducing these factors into the models from sections 4.3 and 4.4 does not change
the fundamental result for the second-best price schedule, expressed by the inverse elas-































Nonlinear pricing is still a consequence of customer heterogeneity and not of scarcity
considerations. However, the shape of the resulting price schedule may now be affected
by the influence of the exogenous weather factor on the price-elasticities of water demand
for the different consumer types.
4.5.1 Impact of scarcity on the shape of the price schedule
As noted earlier, the marginal unit price and the mark-up for each consumer type or
market increment depend inversely on its price-elasticity of demand. Nonlinear prices
would be increasing if the absolute value of price-elasticities decrease with higher optimal
consumption choices and decreasing otherwise. We can investigate the conditions under
which the resulting price schedule is increasing, constant or decreasing and how they are
affected by the weather parameter. The partial derivatives of the elasticity with respect

















































The price schedule will be increasing, constant or decreasing according to whether
∂ξ
∂w∗
is negative, null or positive. The conditions for each case are described below (because the
result is the same for the discrete and the continuous models we only present them once
in a general form).
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In order for elasticity to stay the same regardless of consumption, implying that efficient






















< 0 the expression on the right-hand side of equation (4.21) must
be smaller than 1 and for
∂ξ
∂w∗




, which reflects the curvature of the demand function, plays a very important




is a sufficient condition for IBT to be efficient. Additionally, to verify the impact of the
weather parameter on the price schedule we just have to differentiate the expression from
(4.21) in relation to φ. We omit the lenghty resulting expression and present only sufficient
conditions for the result to be negative, i.e., for the influence of the weather variable on










Condition (4.22) means that the demand function would have to be concave. Condition
(4.23) implies that the demand function’s negative slope would have to be constant or to
become less steep as temperature and dryness increase. Finally, condition (4.24) requires
the demand function’s curvature to be constant or to become more concave as temperature
and dryness increase. Why do these conditions favour the adoption of IBT in hotter and
drier regions or time periods? They seem to create a framework where willingness to pay
for water consumption increases more with temperature in high demand consumers than
in those with low demand profiles, decreasing the difference in marginal valuation of the
initial consumptions and the more extravagant ones. This is consistent with the fact that
low demand residential consumers have a mainly indoor water use which does not vary
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much with weather conditions, whereas high demand residential consumers include those
with gardens to sprinkle or swimming pools to fill in the summer, therefore showing a
more variable demand pattern.
High demand residential consumers are also usually associated with higher income
levels (reflected in θ in our model) which means that water expenses can weigh very little
on their budget. In this context, relative water demand rigidity between high and low
demand users may increase, with high income and high demand users being more willing
and able to afford the ever more scarce water as temperature increases. In the presence
of a Ramsey pricing policy (with price levels inversely related with price-elasticities of
demand) this would mean that the tariff schedule would tend towards IBT as temperature
increases and a bigger share of the water utility’s revenues would be generated by high
demand consumers. This may be an explanation for the fact that IBT’s are more frequent
in countries with hotter and drier climate, as it is in Europe where we find them mainly in
the Mediterranean countries. Further research in water demand estimation that explicitly
takes into account both climate variables and price structures could shed some light on
whether the conditions presented above actually hold.
4.5.2 Impact of scarcity on water consumption
We now evaluate the impacts of scarcity in a two-consumer version of the simplest model
from section 4.3 (with and without the budget balancing constraint). The welfare maxi-











As before, marginal benefit must be equal for both consumers, so that the marginal price
must be the same, and the effects of the weather on costs and on scarcity aren’t consumer-
specific, so there is no scarcity related reason to use increasing marginal prices.
This may no longer be the case when a breakeven constraint is imposed on the model,
resulting the inverse elasticity rule presented in equation (4.17). If both the physical and
the financial constraints are binding, the first-order conditions provide a solution for w∗1(φ),
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w∗2(φ) and µ
∗(φ), which can be used for comparative static analysis of φ. The main results
for the case without the budget balancing constraint can be summarized as follows:
• the sign for dµ
∗
dφ is undetermined, but will be positive if we assume that the mar-
ginal benefit of consumption increases more with drier weather conditions than the









is negative for both consumers, as expected, only in the case of homogeneous




) differ, then the sign becomes undetermined, specially for the type
whose demand increases more with the increase in temperature. If the consumer
types differ enough it may become efficient to have one type of consumers (those
whose willingness to pay increases more with temperature increases and the resulting
scarcity) increasing their water consumption during the drier periods at the cost of
the water savings of the one whose marginal benefits change less. This conclusion
can be interpreted in terms of high vs low demand consumer types as we have done so
far or in terms of different customer classes (residential customers, farmers, factories,
...) where some customer class increases consumption during the summer months
(for example, agricultural irrigation). The necessary and sufficient condition for
















is always negative. No consumer class increases consumption in
scarcity times no matter how valuable the water is to them. This is because, with Ramsey
pricing, the greater willingness to pay from one consumer type will be reflected in a less
elastic water demand. This is taken into account in the water utility optimization problem
which assigns the group’s optimal consumption a higher price (thus balancing the utility’s
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budget with second-best efficiency). The quantity demanded by the group falls accord-
ingly, so that in this context the higher valuation of water in a scarcity situation does not
provoke higher consumption, like it did in the case without the financial constraint, where
the group which valued water the most could, in some cases (through the utility’s pricing
decisions), "lead" the other to save water so it could consume more.
4.6 Dynamic analysis of scarcity
The previous models’ inclusion of weather/scarcity impacts not only on water availability,
but also on benefit and cost functions, can be carried over to a dynamic setting that en-
ables us to study the long run effects of climate change on water resources, namely on the
amount of necessary investment on water supply, treatment and storage infrastructure.
We adapt a dynamic model by Brock and Dechert (1985) for the public utility pricing
and investment decisions so it is consistent with the characteristics of our previous sta-
tic models. We consider, that in the long-run, water scarcity can be dealt with through
the combination of water demand management (through marginal cost pricing or Ramsey
pricing) and investment in water infrastructure. For example, seasonal water inflow vari-
ability can be dealt with through dam construction to stabilize the amount of available
water supply, thus allowing average yearly water availability to increase. Or alternative
sources, other than surface water, can be explored, like groundwater pumping or seawa-
ter desalination. The main novelty in the dynamic model is the introduction of a water
availability production function depending positively on capital invested in water supply
infrastructure and negatively on the weather variable.
Let t denote the time period, Kt the capital invested in water withdrawal, treatment,
storage and distribution infrastructure and Wt be determined by the water production
function:
Wt = f (Kt, φt) (4.27)
where ∂W∂K > 0, and
∂W
∂φ < 0 as before.
Capital can be built upon by investment in infrastructure, It, and it will depreciate at
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rate δ, so that its evolution through time is given by:
K̇ = I − δK
Following Brock and Dechert (1985), we assume the total investment cost in period
t to be given by It + c (It) (price of capital is normalized to 1), where c (It) represents
installation costs and ∂c(It)∂It > 0,
∂2c(It)
∂I2t
> 0. Furthermore, we denote by BL (wt, φt) =
B (wt, φt) − C (wt, φt) the social net benefit from water consumption. The assumptions
made in previous sections about the benefit and cost functions apply.
Assuming the resource constraint is binding, so that all the water made available
through the water supply infrastructure is consumed, and using r as the appropriate




e−rt {BL (f (Kt, φt) , φt)− It − c (It) dt (4.28)
s.t.
{
K̇ ≡ I − δK
K (0) = K0, K (∞) free
(4.29)










K̇ = I − δK (4.31)












In a steady-state situation, gross investment merely replaces depreciated capital, and
the cost of an additional unit of investment must be equal to the capitalized value of the
marginal benefit. It can be shown that the steady state is a saddle point. For every level
of current capital, only one investment decision will be located on the stable branches,
giving the solution for the investment variable in every time period. If we start from a
lower value for K than its steady-state value, than investment should be high initially and
it should decrease gradually as we approach the steady-state. If we start from a level of
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K above the steady-state value, than the investment should be lower than the depreciated
capital to allow for the amount of capital invested to decrease. Investment levels should
recover as the steady-state is approached.
It should be noted that, since the φ value to be considered in the long-run investment
decisions should in principle be an average expected value, unexpected and temporary
fluctuations in φ should not change the investment decisions nor the optimal steady-
state level of capital invested. We may then ask the comparative-static question of what
impact will an expected permanent increase in φ (such as the one that would occur for






, i.e., on the impact of increased temperature and water scarcity on
the marginal net benefit of additional units of capital. The steady-state levels of capital
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Condition 4.33 is similar to the one we found in Section 4.4 for the scarcity cost to
increase with temperature. This is expected given that in the dynamic model, water
availability can always be increased through investment. Condition 4.34 requires the
marginal productivity of capital not to decrease with water scarcity. If we reverse the
signs of the inequalities we have the necessary, albeit not sufficient, conditions for optimal
steady-state capital and investment levels to decrease with temperature.
Further research could combine the techniques of nonlinear pricing with optimal control
to investigate the long-run properties of nonlinear prices. A description of Ramsey pricing
in an isoperimetric problem is presented in Appendix B.
4.7 Conclusion
We set out to write this paper because of a puzzling question: if increasing block tariffs
for water are not recommended in theoretical economic models, why are they so popular
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in practice? Clearly, having one block where water is charged at a low price (or even a
small free allocation) can be justified by the need to ensure universal access to such a
vital good. Yet the IBT schemes we found were much more complex than that. Water
managers often mention that increasing rates signal scarcity and as such are a useful tool
in reducing resource use. We find, after a thorough revision of the literature and an
experimentation with different models, that a relatively strong conclusion stands out: the
best way to allocate water when scarcity occurs is to raise its price in accordance with its
true marginal cost, which includes the scarcity cost. Nonlinear pricing is a consequence of
consumer heterogeneity and not of scarcity considerations.
However, the shape of the resulting price schedule may, in specific circumstances,
be affected by the influence of the exogenous weather factor on the price-elasticities of
the demands for the different consumer types. If high demand consumers’ willingness to
pay for water rises more with temperature increases relative to low demand consumers
than IBT may be more appropriated in countries with hotter and drier climates. This
is consistent with the fact that mediterranean European countries are often mentioned
in OECD reports to make extensive use of IBT. Other results from our models are: the
impact of weather on the scarcity cost depends on the impact that weather has on the
marginal net benefit of water consumption; it may be efficient for some consumer types to
increase their water consumption in drier periods when marginal cost pricing is followed,
but that is not the case in the context of a Ramsey pricing policy. The positive association
of the impact of weather on the scarcity cost and on the marginal net benefit of water
consumption can be confirmed by introducing dynamic water availability explicitly into
the model.
The temporal variability of supply may originate from a regular and expected seasonal-
ity or from a more uncertain inter-annual irregularity of water inflows. One possibility for
extension of this work is that optimal coping strategies may be different, which can lead
us to reconsider the role of capital investments like dam construction in the stabilization
of water supply and in the prevention of droughts, namely when compared to demand
management tools such as pricing.
There are many other avenues for further research which can now be followed. One is
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the combination of dynamic water variability with nonlinear pricing techniques. In order
to assess the potential of nonlinear prices to promote efficiency in the use of water, to
reduce overall water demand, and to recover the costs of water supply, it is also important
to consider real water demand profiles. In chapter 5 we test whether the conditions
under which IBT is an efficient policy for drier countries hold. The assertion that IBT
are, per se, scarcity signals with the potential to influence consumer behavior even when
price elasticities are very low (as they tend to be for water) could also be tested with
econometric models. Finally, a comparison between the merits of nonlinear pricing and
optimal two-part tariffs regarding the efficiency coupled with a budget constraint in a
context of scarcity and consumer heterogeneity could be performed.
Chapter 5





Increasing block tariffs (IBT) are often supported as a good tool for achieving the goals of
equity and water conservation (Bithas (2008)). The lower prices charged for the first cubic
meters of water are meant to favour the consumers with lower incomes, using water mainly
for essential uses such as drinking, washing, bathing or flushing a toilet. The higher prices
for the following consumption blocks are set to induce water savings from more intensive
water users, usually associated with wealthier households and with nonessential uses such
as sprinkling gardens or filling pools. It is thus seen as a form of cross-subsidization of the
access to an essential good by the poorer through the penalization of wasteful consump-
tions of the richer. A third objective to be achieved through IBT is revenue neutrality
(Baumann, Boland and Hanemann (1997)) because they allow the utility to break-even,
while still using marginal-cost pricing for the upper blocks, in a situation of increasing
marginal costs1. If Ramsey pricing is used, no particular block rate will necessary equal
1The water industry is usually seen as a natural monopoly, with large fixed costs and decreasing average
costs. Nevertheless, if we consider the opportunity costs of using water resources in situations of scarcity,




marginal cost, but the prices for consumption units will come as close to the optimum
solution as allowed by the budget-balancing restriction2. One last justification for IBT
is the presence of a positive externality from a minimum amount of water consumption
from a public health point of view, "reducing the risks of communicable diseases through-
out the community" (Boland and Whittington (2000)). Cardadeiro (2005) develops the
argument that, up to a level of satisfaction of basic human needs, a positive public health
externality exists and derives the formal implications for an optimal water tariff, which,
in his proposal, should include two increasing rate blocks.
In spite of the growing popularity of IBT both in developed countries (OECD (2003a),
OECD (2006) and OECD (2009)) and in the developing world (Boland and Whittington
(2000)) they are also subject to criticism. Sibly (2006) argues that "IBT are inferior to
two-part tariffs" concerning efficiency and that equity goals could alternatively be achieved
through the service charge. Boland and Whittington (2000) also show the limitations of
IBT, proposing instead that a rebate be coupled with a uniform volumetric rate, for the
purpose of achieving a balanced budget for the water utility. Hewitt (2000) also points
out that IBT induce greater variability in the utilities’ revenues, especially if a great
proportion of users is consuming in the upper blocks and the variable component of the
tariff is significant relative to the fixed charge.
Even the equity argument for IBT has been subject to some criticism, especially re-
garding its application in the developing world. The existence of shared connections and
indirect purchasing of water from neighbors is pointed out by Whittington (1992) and
Boland and Whittington (2000) as a reality which may lead the poor to pay a higher price
for water if IBT are in place. The same argument has been used regarding households
with numerous members, more frequently associated with low income families (Dahan and
Nisan (2007) and Bithas (2008))3. Crase, O’Keefe and Burston (2007) sums up the merits
2 IBT may result from Ramsey pricing under certain conditions, but this is not a necessity. Uniform
rates or decreasing block tariffs can also be a result of a Ramsey pricing technique.
3See Barberán and Arbués (2009) for an example of a water tariff design proposal which takes into
account the household size in order to improve equity with increasing block tariffs. The same concerns
with the introduction of equity criteria in the design of residential water tariffs are reflected in the proposals
of García-Valiñas (2005a) for two-part tariffs and Ramsey pricing and in the proposal of Diakité et al. (2009)
for a nonlinear social price. Schoengold and Zilberman (2009) investigate the conditions under which tiered
pricing may simultaneously achieve the goals of efficiency, cost recovery and equity.
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and disadvantages of IBT while Baumann et al. (1997) presents some case studies of their
application.
Hewitt (2000), p. 275 notes that "utilities are more likely to voluntarily adopt this
market mimicking rate structure [IBT] if they are located in climates characterized by some
combination of hot, dry, sunny, and lengthy growing season", something that is confirmed
by the recent OECD publications (OECD (2003a)). In Europe they are more common
in the Mediterranean countries like Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece or Turkey, where the
majority of the utilities adopts them4. This also happens in Japan and South Korea,
which are located at a similar latitude. They are also common in countries like Belgium
and the USA and Australia but to a less extent. In Portugal, IBT are commonly used by
water utilities to price residential water use. Their presence is virtually universal, even
though the tariffs are decided at the level of each of the more than 300 municipalities, as
was showned in chapter 1. The National Regulating Authority for Water and Waste has
included a four-block tariff design in its proposal for a tariff regime that should seek to
promote efficient water pricing, as imposed by the European Water Framework Directive,
approved in 2000 and translated into the new Portuguese Water Law in 2005.
After reviewing the literature on water pricing models in chapter 3, we have shown in
chapter 4 that nonlinear increasing tariffs may be justified as a second-best optimum in a
situation of water scarcity and budget-balancing requirements when the water utility faces
heterogeneous consumers5. The conditions under which nonlinear increasing tariffs may
be justified by efficiency reasons as a second-best solution were derived. In this chapter
we aim to test whether those conditions hold in Portugal and whether the climate can
be a justification for the adoption of IBT. The answer to this question depends on the
characteristics of the water demand function, namely the behavior of its price-elasticity.
Therefore, we provide empirical estimations for residential water demand.
4See OECD (2003a), pp. 72-73, table 3.4, OECD (2006), pp. 32-33, table 5, and OECD (2009), pp.
100-101, annex 3.A2.
5A two-part tariff could be a first-best optimum, but its efficiency may be limited when the flexibility
to use the fixed charge to balance the utilities’ budgets is restricted. This is the case in Portugal, where
Law 12/2008 (AR (2008)) implies that charging a fixed fee must be reasonably justified. This has been
interpreted as a need to associate the revenues from the fixed charge with the fixed costs of the service,
which, if coupled with marginal cost pricing, may be insufficient for a balanced budget if marginal costs
are not constant.
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Households can be seen as heterogeneous consumers with different characteristics and
preferences. For example, the indoor water demand has been proven to differ from the
outdoor/sprinkling water demand6. The behavior of households regarding water use will
therefore be different, depending on whether they live in an apartment or in a detached
house with a swimming pool or a garden. Families also differ in the amount of water-using
appliances7 or water saving devices8 they have at home, in the number of persons in the
household or in their income. While the former are characteristics which can be trans-
lated into discrete variables, the latter varies in a continuous fashion. Although discrete
customer heterogeneity may also be interpreted in association with the different customer
classes (residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural), we will focus on residential water
demand, for which there is better available data.
Not only is water demand estimation important to allow us to test IBT efficiency
conditions, but it is also valuable in itself to water managers, as growing scarcity shifts
the focus from supply increasing policies to demand management tools like water pricing9.
Knowing consumers’ behavior is essential for the implementation of such demand side
management policies (Agthe, Billings and Buras (2003)). It is thus "desirable to estimate
water demand" given the "serious role that water demand plays in scarcity, policy and
project analysis, markets and pricing" (Griffin (2006), p.273). In the words of Renzetti
(2002), "for the person who is reading this book on a hot, sunny day, there is little
need to explain the importance of water and the value of understanding the relationship
between water use and economic influences" (ibid., p.1) (he then proceeds to present some
6Several studies find that price-elasticity of water demand is lower for indoor than for outdoor water
uses, for example: -0.23 (indoor) -1.6 to -0.7 (outdoor) (Howe and Jr (1967)); -0.305 (indoor) and -1.38
(outdoor) (Danielson (1979)); -0.07 (indoor) and -0.68 (outdoor) (Mansur and Olmstead (2007)).
7Batchelor (1975) and Ford and Ziegler (1981) incorporate the existence and number of water using ap-
pliances in their estimations of residential water demand at the household level, while Garcia and Reynaud
(2004), Nauges and Reynaud (2001) and Nauges and Thomas (2000) are examples of the incorporation
of these kind of concerns in studies with aggregate data through the use of variables such as the % of
households equiped with bathtubs or toilets.
8Yoo (2007) incorporates dummy variables for the existence of water saving devices in his study of
residential water demand.
9Martin and Kulakowski (1991), for whom "knowing that there is an inverse relantionship between
price and quantity demanded, and that price-elasticity of demand is inelastic rather than elastic, is all that
is required" is a notable exception disagreeing with the need to obtain precise price-elasticity estimates.
Nevertheless, at least one of the authors did find himself engaged in the activity he later finds unnecessary
(Martin and Thomas (1986), Martin, Ingram, Lancy and Griffin (1984)).
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justifications in the introduction to his book on water demand for all other readers).
We recall the efficiency conditions for IBT in section 5.2 and show that the impact
the choice of functional form can have on their empirical testing in section 5.3. In section
5.4 we briefly review the residential water demand literature and section 5.5 describes the
model to be estimated as well as the data. Section 5.6 explains the methodology, estimates
the model and interprets the results, while in section 5.7 the proper specification tests are
performed. Section 5.8 concludes.
5.2 An efficiency justification for increasing block tariffs
In this section we summarize the conditions, obtained in chapter 4, for IBT to be efficient,
which we will test using Portuguese data in the current chapter. In chapter 4, we have
derived the consequences for the water tariff design from using a second-best Ramsey pric-
ing method (i.e., with a budget balancing constraint) in a situation of water scarcity and
heterogeneous consumers. In particular we derived the necessary and sufficient condition
for increasing, constant and decreasing nonlinear pricing to be the most efficient solution
while respecting all constraints.10 The optimal pricing rule, shown here as equation (5.1)
is the classical inverse elasticity rule from Ramsey pricing, where pm is marginal price,
C is total cost and w∗ is the optimal water consumption. The additional unusual com-
ponent µ/ (1 + λ) results from the introduction of resource scarcity (µ is the Lagrangian
multiplier of the water scarcity constraint and λ is the one from the balanced budget
constraint) and reflects the opportunity cost of consuming water. Marginal water supply
costs are not only a function of water consumption, but also of weather factors. They
decrease with greater levels of rainfall and increase with higher temperatures (φ denotes
hotter and drier weather conditions). Naturally, weather also affects demand. Consumer
heterogeneity is represented by θ, which can stand for continuous characteristics like in-
come or discrete features like household size or other household attributes (owning a pool,
10We did not include fixed costs in the model nor did they consider the possibility of using the fixed
component of the tariff as a tool to guarantee that the utility breaks even. We implicitly considered that
the fixed charge is calculated so as to cover exactly the fixed costs of the water supply activity, which is
a situation similar to what is recognized as legally admissible in Portugal, since the publication of Law
12/2008 (AR (2008)).
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In the inverse-elasticity rule, the mark-up of the price over the marginal cost is inversely
correlated with the absolute value of the price-elasticity of demand (ξ(w∗, θ, φ)). This
implies that higher prices must be charged to customers with more rigid demands. The
tariff structure schedule will depend on the result of the following necessary and sufficient

















































≤ 0 is a sufficient condition for IBT to be an efficient solution.
In chapter 4 we also derived the conditions for which the implementation of IBT is
preferred for drier and hotter climates. The following set of conditions, if combined,














11 In the text we refer to increasing block tariffs and decreasing block tariffs, which are "real-world"
tariff schedules. Because the model from chapter 4 is derived in a continuous fashion, the conditions
apply strictly to continuously increasing, uniform or decreasing nonlinear tariffs and not to block rates.
Nevertheless, we use the conditions to discuss the efficiency in the increasing or decreasing nature of the








Condition (5.5) requires the water demand function to be concave. For (5.6) to apply
the slope of the inverse demand function must not become more steep with temperature
increases (or lower precipitation levels). Finally, (5.7) implies that the function’s concavity
could not decrease for higher levels of temperature and drier conditions. Taken together
they denote a situation where warmer and more arid conditions have a greater impact on
high levels of consumption and where the willingness to pay for water rises more signifi-
cantly under these circumstances, which can be understood if we consider the association
of larger users with households with greater incomes (whose water expenses weigh less on
their budget) and probably houses with pools or gardens.
It should be noted that, since the verification of the above conditions at the optimum
point of consumption is sufficient, they will also apply if they can be verified for the entire
range of the demand function. Our econometric estimation of water demand will aim to
check whether these theoretical conditions hold for the Portuguese case.
5.3 The importance of the choice of functional form
Given the findings in the previous literature, which we review in section 5.4, the water
demand function can be written as:
w = w (p, θ, φ, z) (5.8)
where w is the quantity of water demanded and p is the water price. As was previously
mentioned, θ stands for income and φ represents weather variables such as temperature
and precipitation. The vector z can include other household attibutes related to water
consumption like garden or household size, the age and education of the household mem-
bers or the number of water using appliances, just to name a few. w (. . .) is a parametric
function which usually takes one of the functional forms we now describe.
The choice of the functional form for the equation to be estimated is one of the im-
portant decisions to be taken by the empirical analyst. Five types of functional forms are
more commonly used in the estimation of residential water demand: linear, double-log;
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semilogarithmic (lin-log or log-lin) and Stone-Geary. The choice of one of these options
is not neutral and can have an impact on the results. Espey, Espey and Shaw (1997) and
Dalhuisen, Florax, de Groot and Nijkamp (2003) include a dummy variable for loglinear
specifications in their meta-analysis of the price-elasticities of water demand estimated in
the literature and find positive coefficients, meaning that, ceteris paribus, a loglinear spec-
ification may result in a less elastic estimate. This fact is known to empirical researchers,
despite the fact that it has received less attention than other aspects of the estimation
process like the choice of the estimation technique (Renzetti (2002)). In this section we
evaluate the consequences of different functional forms for the verification of the previous
conditions for IBT.
5.3.1 Linear specification
Linear functions are common in water demand estimation, although more so in the early
years than in recent studies. A linear demand function has the following form:
w = ap+ bθ + cφ+ dz′ + f (5.9)
where a, b, c, d and f are parameters to be estimated. The corresponding inverted
demand function is:
p =
w − (bθ + cφ+ dz′ + f)
a
(5.10)
With this kind of functional form, not only is the sufficient condition for IBT (condition
(5.5)) automatically verified, but that is also the case for conditions (5.6) and (5.7). This
was expected because linear functions impose that demand is more elastic for higher levels
of price (lower consumption levels) and lower otherwise. In linear demand functions,
absolute values of the price-elasticity of demand decrease with the quantity demanded,
generating IBT when coupled with the inverse elasticity rule from (5.1).
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5.3.2 Double-log specification
Even more popular than the linear specification is the logarithmic functional form or
double-log12. Double-log demand specifications assume a constant price-elasticity for every
price level which can be read directly from the estimated coefficient for price. The double-
log functional form for water demand can be written in the following fashion:
lnw = a ln p+ b ln θ + c lnφ+ dz′ + f (5.11)
The corresponding inverted demand function is:
p = exp
{




Condition (5.5) is verified in this case if and only if a ≥ 1, but this implies a nonnegative
slope for the demand function, which would be an unrealistic assumption. Therefore,
unlike in the linear case, (5.5) will never be verified for a reasonable demand function with
a double-log functional form. However, this does not mean that double-log specifications
exclude the possibility of IBT, since we can use the necessary and sufficient condition (5.2)
to determine the shape of the price schedule. Finally, the verification of conditions (5.6)
and (5.7) would simply require a positive coefficient for φ.
5.3.3 Semilogarithmic specification (log-lin)
The semilogarithmic specification is much less frequent in the residential water demand
estimation literature, but from Andrews and Gibbs (1975) to Arbués and Villanúa (2006),
we do find some studies which include estimations with this functional form. The log-lin
specification for water demand is:
lnw = ap+ bθ + cφ+ dz′ + f (5.13)
The corresponding inverted water demand function is:
p =
lnw− (bθ + cφ+ dz′ + f)
a
(5.14)
12This can be seen from the two meta analysis performed by Espey et al. (1997) and Dalhuisen et al.
(2003) where the majority of the studies used logarithmic functional forms.
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The verification of (5.5) for a log-lin specification would only occur if and only if a ≥ 0,
which is a situation similar to the one found for the double-log form, i.e., the verification
of the sufficient condition for IBT would imply a nondecreasing slope for the demand
function, and can thus be discarded as unrealistic13. Although conditions (5.6) and (5.7)
are automatically verified for the log-lin form, the positive effect of temperature on the
adoption of IBT would be proven from the simultaneous verification of all three conditions,
which is impossible with the usual negative sloping demand function14.
5.3.4 Semilogarithmic specification (lin-log)
The lin-log semilogarithmic specification is rare and is usually only estimated for compari-
son purposes together with other functional forms. Al-Qunaibet and Johnston (1985) and
Mu, Whittington and Briscoe (1990) are two examples of its implementation. The lin-log
functional form for water demand is:
w = a lnp+ b ln θ + c lnφ+ dz′ + f (5.15)
The corresponding inverted water demand function is:
p = exp
{




With this functional form condition (5.5) is never verified, not even in unrealistic
conditions. The inverted water demand function is always strictly convex. The other
two conditions would imply a nonnegative value for c and an opposite sign for a if c is
positive, but this becomes irrelevant given the first result. Although not dismissing entirely
the possibility of IBT, this functional form does not enable the verification of the above
sufficient conditions for IBT.
5.3.5 Stone-Geary demand function and reciprocal functions in general
The Stone-Geary demand specification is:
w = (1− g)h+ g
θ
p
+ cφ+ dz′ + f (5.17)
13The same qualification applies here that this is an unconclusive case and not a dismissal of IBT and
that we must always check 5.2 for a definitive conclusion.
14Recall also the relatively more complex necessary and sufficient conditions for hotter and drier condi-
tions to favour the adoption of IBT derived in chapter 4 .
156
The parameter g can be interpreted as the fixed proportion of the supernumerary
income15 spent on water. This specification was first applied to water demand estimation




w− [(1− g)h+ cφ+ dz′ + f ]
(5.18)
We can see that the Stone-Geary is a particular form of the reciprocal demand function,




+ bθ + cφ+ dz′ + f∗ (5.19)
In fact, the conclusions are indeed the same for both forms. Because water consumption
must not be less than the subsistence level implied by (1− a) b+cφ+dz′+f , the verification
of (5.5) will only happen if and only if a = 0. But this would mean that water consumption
was unresponsive to price and income, contradicting economic theory and a great deal
of accumulated empirical evidence. Thus the estimation of a significative Stone-Geary
functional form (or any kind of reciprocal form), if considered superior to other functional
forms by the relevant statistical tests, implies that we can not prove the sufficient condition
for IBT.17
5.3.6 Summary of implications of the choice of functional form on elas-
ticities of demand
We have shown that the choice of functional form can have a significant impact on the
conclusions about which tariff schedule design is more adequate when facing water scarcity
and budget balancing restrictions by looking at the sufficient conditions derived in chapter
4 about the shape of the demand function. Summing up, so far we have seen that while
15Supernumerary income is defined as the income remaining after the minimum amounts of water and
all other goods have been purchased (Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges (2004)). This minimum amounts are
unresponsive to the respective price and are usually termed subsistence levels. The simplified version of
(5.17) results from assuming a zero subsistence level for the other goods. See Gaudin, Griffin and Sickles
(2001) or Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges (2004) for more details.
16García-Valiñas, Nauges and Reynaud (2009) and Schleich (2009) are examples of recent applications.
17 (5.6) would be verified if c ≤ 0, which is unrealistic, while (5.7) implies that a and c must have opposite
signs or that both should be null.
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for the linear functional form the conditions for IBT are automatically verified and hotter
and drier climatic conditions favour the adoption of IBT18, for the other usual functional
forms, we must resort to (5.2) to know with certainty what would be the most efficient
tariff schedule.
Nevertheless, from the inverse elasticity rule we know that a necessary and sufficient
condition for IBT is that demand becomes less price-elastic with higher levels of water
consumption. We can look directly at the influence of the assumptions imposed by each
functional form on the behavior of the price-elasticity of demand. We review these conse-
quences in this section. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the price and income-elasticities for the
functional forms described above. We can see from 5.1 that demand becomes less elastic
(price-elasticity becomes less negative) with higher consumption for most functional forms.
Only the double-log case is associated with constant elasticities (which makes up most of
its appeal) and the Stone-Geary specification has an undetermined result, dependent on
the actual values of the variables and the parameters associated. For all the cases except
these two, under the conditions of our model, IBT will be a natural consequence of demand
characteristics. The next step is to estimate the water demand and test which case fits
best.


















Semilogarithmic (log-lin) ap =lnw− (bθ + cφ+ dz′ + f) >0
Semilogarithmic (lin-log) aw >0





b, c, g > 0
bθ + cφ+ dz′+f > 0
lnw−
(
bθ + cφ+ dz′ + f
)
> 0
18Especially if the fixed charge is not allowed the flexibility of a lump sum charge when the utility is faced
with the obligation to exactly breakeven, in a world of scarce water and consumers with heterogeneous
preferences.
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The field of residential water demand has been very productive in the past decades, ever
since Metcalf (1926) took on the task of studying the effects of water rates on per capita
water consumption. The number of published studies in the field has risen to a three
digit figure, as can be seen from Appendix C. The existence of literature surveys can
be very useful to guide new research or someone just trying to figure out what have we
come to know about the role that price and demand-side management policies may play
in promoting an efficient use of an ever scarcer resource. Earlier studies are best cov-
ered by Boland, Dziegielewski, Baumann and Optiz (1984), but other literature reviews
can be found in Hanemann (1997a), Gómez-Ramos and Garrido-Colmenero (1998), Ren-
zetti (2002), Arbués, García-Valiñas and Martínez-Espiñeira (2003) and Worthington and
Hoffman (2008). Another, more quantitative source of information of the knowledge accu-
mulated so far are the two meta-analysis of the determinants of price-elasticity of demand
performed by Espey et al. (1997) and Dalhuisen et al. (2003). In Appendix C we provide
an extensive, but not exhaustive, listing of the residential water demand studies in the
literature and of their main characteristics.
Until the 1980’s estimations for the USA dominated the literature, but since the 1990’s
and especially after the turn of the century, a great number of estimations from other
parts of the world have been published, especially from Europe, although estimations
from the developing world have already warranted a specific literature review by Nauges
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and Whittington (2008). For Portugal two previous estimations can be found in Martins
and Fortunato (2005b) and Martins and Fortunato (2007).
The first few research efforts relied mostly on annual cross-section data for water
utilities and on limited information on the water tariffs (having access to the unit price for
a specific consumption amount instead of the entire rate schedule, for example). Nowadays,
the improvement of information available enables the inclusion of a time-series dimension
(and the study of seasonal variations, from monthly data) and the use of panel data is
common. There is also a growing number of studies using household level data.
Water demand estimation differs fundamentally from other statistically supported wa-
ter use studies in that a price variable is included as a determinant for water consumption.
Throughout the years, marginal price has for the most part replaced average price as the
specification of choice, but either because of data availability concerns or because the re-
searcher believes that the price specification is an empirical question, due to the fact that
consumers may not have full information on the rate schedule, average price specifications
are still used or tested against marginal price19. The consideration of sewer charges when
they appear coupled with the water price is consensual. When marginal price is the vari-
able of choice and block rates are in place, the Taylor-Nordin specification, introduced in
the water demand literature by Billings and Agthe (1980), is commonly used. It results
from a modification by Nordin (1976) of the original proposal made by Taylor (1975) for
a variable to accommodate the virtual income change resulting from the block design of
the tariff. It considers a second price-related variable, the "difference" between the actual
water bill and the value of the tariff, had all volume been charged at the marginal price.
Griffin, Martin and Wade (1981) and Griffin and Martin (1981) were the first to point
out the problem of the simultaneous determination of water demand and the price-related
variables in the presence of block rates. It is since considered good practice to check for
this bias in the estimation and, if present and significant, to solve it through instrumental
variable techniques.
Other variables typically included as water demand determinants are the household
income (or the assessed property value as a proxy in micro level studies), weather related
19Ruijs, Zimmermann and Berg (2008) is a recent example.
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variables such as temperature and precipitation, or alternatively lawn moisture require-
ments or the number of rainy/dry or hot days, and the household size (especially at the
micro level). The remaining variables included differ somewhat more, sometimes reflect-
ing specific research questions. We can find variables related to the age of the household
members or the house itself, to the water using appliances or the lot/garden size, popula-
tion density, home ownership (Nieswiadomy (1992)), pool ownership (Dandy, Nguyen and
Davies (1997)), water saving devices (Renwick and Archibald (1998) and Yoo (2007)) or
even ethnic origin (Griffin and Chang (1990) and Griffin and Chang (1991)). Dummy vari-
ables in particular have been used extensively for season/month, region/city, water restric-
tions (Grafton and Kompas (2007)) or water conservation programs/messages (Renwick
and Green (2000), Gaudin (2006) and Martínez-Espiñeira (2007)).
The functional form most widely used is the double-log specification for its convenience
for the calculation of elasticities. The linear form has also been widely used, while other
alternatives like the semilogarithmic or Stone-Geary approaches are rarer as we have seen
in section 5.3.
The estimation technique is probably the most widely discussed issue, after the speci-
fication of the price-related variables. While earlier studies relied heavily on ordinary least
squares, the endogeneity criticism soon stimulated the adoption of instrumental variable
techniques (2SLS or 3SLS). Other methods have been used like maximum likelihood esti-
mation, specific time-series techniques20 or simultaneous equations methods, but it is the
use of panel data techniques (fixed effects, random effects, GMM) that has seen the larger
increase in the last decade. The use of discrete/continuous choice models in situations were
block rates apply21 merits special attention, but researchers have rarely had access to the
necessarily more demanding information required to apply them in household level stud-
ies (Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins (2007), Olmstead
(2009)) or with aggregate data (Martínez-Espiñeira (2003) and Diakité et al. (2009)).
20The work of Martínez-Espiñeira (2007) with cointegration is a recent example.
21Modelling the discrete choice of block and the continuous choice of the consumption level.
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5.5 The model and the data
Data on water consumption and tariffs was provided by the Portuguese National Water
Institute (INAG) for the years 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2005. It consists of aggregate data
for the 278 municipalities in mainland Portugal. It has been combined with information
on the income, weather, water quality and household characteristics respectively from the
Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, the National Weather Institute (Instituto
de Meteorologia, I.P.), the Regulating Authority for Water and Waste Services (ERSAR,
ex-IRAR) and the National Statistics Institute (INE). Due to the presence of missing data
concerning consumption levels it constitutes an unbalanced panel for the study period. The
missing data problem was minimized through direct collection of additional information
on consumption and tariffs from the water and wastewater utilities of each municipality.
The estimation of model 5.8 is based on the following functional form and hypothesis:
consumptionit = f(mptotalit, diftotalit, incomeit, precit, tempit, (5.20)










In 5.20, w is replaced by consumption and the price related variables (p) are mptotal
and diftotal. θ is repesented by income, while the weather related variables (φ) are prec
and temp. waterqual, bathroom, elder and seasonal_dwelling correspond to the z vector
of variables in model 5.8. This simbology correspondence is established to enable the use
of Stata outputs in the following sections.
The formulation of the error variable as the sum of a municipality effect (αi) and an
autoregressive component (εit) is not assumed from the outset but is instead the result
of the preliminary analysis described in the next section. Tables 5.3 and 5.422 show the
definition of the main variables used23 and some summary statistics.
22The variables waterqual, bathroom, elder and waterqual are used in estimation as ratios varying from
0 to 1.
23Other variables were included in early larger models, but were droped due to the insignificance of the
coefficients estimated or to avoid high levels of multicolinearity in the final model. Examples of variables
tested and droped are average household size, % of population served by water supply and drainage systems
or wastewater treatment plants, frequency of billing, educational level attained, population density, house
age or % of detached houses in total buildings.
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Table 5.3: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
consumption Average monthly water consumption (m3/month)
mptotal Marginal price of water supply and sewage (€/m3)
diftotal Variable part of the water and sewage bill - (MP*Water) (€/month)
fixedtotal Fixed part of the water and sewage bill (€/month)
Income Per capita available income (€103/person/year)
prec Total annual precipitation (mm)
temp Average annual temperature (oC)
waterqual % of delivered water analysis failing to comply with mandatory parameters
bathroom % of regularly inhabited dwellings without shower or bathtub
elder % of population with 65 or more years of age
seasonal_dwelling % of dwellings with seasonal use
Table 5.4: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
consumption 884 7.46 2.21 2.46 19.50
mptotal 871 0.62 0.39 0.05 4.59
diftotal 875 -0.73 1.24 -14.35 2.50
fixedtotal 864 2.09 1.35 0.00 10.49
Income 1112 3.48 3.27 0.67 29.80
prec 1112 877.53 435.65 205.47 2807.75
temp 1112 15.27 1.34 10.93 18.15
waterqual 1106 4.06 4.40 0.00 40.09
bathroom 1112 9.75 5.54 7.91 33.76
elder 1112 20.83 6.33 7.52 42.02
seasonal_dwelling 1112 23.98 11.13 4.54 54.10
The consumption dependent variable used is average monthly residential water con-
sumption per customer24 in cubic meters. Because virtually all water utilities adopt IBT
we use the Taylor-Nordin specification with a marginal price (mptotal) coupled with the
"difference" variable between the value of the water and sewage bill and the value it
would reach had the marginal price been charged for all the volume consumed. Schefter
and David (1985) point that the correct definition of the marginal price and difference
variables for aggregate studies would be the average value of the household level of such
variables and not their level at the average consumption level for the aggregate. However,
24The database has an annual periodicity, from which average monthly figures are derived.
163
very few studies had available the necessary information about the proportion of users in
each block of the tariff structure to apply the theoretical correct definition and weight the
averages of marginal price and difference, despite the fact that the Taylor-Nordin specifica-
tion is widely accepted and used. Corral, Fisher and Hatch (1999) and Martínez-Espiñeira
(2003) are notable exceptions. In our contacts with the water utilities, such information
was explicitly asked for, but in the end less than a third were able to retrieve the informa-
tion from their databases or records. Even among those whose management and billing
software programs enabled the access to the % of users in each block, we found very few
of them who could provide it systematically for the 4 years of study. Therefore, we join
the mass of researchers using the best possible methods given the available data, when
more theoretically correct ones are unpractical.
Generally, in the presence of IBT, the difference variable is nonpositive25 and so is
its expected coefficient. However, Martins and Fortunato (2007) estimates a positive
coefficient and finds a justification in the fact that the difference variable includes both the
effect of the block schedule (nonpositive for IBT) and the positive fixed charge. The latter,
not only renders the average price decreasing for the first cubic meters of consumption but
also partially cancels out the usual effect of the block schedule. In contrast, we assume
fixed charges (fixedtotal) are made explicit in the water bill, since they are present in
virtually all residential tariffs, so that we can separate them from the "difference" variable
for the volumetric part of the tariff (diftotal).
The income variable chosen is disposable income per household (deducting the personal
income taxes collected from the taxable personal income) in €103/year26. The available
weather related variables are total annual precipitation (prec, in mm) and average annual
temperature (temp, in oC). A measure of the quality of water delivered to the consumers
25This is the case for the Portuguese water supply tariffs. In our estimation we add the relevant charge
for wastewater drainage and treatment to the price variables to come up with the prices that the consumer
actually faces in the water bill. Because it is not uncommon to find fixed charges per block of consumption
(fixed within the block, but varying between blocks) in wastewater tariffs, the sewage component of the
"difference" variable may be positive for volumes other than the block limits even with IBT. This effect
can also be seen from the tariffs for Manila, Phillipines, shown in Palencia (1988).
26All monetary variables are expressed in 2005 constant prices. We used the deflator for Portuguese GDP
at market prices, unit Euro/ECU, supplied by AMECO — Annual Macroeconomic Database of Directorate
General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) of the European Commission).
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(waterqual) is given by the % of failures to comply with mandatory quality parameters
in the analysis performed by ERSAR (ex-IRAR). We expect a negative association be-
tween this variable and water consumption. Ford and Ziegler (1981) were the first to
introduce a measure of perceived water quality as an explanatory factor for residential
water demand. In spite of the several studies trying to estimate the willingness to pay
for improved tap water quality (Whitehead (1995) and Um, Kwak and Kim (2002)) or
improved service quality (Hensher, Shore and Train (2005) and Wang, Xie and Li (2008))
we found no other examples of the introduction of water quality as a regressor in water
demand estimations before Piper (2003) who introduced water hardness as a measure of
delivered water quality which can be perceived by the consumers. Two other recent stud-
ies use quality measures but pertaining to raw water. Reynaud, Renzetti and Villeneuve
(2005) uses average biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) of raw water and Reynaud (2008)
includes the share of rivers classified as bad quality within a given local community as
regressors in water demand estimation.
The remaining conditioning variables, collected from INE, are the % of the population
with 65 or more years of age in the municipality, % of inhabited residential dwellings
without a shower or bathtub installed and the % of houses with a seasonal use. We expect
negative coefficients for these variables.
The % of elderly people has been used as a determinant of water demand by Nauges
and Thomas (2000), Nauges and Reynaud (2001), Martínez-Espiñeira (2002), Martínez-
Espiñeira (2003) and Martins and Fortunato (2007). They all have convincingly shown
that older people use less water. The results are not so clear when the variable used
is average household age as is the case with Ford and Ziegler (1981) and Schleich and
Hillenbrand (2009) which suggests that water savings are more related to elderly retired
people than to age in general27.
The importance of the existence of water using equipment on the amount of water de-
manded is recognized in many estimation studies which deal with household data through
the inclusion of variables like the number of taps (Ford and Ziegler (1981) and Renwick
27Yoo (2007) uses the number rather than the proportion of elderly people, what explains the positive
coefficient obtained.
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and Archibald (1998)) or the number of bathrooms (Chicoine, Deller and Ramamurthy
(1986) and Olmstead et al. (2007) are just two examples). Recently, aggregate studies have
began to use their the % of houses with bathtubs and/or toilets to take this dimension
into account (see, for example: Nauges and Thomas (2000), Nauges and Reynaud (2001)
or Garcia and Reynaud (2004)).
Seasonality in water demand was an early concern and was considered either through
the separation of indoor and outdoor/sprinkling water demands (Howe and Jr (1967))
or through the inclusion of seasonal dummy variables (Morgan (1974)). Nevertheless, its
relation with a seasonal population and not only with the seasonal behavior of a stable
population has failed to be considered. The exclusion of this dimension may bias the
results, especially in aggregate demand studies including areas with a great importance of
tourism, with a large proportion of emigrated population or with an important proportion
of secondary houses owned by people living in large nearby urban centres which use the
secondary house in weekends for example. This is the case in many areas of Portugal.
Algarve, for example greatly increases its population in the summer with tourists from
all over the country and from abroad filling up hotels and occupying rented or secondary
houses, which are usually left empty for the rest of the year (a phenomenon which happens
also in some other coastal areas with pleasant beaches although in a less intensive fashion).
The rural villages in the inland regions also increase their population in the summer
through the inflow of families with relatives who migrated to the urban centres or to
foreign countries. The usual procedure of dividing total volumes of water supplied by the
number of residential customers, used in aggregate studies, without consideration of this
reality, where it is important, creates the usual econometric problem of relevant variables
exclusion bias. The only other study known to the author which took these considerations
into account was Reynaud (2008) which considered not only a dummy variable for the
tourist areas but also the share of seasonal population through the inclusion of the ratio
between the number of hotel rooms and camping places and the total population. He finds
a positive effect of this latter variable on peak average daily residential water demand
per user and surprisingly the coefficient’s sign remains the same in the off-peak demand
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equation 28.
5.6 Methodology, estimation and results for a linear func-
tional form
The problem of endogeneity of marginal price (or average price) and the difference variable
in the presence of block rates, due to the fact that they are simultaneously determined
with the volume consumed, has been acknowledged since the famous comments of Grif-
fin et al. (1981) and Griffin and Martin (1981) on the estimations by Foster and Beattie
(1979) and Billings and Agthe (1980). Special importance has been given to the existence
of measurement error in the quantity variable and its influence on the block price assigned
to observations close to the block limits. Billings (1982) eventually reestimated the model
with the data set from Billings and Agthe (1980) while introducing instrumental variable
techniques in water demand estimation to correct the bias. His approach consisted of re-
gressing the total water bill resulting from specific consumption levels against those values
for consumption and obtaining the instrumented variable for price from the slope of the to-
tal bill function and the instrumented variable for difference from its intercept for each rate
schedule. This procedure, also followed by Agthe and Billings (1997), Martínez-Espiñeira
(2002), Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges (2004) and Martins and Fortunato (2007), for ex-
ample, has been criticized by Deller, Chicoine and Ramamurthy (1986) for not solving the
original measurement error problem, even if simultaneity in marginal price and difference
is eliminated. They also point out that if the consumer is responding to the total water bill
and not to the full information from the rate schedule the causality direction is inverted in
the auxiliary regression. In the end, this technique is not really helpful in our case given
that, with some exceptions of municipalities which did not update their tariffs in specific
years, every data point is a specific tariff schedule in our database. Therefore, we adopt
a procedure closer to Deller et al. (1986), Reynaud et al. (2005), Olmstead (2009) and
Ruijs et al. (2008) and instrument the endogenous variables from exact information from
the water bill. Namely we choose the marginal price corresponding to specific volumes of
28Only the latter variable is included in the final estimations for peak and off-peak demand.
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consumption29 and other characteristics relevant to the calculation of the final water bill
as regressors for the auxiliary equations for mptotal and diftotal.
mptotalit = β1 + β2privcompanyit + β3munservicesit + β4muncompanyit + β5m3_5it+
(5.22)
+β6m3_10it + β7m3_15it + β8calc_tariffit + αi + εit










Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present the definition and summary statistics of the variables used
to instrument mptotal and diftotal.30
Table 5.5: Definition of the variables used to instrument mptotal and diftotal
Variable Definition
privcompany dummy variable (=1 if the water supply utility is a private company)
munservices dummy variable (=1 if the water supply utility is an autonomous municipal service)
muncompany dummy variable (=1 if the water supply utility is a municipal company)
m3_1 Marginal price of water supply and sewage for a consumption of 1 cubic meter
m3_5 Marginal price of water supply and sewage for a consumption of 5 cubic meters
m3_10 Marginal price of water supply and sewage for a consumption of 10 cubic meters
m3_15 Marginal price of water supply and sewage for a consumption of 15 cubic meters
m3_20 Marginal price of water supply and sewage for a consumption of 20 cubic meters
calc_tariff dummy variable (=1 if all water is charged at the price of the last block reached)
The equations (5.22) and (5.23) were estimated by a random effects model31. The
results are presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2
29The specific volumes chosen resulted from previous analysis of instrument relevance and validity per-
formed with the Anderson, Sargan and difference in Sargan tests for the values 1m3, 5m3, 10m3, 15m3,
20m3, 25m3. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the results of the first two tests for the final specification.
30The fact that maximum values for the consecutive marginal prices do not have a monotonous increasing
order in spite of the wide spread use of IBT is due to the different processes used to calculate the final tariff.
Most water utilities charge each m3 of water at the price where it belongs. However, some charge the price
of the last block reached for all the volume consumed, generating high values for marginal prices at the
lower block limits (a graphical representation of this effect can be seen from Monteiro and Roseta-Palma
(2007)). This is the reason why calc_tariff becomes essential for the creation of instruments for mptotal
and diftotal.
31All estimations were performed in STATA version 9.2.
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Table 5.6: Summary statistics of the variables used to instrument mptotal and diftotal
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
privcompany 1112 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
munservices 1112 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
muncompany 1112 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
m3_1 1090 0.33 0.19 0.00 1.69
m3_5 1091 0.35 0.16 0.00 1.80
m3_10 1091 0.53 0.24 0.00 1.99
m3_15 1091 0.75 0.45 0.00 5.17
m3_20 1091 0.96 0.48 0.00 4.82
calc_tariff 1090 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Figure 5.1: Random effects regression for mptotal
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Figure 5.2: Random effects regression for diftotal
We implement a test of exogeneity by Davidson and MacKinnon (Davidson and MacK-
innon (1993)) and adapted to a panel data context by Christopher Baum and Steven
Sillman, through the dmexogxt procedure in Stata (Baum and Stillman (1999)), to con-
firm the endogeneity of mptotal and diftotal and the need to use instrumental variables.
Results are presented in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The small p-values of the test confirm the
need to create instrumental variables for these two endogenous regressors. This result is
confirmed by the usual Hausman test. The Hausman test statistic for the comparison
of the models with and without instrumenting for mptotal and diftotal has the value
of 147.11, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.0000 in a χ2(8). The test clearly rejects
the null hypothesis of exogenous regressors in the original model and the instrumenting
technique is called for.
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Figure 5.3: Davidson and MacKinnon test of exogeneity for mptotal
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Figure 5.4: Davidson and MacKinnon test of exogeneity for diftotal
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The relevance and the validity of the instruments used were tested through the An-
derson and Sargan tests, respectively, making use of the xtivreg2 command (Schaffer
(2007)).The null hypothesis of underidentification of the former test is rejected while the
null of instrument validity of the latter is not, which is a good measure of the quality of
the instruments used for both mptotal and diftotal, as can be seen in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
Difference-in-Sargan tests were performed on each separate instrument for mptotal and
diftotal to check their individual validity as instruments. None of the tests rejected the
null.
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Figure 5.5: Tests of instrument relevance and validity for mptotal
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Figure 5.6: Tests of instrument relevance and validity for diftotal
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For the next steps after correcting for endogenous regressors we follow the procedure
by Dalmas and Reynaud (2005) and Reynaud (2008) and start by testing the presence of
specific municipal effects in the data, i.e., comparing the random effects model with pooled
OLS through a Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects. Figure 5.7
shows that the null hypothesis of no specific municipal effects is clearly rejected, supporting
the two-error components model presented in (5.20).
Figure 5.7: Bresch Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
Before we resort to the Hausman test for the choice between random and fixed ef-
fects estimation, we perform tests for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, respectively
through the commands xttest3 and xtserial. xttest3 implements a modified Wald test
for group heteroskedasticity and we can see from Figure 5.8 that the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity is clearly rejected. xtserial implements an autocorrelation test discussed
by Wooldridge (2001) for linear panel data models. Figure 5.8 shows that the null hypoth-
esis of no autocorrelation in the residuals is also rejected. We adopt therefore a feasible
GLS estimator developed by Baltagi and Wu (1999) and implemented through the Stata
command xtregar.32
32 In this apect, our procedure departs from Dalmas and Reynaud (2005) and Reynaud (2008), who
perform the Hausman test after the BP-LM test without ttest for serial correlation, and is similar to the
one used by Martins and Fortunato (2007).
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Figure 5.8: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation tests
The Hausman test statistic for the comparison of the models with random and fixed
effects has the value of 8.44, which corresponds to a p-value of 0.3921 in a χ2(8). The
test does not reject the null hypothesis of independence between the municipal effects
and the exogenous regressors. Therefore, the GLS estimator is not only efficient but also
consistent.
Figure 5.9 presents the estimation results. All coefficients have the expected signs
and the great majority is significant at the 1% level. The value at the sample variable
means for the price-elasticity of demand is −0.124, a relatively small value, but in line
with the established result that water demand is price-inelastic. The estimated value is
significantly lower than the value of −0.558 estimated by Martins and Fortunato (2007)
for 5 Portuguese municipalities with monthly aggregate data33 but is similar to the values
estimated by Arbués-Gracia, Ortí and Martín (2008), Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges
(2004) and Martínez-Espiñeira (2002) respectively for Zaragoza, Seville and Galicia in
Spain, Reynaud (2008) and Nauges and Reynaud (2001) for the southwest of France or
33Our own estimation with our data for the 5 municipallities used by Martins and Fortunato (2007)
yielded a price-elasticity of −0.187, which reveals that this municipalities have an above average reaction
to price changes, but most of the difference is probably explained simply by the fact that the data used by
both studies has rather different characteristics. Dalhuisen et al. (2003) have shown that the frequency of
the data can have a significantly impact on the estimated price-elasticity and that estimations from monthly
data usually yield more elastic results than with annual data. The only comparable estimation performed
on the INSAAR data for all Portuguese water utilities in 2002 was done by Martins and Fortunato (2004),
but this work does not find a significant coefficient for the price variable.
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Grafton and Ward (2007) for Sydney in the New South Wales region of Australia. All
these regions have weather conditions similar to what can be found in Portugal. The
income elasticity is 0.036, also a low value. Curiously, low values estimated for income
elasticities are also not unheard of for regions at latitudes similar to Portugal and with
close weather conditions as can be seen from Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges (2004) for
Spain, Nauges and Thomas (2000), Nauges and Reynaud (2001) and Garcia and Reynaud
(2004) for France, Mylopoulos, Mentes and Theodossio (2004) for Greece, Nauges and
Blundell (2002) for Cyprus, Yoo (2007) for South Korea, Barkatullah (1996) for Australia
or Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991) for Texas, USA. The coefficients for the variables which
together compose the usual "difference" variable in the Taylor-Nordin price specification,
here decomposed into the block subsidy effect and the fixed charge, carry the expected
negative signs but are not significantly different from zero. This may be a demonstration
that consumers are not aware of the block subsidy effect or simply do not react to it for
being small in comparison to their household income. The fact that fixedtotal does not
affect water demand is expected and supported by economic theory due to the fact that
it is a fixed charge which does not vary with the amount of water consumed.
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Figure 5.9: Estimation results
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The weather related variables have the expected signs, i.e., water demand increases
with temperature and decreases with the amount of precipitation, although the coefficient
for the latter is not significantly different from zero34. As expected, the % of seasonally
inhabited dwellings has a significant negative effect on water consumption as does the %
of houses without a bathtub or a shower. The negative coefficient for the % of people with
65 or more years of age confirms the previous findings. Finally the significant and negative
coefficient for waterqual is a result which supports the view that consumers are aware of
the tap water quality and do decrease their consumption when they consider it inadequate,
perhaps turning to bottled water, private boreholes and wells or public fountains for their
drinking and cooking water needs. This finding adds to the evidence brought up by Ford
and Ziegler (1981), the only other study we are aware of that included delivered water
quality as an explanatory factor for residential water demand.
Some authors like Foster and Beattie (1981) criticize the Taylor-Nordin price specifi-
cation for assuming a fully informed consumer who is aware of the entire rate schedule
and who responds to it accordingly. They argue that the consumer may only be aware
of the total values of water expenditures and water consumption, supporting the use of
an average price specification. Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991) apply the test procedure
developed by Shin (1985) to test whether the consumer responds to the marginal or the
average price (aptotal) of water. They consider the following "price perception variable",
where k is the price perception parameter to be estimated:






A value of 0 for k would mean that consumers were responding to marginal price, rather
than average price, while a value of 1 would have the opposite meaning. The adaptation
of the test to our panel data framework proceeds as follows. The ratio aptotalmptotal (perceived)
is included in a double-log functional form for water demand which is of subsequently
34Perhaps a different specification for the rainfall variable could be a better explanatory variable for
residential water demand. For example, some authors like Olmstead et al. (2007) transform it into a
measure of effective rainfall ans subtract it from potential evapotranspitation to get a variable representing
the moisture requirement for lawns. Others like Schleich and Hillenbrand (2009) consider only the rainfall
occured in the summer months. Hoffmann et al. (2006) choose to use the number of rainy days, instead of
the actual amount of precipitation.
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estimated (Zit is the vector of the remaining exogenous regressors in logarithmic form and
δ3 the vector of their associated coefficients).
ln consumptionit = δ1 + δ2 lnmptotalit + δ2k ln perceivedit + δ3Z
′
it + αi + εit (5.26)
The error structure is similar to (5.21). k can be recovered after the estimation of
(5.26) by dividing the coefficients associated with lnperceived and lnmptotal. Because
the endogeneity suspicions apply to the average price as well as the marginal price, we
start by instrumenting it in the same fashion as we did with mptotal and diftotal.
aptotalit = ψ1 + ψ2fixedtotalit + ψ3m3_10it + ψ4calc_tariffit + αi + εit (5.27)
The estimation results from a random effects model for (5.27) are shown in Figure
5.10.
Figure 5.10: Random effects regression for aptotal
Figure 5.11 shows the low p-value for the Davidson and MacKinnon test of exogeneity
indicates that the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be accepted with confidence, which
supports the usual option on instrumenting the price variables in the presence of block
tariffs35.
35The Hausman test is not computable for this case.
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Figure 5.11: Davidson and MacKinnon test of exogeneity for aptotal
Figure 5.12 shows that the Anderson test rejects the null hypothesis of underidentifica-
tion, thus supporting the relevance of the instruments chosen, while the Sargan test does
not reject the null hypothesis of the instruments’ validity. Separate difference-in-Sargan
tests were performed on each instrument to check their individual validity as instruments
for aptotal. None of the tests rejected the null.
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Figure 5.12: Tests of instrument relevance and validity for aptotal
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The test statistic for (5.28) is 0.23 which corresponds to a p-value of 0.6326 in a χ2(1).
The test statistic for (5.29) is 8.66 which corresponds to a p-value of 0.0033 in a χ2(1).
The result is therefore very clear. (5.28) is not rejected while (5.29) is, meaning that
Portuguese consumers do respond to the marginal price and not to the average price of
water.
Figure 5.13: Estimation result of the auxiliary model for the price perception test
184
5.7 Functional form specification tests
We now turn to the question of choice of functional form. Table 5.7 presents the estimation
results for the functional forms considered in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The nonsignificant
variables from the Figure 5.9 were removed36. All coefficients retain the expected signs
already seen in Figure 5.9. Only bathroom and waterqual have somewhat less significant
coefficients in specific functional forms. All other coefficients are always significant at the
1% level.
Table 5.8 presents the calculations of the demand elasticities for the several functional
forms considered.We can see that the results for the price-elasticities are generally robust
to the choice of functional form, with only small variations between them.
To choose between the several functional forms presented in Table 5.7 we focus on
three different methods:
- an encompassing approach (Mizon and Richard (1986));
- a comprehensive approach (the J test) (Davidson and MacKinnon (1981));
- the PE test (MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983)).
The first two approaches will be used to compare nonnested models with the same
dependent variable, while the PE test will be used to compare models where consump-
tion is defined in natural logarithms with models where it is introduced without that
transformation.
36Besides the usual advantages for efficiency of removing insignificant variable from an econometric
model, the removal of diftotal has the additional advantage of enabling the estimation of the linlog and
double-log models, because it has both negative, null and positive values.
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Table 5.7: GLS regressions with AR(1) disturbances for several functional forms
Functional form Linear Double-log Log-lin Lin-log Stone-Geary
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
mptotalz -1.236*** -0.111*** -0.154*** -0.910*** -
(0.360) (0.027) (0.045) (0.213) -
income 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.010*** 0.594*** -
(0.030) (0.025) (0.004) (0.193) -
(income*103)/mptotalz - - - - 0.001***
- - - - (0.000)
temp 0.342*** 0.682*** 0.049*** 4.284*** 0.330***
(0.072) (0.138) (0.010) (1.055) (0.072)
seasonal_dwelling -3.952*** -0.124*** -0.647*** -0.891*** -3.429***
(1.087) (0.030) (0.140) (0.226) (1.055)
bathroom -5.815*** -0.043† -0.867*** -0.382* -4.608**
(2.120) (0.027) (0.273) (0.209) (2.056)
elder -7.353*** -0.211*** -1.025*** -1.409*** -7.141***
(1.840) (0.052) (0.235) (0.394) (1.844)
waterqual -2.807* -0.009 -0.374** -0.065 -2.128
(1.508) (0.007) (0.182) (0.054) (1.505)
intercept 5.864*** -0.734** 1.739*** -10.259*** 4.841***
(1.251) (0.368) (0.159) (2.825) (1.206)
N 873 830 873 830 873
Wald χ2 (7) 188.82 259.42 246.29 211.40 184.07
Prob >χ2 (7) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Price-elasticity -0.101 -0.111 -0.094 -0.122 -0.052
Income-elasticity 0.037 0.091 0.033 0.078 0.001
*** Significance at the 0.01 level
** Significance at the 0.05 level
* Significance at the 0.10 level
† Significance at the 0.15 level
Table 5.8: Summary of elasticity results for several functional forms
Functional form Linear Double-log Log-lin Lin-log Stone-Geary
Variable Elast. Elast. Elast. Elast. Elast.
mptotalz -0.101 -0.111 -0.094 -0.122 -0.052
income 0.037 0.091 0.033 0.078 0.001
temp 0.700 0.682 0.748 0.574 0.675
seasonal_dwelling -0.127 -0.124 -0.155 -0.119 -0.110
bathroom -0.076 -0.043 -0.085 -0.051 -0.060
elder -0.205 -0.211 -0.214 -0.189 -0.199
waterqual -0.153 -0.009 -0.015 -0.009 -0.012
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The encompassing approach starts by assuming one of the models being compared as
the base model. Then it proceeds to create and estimate a model were the variables from
the alternative model not included in the base model are added to it. The null hypothesis
of the test is that the coefficients of these additional variables are all zero. A t-test or
a Waldman F-test, depending on whether one or more additional regressors were added
to the base model, is performed to test the null hypothesis and the validity of the base
model. The role of each model can be reversed and the test performed again to the test
the validity of the alternative model37.
The comprehensive approach or J-test consists of adding to the base model the fitted
values of the alternative model and testing whether or not they are significantly different
from zero by means of a t-test38. The null hypothesis of a zero coefficient corresponds a
valid base model.
Finally, the PE test for the validity of the model with the linear specification of the
dependent variable (base model) involves adding to this base model the difference between
the natural logarithm of the fitted values for the base model and the fitted values for the
alternative model (the one with the dependent variable in logarithms). The null hypothesis
that the coefficient of this additional regressor is zero, supports the linear model if it is
not rejected and invalidates it against the alternative otherwise. To test the validity of the
model with the dependent variable in logarithms we must add to the loglinear model the
difference between fitted values of the linear model and the exponential function of the
fitted values of the loglinear model. The null hypothesis for this second model states that
the coefficient of this additional regressor is zero. If rejected it invalidates the loglinear
model, but if not rejected, then it may be preferable. The PE test is an adaptation of the
J-test for different dependent variables39.
Table 5.9 shows the results of the relevant specification tests for comparing the different
functional forms and the preferred one for each comparison. Summing up, we can see that
the semilogarithmic functional form log-lin performs worst than any of the alternatives.
37See Greene (2003), p. 154, and Verbeek (2000), pp. 55-6, for further details.
38See Greene (2003), pp. 154-5, and Verbeek (2000), p. 56, for further details.
39See Greene (2003), pp. 178-80, and Verbeek (2000), p. 56-7, for further details.
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The Stone-Geary form is also rejected when compared to the linear or to the lin-log
semilogarithmic forms. The linear functional form is also not the preferred as it is discarded
when compared to the lin-log alternative. The only alternative which is not rejected when
compared with the lin-log is the double-log specification. The PE test rejects either form
and none is preferred. The double-log specification is preferred to the semilogarithmic log-
lin, but the tests fail to decide when it is compared to any of the other three alternatives.
In the end we are left with an inconclusive choice between the semilogarithmic lin-log
functional for and the double-log specification. This is unfortunate as we have seen that
the former would justify IBT, while the latter would recommend an uniform volumetric
rate (either of them coupled with a fixed charge, leading to a multi-part tariff for the
former and a two-part tariff for the latter).
Table 5.9: Specification tests results and resulting preferred functional form
Funct. form Double-log Log-lin Lin-log Stone-Geary
Linear undetermined Linear Lin-log Linear
Encompassing - - (H0 : linear; F -test: 0 .070) (H0 : linear; t-test: 0.365)
- - (H0 : lin -log ; F -test: 0 .822) (H0 : SG ; F-test: 0.152)
Comprehensive (H0 : linear; t-test: 0.016) (H0 : linear; t-test: 0.537) (H0 : linear; t-test: 0.002) (H0 : linear; t-test: 0.365)
(J-test or PE-test) (H0 : d -log ; t-test: 0.003) (H0 : log -lin; t-test: 0 .000) (H0 : lin-log; t-test: 0.558) (H0 : SG ; t-test: 0.065)
Double-log - Double-log undetermined undetermined
Encompassing (H0 : d -log; F -test: 0 .404) - -
(H0 : log-lin ; F -test: 0.025) - -
Comprehensive (H0 : d -log ; t-test: 0.227) (H0 : d -log ; t-test: 0.000) (H0 : log-lin; t-test: 0.020)
(J-test or PE-test) (H0 : log -lin; t-test: 0 .001) (H0 : lin-log; t-test: 0.002) (H0 : SG ; t-test: 0.001)
Log-lin - - Lin-log Stone-Geary
Comprehensive (H0 : log -lin; t-test: 0.000) (H0 : log-lin; t-test: 0.535)
(J-test or PE-test) (H0 : lin-log; t-test: 0.472) (H0 : SG ; t-test: 0.002)
Lin-log - - - Lin-log
Encompassing (H0 : lin -log ; F -test: 0 .783)
(H0 : SG ; F-test: 0.031)
Comprehensive (H0 : lin-log; t-test: 0.639)
(J-test or PE-test) (H0 : SG ; t-test: 0.000)
Our analysis of the Portuguese residential water demand does not enable us to conclude
if the IBT universally applied by the Portuguese water utilities for residential water supply
and to a much lesser extent to the wastewater component of the water bill can be grounded
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on efficiency reasons, besides the usual justifications for its implementation based on equity
or water conservation concerns. We were, nevertheless, unable to dismiss this possibility
when the conditions described by Roseta-Palma and Monteiro (2008) apply.
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5.8 Conclusion
We tested the conditions derived by Roseta-Palma and Monteiro (2008) for IBT to be a
second-best pricing practice under water scarcity and budget balancing constraints, when
consumers are heterogeneous and the fixed charge is only allowed to cover fixed costs and
not to act as a lump sum charge in order to guarantee cost recovery by the water utility.
The choice of functional form, which is most usually based on convenience for the practical
research objective at hand, is shown to be essential in determining the outcome of such a
test. While a linear or semilogarithmic specifications would lead us to conclude that IBT
are justified, a double-log functional form would recommend a uniform volumetric rate
and a Stone-Geary specification would make the choice of tariff schedule design dependent
on the estimated values of the coefficients associated with each regressor.
We estimate residential water demand for Portugal for a panel of annual data at
the municipal level for four different years through a random effects GLS estimator with
AR(1) disturbances and make the choice of functional form dependent on the appropriate
statistical specification tests for comparing each pair of alternative hypothesis (like the
J-test or the PE-test). We are left with an inconclusive choice between a semilogarithmic
lin-log functional form and a double-log specification. Therefore it has not been proved
that the use of IBT can have efficiency justifications, besides the usual equity and water
conservation concerns, but such possibility could not be dismissed.
The results for the water demand determinants confirm that residential water demand
does respond to the marginal and not to the average price, although it is inelastic. Besides
the usual positive impact of income, temperature and water using appliances and the neg-
ative impact of the proportion of elderly people, we show that the proportion of seasonally
inhabited dwellings and a reduced water quality on delivery can have a significant negative
influence on the amount of water households consume.
Future research on the Portuguese water demand could try to improve the data avail-
able, gathering household level information to explicitly model the choice of consumption
block and include more specific household characteristics, like gardens and pools. Intra-
annual data would also be valuable in the identification of seasonal consumption patterns
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or in the separation of indoor and outdoor water demand, enabling further research on
whether seasonally differentiated tariffs are called for. Furthermore, if the frequency of
observations was similar to the billing frequency, lagged price specifications coud be tested
and the speed of adoption of water saving measures in response to higher prices could also
be investigated. Finally, the combination of water demand estimations with research on
the costs of water supply and sewerage would be valuable to better assess the potential
of the tariff schedules to contribute to the objectives set out by the Water Framework
Directive for 2010 regarding the establishment of efficient water prices and adequate cost
recovery levels. Furthermore, if cost savings could be made, by the water utilities by seiz-
ing economies of scale for example, adequate cost recovery levels might be achieved with
a lesser impact on tariffs and consumers.
Chapter 6
Estimation of Cost Functions for
the Portuguese Water and
Wastewater Industry
6.1 Introduction
Water policy in Portugal, as in many other countries, is currently focused on two main
issues: demand management and water supply. On the demand side, the focus has been
on the implementation of the management policies advocated by the European Water
Framework Directive in 2000 (EU (2000)) and transcribed in the new Portuguese Water
Law in 2005 (AR (2005)) and the new Economic and Financial Regime for Water Resources
in 2008 (MAOTDR (2008a)). The principle of adequate cost recovery (including scarcity
and environmental costs) has led to the creation of a water resources charge, which will
put a price on the water resources abstracted from the environment and help finance
the newly created River Basin Authorities. The new tariff regulation, prepared by the
Regulating Authority on Water and Waste Services (ERSAR, ex-IRAR) will help to bring
some harmonization and to introduce increased concerns with water use efficiency and cost
recovery into the design of water tariffs for final users. There is also an explicit concern
with the promotion of water use efficiency (LNEC-ISA (2001)).
The supply side is mainly guided by the Second National Strategic Plan for Water
Supply, Sewerage and Waste Water - PEAASAR II 2007-2013 (MAOTDR (2007a)), which
states the amounts of public European and national governmental funding which will be
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allocated to the required investments in the industry, namely to improve the levels of
population covered by adequate water supply and wastewater drainage and treatment ser-
vices. A plan to build ten large water dams was recently approved, but these are mainly
focused on the generation of electricity from hydropower, although they will also add to the
national strategic water reserves for water supply and a few of them could also benefit irri-
gation farming (COBA-PROCESL (2007)). Thus, we can say that a combination of water
demand management policies is being coupled with water supply enhancing investments.
This paper focus on the supply side.
Two of the structural problems identified by PEAASAR II in the Portuguese water
industry are (MAOTDR (2007a), p.33):
- "The existence of a significative number of small systems, unable to seize economies
of scale";
- "The separate management of water supply and wastewater sewerage, lacking inte-
gration from the perspective of the urban water cycle, ruling out a correct articulation
between abstractions and rejections".
In response to the identified problems the plan seeks to promote economies of scale
and scope in the industry, mainly at the bulk water level where the fusions of different
multimunicipal systems are explicitly called for where these types of economies could be
seized, but also at the retail level. Economies of scale exist when an increase in output
is associated with a less than proportional increase in costs, which implies a decreasing
average cost. Diseconomies of scale exist if there is a more then proportional increase in
costs associated to an increase in output1. Scope economies exist when the cost of jointly
producing a set of outputs is less than the sum of the costs of their separate production
by specialized firms (Cabral (2000), pp. 23-4). Economies of scope can be positive, null
or negative2.
1The concept of economies of scale can be associated with but is not the same as returns to scale. The
latter is a measure of how output varies relative to proportional increases in all inputs. Returns to scale
are said to be increasing, decreasing or constant if the output increases proportionally more, less or the
same, respectively, relative to the input increase in scale.
2 In our case, a situation of positive scope economies would mean that the costs for a single utility of
providing both water supply and sewerage would be less than the sum of the costs of two utilities providing
the two services separately.
193
The formulated strategy for the territorial organization of the retail part of the business
is said to be based on the following principle (among others): "territorial integration of
the solutions in a plurimunicipal logic, similar to what already happens in the "bulk"
part, and involving the water supply and wastewater sewerage components, enabling the
generation of economies of scale and scope and the solidary and articulated solution of
the coverage problem in the area of intervention of each system" (MAOTDR (2007a),
p.57). The public holding company for the industry has already been playing a significant
role in promoting this solution to the municipalities responsible for the retail systems.
Solving supply problems at the retail level is the main challenge for the period 2007-2013,
after the previous plan had a greater impact at the bulk level, during the period 2000-
2006. The choice of the best management model (regarding size and system connections in
addittion to ownership), together with the investment in infrastructure to improve coverage
levels, as well as the adoption of tariffs that promote water use efficiency and the financial
sustainability of water utilities (matching cost recovery concerns with the population’s
economic means) make up the set of the three main problems to be addressed.
For all these reasons, this is the right time to be thinking about whether the Portuguese
water industry is seizing the opportunities to grab hold of the possible scale and scope
economies revealed by its cost structure. Our paper seeks to contribute to this discussion
through the estimation of the cost function for water supply and wastewater drainage
and treatment in the Portuguese industry. We review the literature on the econometric
estimation of the water cost function in section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents the models and
the methodology used, while section 6.4 present the database. The estimation results and
the findings regarding economies of scale and scope are described in sections 6.5, 6.6 and
6.7. Section 6.8 concludes.
6.2 Literature review
The literature concerning the econometric estimations for the water supply cost function
started in the end of the 1960’s with the works of Ford and Warford (1969) for a cross
section of 162 water utilities in England and Wales and Hines (1969) for a thirteen-year
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panel of 52 water utilities in Wisconsin, USA. The number of published studies has grown
since, with cross-sectional databases dominating until the turn of the century and panel
databases assuming a more prominent role since. Studies based on single-utility time-series
data are scarcer3.
Several econometric estimation techniques have been applied in the field. The initial
use of ordinary least squares has by now virtually subsided and other methods have taken
its place like seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), maximum likelihood estimation and
panel data techniques like random effects estimators or GMM. The most common method
is SUR, developed by Zellner (1962) and applied to the estimation of the water cost
function in combination with the inputs’ cost shares, through the use of Shephard’s lemma,
as we shall see below.
The initial studies published used mostly data from the USA. The first publication, to
our best knowledge, to use data from other than North America (USA and Canada) or the
UK was Kim and Lee (1998) which used a panel of 42 utilities from South Korea, more
than thirty years after the seminal works. The last decade has seen some more research
in other European countries like Italy (Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000)), France (Garcia and
Thomas (2001)), Germany (Sauer (2005)), Spain (García-Valiñas (2005a)) and Slovenia
(Filippini, Hrovatin and Zoric (2008)). A number of works have also been undertaken in
Japan (Mizutani and Urakami (2001)) and in developing countries. The latter consisted
not only of studies for specific countries like Corton (2003) and Lin (2005), but also of
international databases like the IBNET4 to pool utilities from Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Africa and Asia (Nauges and Berg (2008b) and Nauges and Berg (2008a)) or the
Water Utilities Data Books provided by the Asian Development Bank to pool utilities from
Asian and Pacific countries (Estache and Rossi (2002)). For Portugal, three studies can
be found in unpublished working papers (Martins, Fortunato and Coelho (2006), Martins
et al. (2008) and Sampaio (2008)).
The dependent variable for these studies is usually either the total or the variable/operating
3The works of Renzetti (1992) for Vancouver, Canada, and García-Valiñas (2005a) for Seville, Spain,
are exceptional cases using time-series data for a single utility.
4 IBNET - The International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities, http://www.ib-
net.org/.
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cost of the water utility (a few early studies used unit costs instead of total values for the
utility). Essential to the definition of the cost function are the outputs produced. The
volume of water delivered is naturally the obvious first regressor to include. When data
on the amount of water delivered is not available, is usually replaced by water produced,
which is the sum of the surface water diversions, groundwater pumping and bulk water
acquisitions. When, on the contrary, the available data was more detailed, some authors
were able to use multi-output specifications and separate residential from other nonresi-
dential water uses (Renzetti (1992), Kim (1995) and Renzetti (1999)), bulk water supply
to other utilities from retail water supply to final customers (Torres and Paul (2006) and
Garcia, Moreaux and Reynaud (2007)) or to consider water delivered and water losses
as two outputs (one desired, the other not) (Garcia and Thomas (2001) and Martins
et al. (2008)). The multi-ouput framework has also been used by several authors to esti-
mate cost functions considering both the water supply and the wastewater collected (Lynk
(1993) and Martins, Fortunato and Coelho (2006) are respectively an early and a recent
example). Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983), Lynk (1993) and Hunt and Lynk (1995) addi-
tionally consider the environmental service provided by the water industry. Feigenbaum
and Teeples (1983) includes it in the list of regressors for an index of output (the output
hedonic function estimates are included in a second step in the cost function), while the
other two studies consider it directly in the cost function as an equally standing output like
water supply and wastewater collected. Finally, Fraquelli, Piacenza and Vannoni (2004)
considers a multi-output framework combining water, gas and electricity supply, but this
approach is not relevant for Portugal, at least at the retail level that our study considers5.
The other usual regressors are the input prices, namely for labour6, capital, energy,
consumables/chemicals and contracted out services. No matter how much disaggregation
has been applied by the researcher, a category for some miscellaneous inputs is tipically
added, not only because of the natural heterogeneity in this residual category of inputs, but
5At the bulk water level it might be more relevant due to recents trends related to the operation of
small hydropower facilities, biogas from controlled waste landfills and electricity generation from urban
and industrial solid waste burning.
6Teeples and Glyer (1987b) and Renzetti (1992) have further subdivided labour inputs into two or more
different categories.
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also because one or more of the aforementioned inputs often can’t be measured separately.
The number of customers and the length of the water distribution/wastewater collec-
tion network are also common among the chosen regressors, in order to disaggregate the
estimated value for the scale economies into returns for output, customer density, or even
spatial density. Other possible explaining factors are: area served; pumping and storage
capacity; % of water delivered to nonresidential customers; % of metered connections; %
of raw water undergoing a given level of treatment7; types of water sources; drinking water
quality measures; % of water losses8; service interruptions.
An additional factor deserves special attention. The type of ownership, public or
private, is also often included as an explaining factor. Moreover, testing the hypothesis
that these two types of ownership are associated with different efficiency levels has been
the drive of much of the research in this literature, the estimation of the cost function being
an obvious tool for that goal9. Because efficiency is the main concern and the hypothesis
is that not all water utilities operate at the minimum possible cost, many studies estimate
stochastic cost frontiers rather than cost functions for the average utility in the sample10.
The ownership effects are, according to Martins et al. (2008), only one of the three main
motivations for the estimation of the water cost function. The other two are the design of
optimal price schemes and the test of the existence of economies of scale and scope. While
this paper will focus on the latter issue, the estimation of the cost function for the water
industry is also an important step for the future assessment of the characteristics of the
Portuguese tariff schedules regarding efficiency and cost recovery11.
The most widely used functional form is the transcendental logarithmic, introduced by
Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1971) and first used to estimate a water cost function
by Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983). It may be interpreted as a second-order Taylor-series
7Which is used in alternative to the raw water quality.
8Or alternatively, the ratio of water delivered to the water produced.
9An alternative literature exists on the measurement of water utilities’ eficiency based on data envel-
opment analysis, but it falls outside the scope of our study. See Renzetti and Dupont (2008) for a recent
example.
10See Renzetti and Dupont (2004) for an overview of the literature focused on the question of ownership
and with a concern for the separation of cost functions and cost frontiers.
11Renzetti (1992), Kim (1995), Garcia and Reynaud (2004) and García-Valiñas (2005a) are examples
of studies combining the analysis of water demand and supply to assess the porperties of water tariff
schedules.
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approximation to the true cost function rather that the function itself. It is considered a
flexible functional form enabling elasticities of substitution and economies of scale to differ
for different output and cost levels. The loglinear form derived from the Cobb-Douglas
functional form for costs also enjoys some popularity, thanks to its ease of estimation and
the interpretation of coefficients as elasticities. The use of other specifications is rarer.
6.3 Models and methodology
We estimate three total cost function models, one for the water supply industry, another
for the wastewater drainage and treatment activity and a third combining both activities.
We choose the transcendental logarithmic (translog) functional form for its flexibility in
approximating the true total cost function. This functional form is the most widely used




















































































































where TC stands for total costs and Y , C and P represents outputs, number of cus-
tomers and inputs, respectively. j, k ∈
{
LWS , BWS , OTWS
}
are indexes for the three dif-
ferent inputs considered, labour, bulk water and all others (except capital, but including
energy) and q, r ∈ {delivered, losses} are indexes for the two types of outputs considered,
delivered water and water losses. ZWSm stands for theM additional relevant technical vari-
ables included in the regression in logarithms separately, while D are additional dummy
variables. The same translog specification is used for the estimation of the wastewater
drainage and treatment cost functions, except that the number of outputs is reduced to
one, the amount of wastewater collected, besides the obvious necessary adaptations in
interpretation of the remaining explanatory variables. The equation for the wastewater
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where j, k ∈
{
LWW , BWW , OTWW
}
is an index for the three different inputs con-
sidered, labour, bulk wastewater collection and all others (except capital, but including
energy). ZWWf stands for the F additional relevant technical variables included in the
regression separately, while D are additional dummy variables.
The specification for the multi-output cost function differs in that it considers two
outputs, the amount of water supplied and the volume of wastewater collected. Moreover,
the length of the distribution network has to be discarded for the model to be estimated
due to the amount of missing data it contains. The adapted model is then:
ln (TCit) = γ0 +
∑
q
γY q ln (Yqit) +
∑
q
γCq ln (Cqit) +
∑
j















































where j, k ∈ {L,B,OT} is an index for the three different inputs considered, labour,
bulk water/wastewater and all others (except capital, but including energy) and q, r ∈
{delivered, collected} are indexes for the two types of outputs considered water supply
and wastewater collection12. Zh stands for the H additional relevant technical variables
included in the regression separately, while D are additional dummy variables..
12Water losses could not be considered because the number of parameters to be estimated would be
greater than the available observations.
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In the previous equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3), i is a water utility index, t is a time
index. The α’s, β’s and γ’s are the parameters to be estimated. The estimated equation
assumes the usual symmetry conditions on the Hessian matrix: αjk = αkj, αY qr = αY rq
(model (6.1)), βjk = βkj (model (6.2)), γjk = γkj, γY qr = γY rq and γCqr = γCrq (model
(6.3)). Homogeneity of degree one in inputs is imposed by dividing the costs and the input
prices of labour, bulk water/wastewater and others by the price of capital13.
We assume the utilities operate at their cost minimizing optimum and apply Shephard’s
lemma14 to obtain the following equations for the inputs’ cost-shares associated with





































































We use the method of estimation developed by Zellner (1962) for the estimation of
seemingly unrelated regression equations to jointly estimate the following system composed
by the translog equation and by the cost shares. We do not consider the capital cost share
in the following simultaneous equations estimation procedures to avoid the singularity of
the variance-covariance matrix of errors16. We assume no specific effects exist and that
13This is equivalent to the imposition of the following restrictions:
∑
j αj = 1,
∑
j αjk = 0,
∑
j αY j =∑
j αCj = 0 (model (6.1));
∑
j βj = 1,
∑
j βjk = 0,
∑
j βY j =
∑
j βCj = 0 (model (6.2));
∑
j γj = 1,∑






γCqj = 0 (model (6.3)); where j, k ∈ {L,B,K,OT} is an index for the four
different inputs considered, labour, bulkwater/wastewater, capital and all others (including energy). This
is the reason why capital is not considered in equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3).
14See Varian (1992), p. 74 or Mas-Collel, Winston and Green (1995), p. 141.
15xjit is the derived demand of input j by utility i in year t.
16We used the SUREG procedure from STATA 9.2 software.
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the error component is white noise. The common procedure of mean-scaling all variables
(except dummies) as been applied, i.e., they were divided by their respective sample mean
before the logarithmic transformation. In this way, the estimated first-order coefficients
are all interpretable as cost elasticities evaluated at the sample mean.17
6.4 The data
Our research in this paper focuses on the utilities operating at the retail level, i.e., pro-
viding water services to households and other nonresidential customers and not on the
wholesale operators whose main activity is to provide bulk water to other utilities or to
collect and treat wastewater from them. Data on 289 water and wastewater utilities’ costs,
number of customers, volumes supplied/collected and the length of the water/wastewater
distribution/collection networks was provided by the Portuguese National Water Institute
(INAG) from the National Inventory of Water Supply and Wastewater Systems (INSAAR)
for the years 2002 and 200518, covering all municipalities of mainland Portugal19. In 260
municipalities, the utilities provide both water supply and sewerage services, but in the
remaining cases there are different utilities for each service (usually, the municipality con-
cedes the water supply operation and continues to operate the sewerage network). We
found one case where the retail water supply operation covering five municipalities was
provided by a single utility, but each municipality managed their own separate sewer-
age service. This results in having 271 utilities providing water supply, 275 draining and
treating wastewater and a combined set of 289 utilities to consider in a multiproduct
framework. The available database is an unbalanced panel for the study period. Direct
collection of additional information on volumes supplied/collected and the number of cus-
tomers from the water and wastewater utilities of each municipality improved the data
for those categories, but significant missing data remains, specially regarding the price of
17At the sample mean, the mean scaled variables will have the value of one, rendering their logarithmic
transformation null. The extra terms in the cost elasticities formulas resulting from the second-order terms
in the translog equation disappear at the sample mean, leaving the straightforward result: ∂ ln(TCit)
∂(ln(Xit))
= βX
18The database also included the years 1998 and 2000, but for those years there was a large enough
amount of missing data to prevent its use.
19We only consider the retail service providers, although the database did include information on bulk
water and wastewater operators.
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labour20.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the definition of the main variables used in the water supply
cost function model21 and some summary statistics22.
Table 6.1: Definition of the variables used in the water supply cost function
Variable Definition
TCWS Total cost of water supply (€/year)
YWS
delivered
Volume of water delivered (m3/year)
YWS
losses
Estimated volume of water losses (m3/year)
CWS Number of water supply customers
PWS
L
Labour price index in water supply (€/m3 of water delivered)
PWS
B
Bulk water price (€/m3)
PK Price of capital (harmonized long-term interest rates
for convergence assessment purposes) (%)
PWS
OT
Price index for other miscellaneous inputs in water supply, including energy (€/m3)
multimunicipalWS Existence of a multimunicipal bulk water provider for the municipality
customerdensityWS CWS/area of the municipalities served (customers/km2)
SWS
L
Share of labour costs in total costs of water supply
SWS
B
Share of bulk water acquisition costs in total costs of water supply
SK Share of capital costs in total costs of water supply
SWS
OT
Share of costs with other miscellaneous inputs, including energy, in water supply
The total cost of water supply is calculated as the sum of the following categories of
costs: labour costs, bulk water purchases, capital costs and other operational costs (includ-
ing energy). The lack of disaggregation of the operating costs by the utilities is responsible
for a significant amount of missing data regarding labour costs. We must also mention
that not all water utilities purchase bulk water. Multimunicipal bulk water systems are
still being expanded in Portugal and they do not cover the entire country23. Our choice to
consider the bulk water costs as a separate category prevents us from using observations
20Missing data was the reason why the length of the water distribution/wastewater collection network
was not considered.
21Other variables were considered in preliminary analysis, but they were dropped for not being significant
or simply because the number of available observations in the panel limited the number of regressors which
could be considered Examples of such variables were precipitation, % of missing mandatory water quality
analysis, altitude difference between the highest and the lowest point in the municipality, % of water
produced from bulkwater acquisitions, volume of water losses, % of population served by water supply
systems, % of detached houses (proxy for meter reading costs), frequency of billing and type of utility
dummy variables.
22The estimation considered regional dummies at the NUTS II level, which are not included in the tables.
23The data considers the cases of bulk water purchases from neighbouring municipal operators, but they
are a fraction of the bulk water transactions.
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Table 6.2: Summary statistics of the variables used in the water supply cost function - all
water utilities
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
TCWS 526 2,471,713 5,856,423 1,915 5.39×107
YWSdelivered 542 2,078,061 4,767,810 104,514 6.56×10
7
YWSlosses 542 1,109,162 3,056,561 0 4.67×10
7
CWS 532 16,812 32,028 1,261 341,799
PWSL 170 0.261 0.201 0.006 1.122
PWSB 379 0.403 0.148 0 1.57
PK 542 3.955 0.496 3.46 4.45
PWSOT 483 0.366 0.449 0.001 3.947
multimunicipalWS 542 0.614 0.487 0 1
area 542 328.2 287.8 7.9 1,720.6
customerdensityWS 532 132.2 413.7 2.2 4,035.4
SWSL 186 0.206 0.138 0.006 0.640
SWSB 526 0.103 0.185 0.000 0.849
SK 526 0.337 0.196 0.002 0.942
SWSOT 481 0.238 0.189 0.000 0.904
from the utilities that do not buy bulk water24. Nevertheless, the impact is marginal,
given that usually the utilities located outside the scope of the multimunicipal bulk water
systems are usually from in less populated rural areas and tend not to disaggregate opera-
tion costs entirely, meaning they tend to be discarded due to missing data anyway25. The
capital costs considered result from the calculation of equivalent annuities for a 30-year
term of maturity of a deflated26 series of investments for the period 1987-2005, to which
we add financial outlays.
The volume of water losses is calculated from the difference between the amount of
water produced from all sources (including bulk water purchases) and the volume of water
delivered. This data is available in the Regional Statistics published by the National
Statistics Institute (INE).
24We do not transform null observations on variables. Where they appear, the utility is discarded in the
same fashion as the missing data cases.
25We do realize however, that our estimation results may represent only the cases where a bulk water
provider exists and may lack the ability to be generalized for the remaining retail operators.
26We used the deflator for Portuguese GDP at market prices, unit Euro/ECU, supplied by AMECO —
Annual Macroeconomic Database of Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN)
of the European Commission) and considered constant 2005 prices.
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The price of labour (PWSL ) is calculated as an index based on the ratio of labour costs
per m3 of water delivered, due to lack of data on the number of employees, adapting an
approach used commonly for the residual cost category27 (the same procedure is in fact
used for the residual cost category in our study). Energy expenditures have not been
considered separately in equation (6.1) due to the lack of variation in the corresponding
price.28
The set of ZWSm variables included in equation (6.1) will only include a measure of the
density of customers served (customerdensityWS)29. Dummy variables were created to
capture regional differences in the conditions of operation. We also consider a dummy
variable with a value of one if there is a multimunicipal bulk water provider for the
municipality30. Finally, the cost shares are calculated from the INSAAR data.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the definition of the main variables used in the wastewater
drainage and treatment cost function model and some summary statistics. The afore-
mentioned considerations apply. The separation of costs between the water supply and
sewerage activity was done by the utilities at the time of the data collection by the National
Water Institute.
27See for example Garcia and Thomas (2001). An alternative is the division by the amount of capital
assets or a proxy like the network length (Bottasso and Conti (2009) and Filippini et al. (2008)). The
alternative would not be a good choice in our case due to the missing data regarding network length.
28All the utilities face the same regulated price schedules, as long as they choose the same power load
capacity. Variation in the price of energy would only came from the temporal dimension of the panel which
is only two years.
29Other variables were considered in preliminary analysis, but they were dropped for not being signif-
icant. Examples of such variables were the % of water produced from different sources (groundwater,
surface, bulkwater purchases), measures of water quality, billing frequency, temperature and precipitation,
altitude difference between the highest and the lowest point in the municipality, % of population served
by water supply or by wastewater collection systems and treatment plants or the % of output to nonresi-
dential customers. Some of these variables showed relevance in preliminary tests without the mean-scaling
transformation, but not in the models where it was applied.
30The value of zero stands for the cases where bulk water is purchased from neighbouring municipalities,
given that the cases which do not buy bulk water and are not covered by a multimunicipal bulk water
system are discarded in in the logarithmic transformation.
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Table 6.3: Definition of the variables used for the wastewater drainage and treatment cost
function
Variable Definition
TCWW Total cost of wastewater drainage and treatment (€/year)
YWW Volume of wastewater collected (m3/year)
CWW Number of customers of the wastewater service
PWW
L
Labour price index in wastewater drainage and treatment (€/m3 of water collected)
PWW
B
Bulk wastewater collection price (€/m3)
PWW
K
= PWSK Price of capital (harmonized long-term interest rates
for convergence assessment purposes) (%)
PWW
OT
Price index for other miscellaneous inputs in wastewater service, including energy (€/m3)
multimunicipalWW Existence of a multimunicipal bulk water provider for the municipality
customerdensityWW CWW /area of the municipalities served (customers/km2)
SWW
L
Share of labour costs in total costs of wastewater drainage and treatment
SWW
B
Share of bulk water acquisition costs in total costs of wastewater drainage and treatment
SK Share of capital costs in total costs of wastewater drainage and treatment
SWW
OT
Share of costs with other miscellaneous inputs,
including energy, in wastewater drainage and treatment
Table 6.4: Summary statistics of the variables used in the wastewater drainage and treat-
ment cost function - all wastewater utilities
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
TCWW 542 1,504,902 3,209,920 1,989 2.47×107
YWW 546 1,633,302 4,276,020 4,846 5.27×107
CWW 503 13,439 26,303 260 182,466
LWW 296 85,434 105,199 200 796,770
PWWL 166 0.263 0.471 0.007 5.080
PWWB 283 0.422 0.113 0 0.53
PWWK 550 3.955 0.496 3.46 4.45
PWWOT 469 0.520 1.129 0.000 14.633
multimunicipalWW 550 0.502 0.500 0 1
area 550 326.8 286.2 7.9 1,720.6
customerdensityWW 503 111.0 349.4 0.948 3,624.9
SWWL 167 0.183 0.132 0.006 0.602
SWWB 542 0.029 0.093 0.000 0.707
SK 541 0.253 0.253 0.002 1.000
SWWOT 474 0.198 0.198 0.000 0.962
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Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the definition of the main variables used in the cost function
model combining the water supply and wastewater collection activity and some summary
statistics. Due to limitations in the number of complete observations available and the
large number of parameters to be estimated in a translog equation, we have to dispose of
the water losses variable. The price variables for labour and the residual cost category are
obtained dividing their respective costs by the sum of the volumes of delivered water and
wastewater collected. The bulk price is a simple average of the unit prices for bulk water
supply and bulk wastewater collection. The cost shares consider the sum of the water
supply and wastewater drainage and treatment activities. Populational density is used as
a proxy for the number of customers of each utility31.
Table 6.5: Definition of the variables used for the multi-output water and wastewater cost
function
Variable Definition
TC Total cost of water supply and wastewater drainage and treatment (€/year)
YWS Volume of water delivered (m3/year)
YWW Volume of wastewater collected (m3/year)
CWS Number of water supply customers
CWW Number of customers of the wastewater service
PL Labour price index in water supply and wastewater drainage and treatment (€/m3 of water collected)






K Price of capital (harmonized long-term interest rates
for convergence assessment purposes) (%)
POT Price index for other miscellaneous inputs in water supply and wastewater service,
including energy (€/m3)
multimunicipalWS Existence of a multimunicipal bulk water provider for the municipality
multimunicipalWW Existence of a multimunicipal bulk water provider for the municipality
popdensity population density(habitants/km2)
SL Share of labour costs in total costs of wastewater drainage and treatment
SB Share of bulk water acquisition and bulk wastewater disposal costs in total costs
of wastewater drainage and treatment
SK Share of capital costs in total costs of wastewater drainage and treatment
SOT Share of costs with other miscellaneous inputs, including energy,
in wastewater drainage and treatment
31The simultaneous introduction of customer density measures for both water supply and wastewater
would generate serious multicollinearity problems.
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Table 6.6: Summary statistics of the variables used in the multi-output water and waste-
water cost function - all water and wastewater utilities
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
TC 559 3,771,353 8,224,195 12,534 7.00×107
YWS 578 1,948,631 4,643,961 0 6.56×107
YWW 574 1,553,629 4,185,077 0 5.27×107
CWS 568 15,747 31,265 0 341,799
CWW 561 12,731 25,776 0 182,466
PL 153 0.247 0.207 0.020 1.593
PB 276 0.430 0.096 0 0.788
PK 578 3.955 0.496 3.46 4.45
POT 489 0.391 0.463 0.002 4.083
multimunicipalWS 578 0.612 0.488 0 1
multimunicipalWW 568 0.509 0.500 0 1
popdensity 578 287.1 782.4 5.8 6498.4
SL 152 0.196 0.124 0.013 0.607
SB 559 0.076 0.140 0.000 0.773
SK 558 0.371 0.196 0.013 1.000
SOT 491 0.242 0.180 0.000 0.891
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6.5 Empirical results - Economies of scale for water supply
Table 6.7 shows the estimated values for the parameters of the translog equation (6.1).
All first-order coefficients for outputs and input prices have the expected positive sign,
although the number of customers and the labour price are not significantly different from
zero. Customer density also has the expected negative impact on total costs. Using the
interpretation of the first order coefficients as cost elasticities at the sample mean, we
can see that producing one percent more of water delivered costs increases total costs in
0.78%, while one percent more of water lost in the system increases total costs by only
0.2%. These values are close to the ones reported by Garcia and Thomas (2001) for the
French region of Bordeaux, which were respectively 0.65% and 0.22%. They interpret this
result as a confirmation of "the intuition that minimizing water losses is not a priority,
especially if repairing leaks is very costly". This may be the case from the point of view
of the water utility, specially if it is not paying the actual opportunity/scarcity cost of the
water abstracted but it does not mean that for society as a whole it is better not to invest
in the maintenance of the networks, because the price of water does not reflect its actual
value32. The interpretation of coefficients as cost-elasticities at the sample mean is also
useful to calculate the measure of economies of scale as the proportional increase in total
costs resulting from proportional increases in both outputs and customers.
32We also stress that the interpretation of the cost-elasticity regarding water losses is not so straighfor-
ward, because the impacts that this undesirable output has on costs are twofold and opposed. On one
hand a higher volume of water losses increases the costs of obtaining raw water from own sources or from
bulk water purchases. On the other hand, higher values of water losses are incurred by utilities which save
on outlays for network maintenance. These opposing effects alone may justify the lower coefficient.
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Table 6.7: Translog parameter estimates for the water supply cost function
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate













































































































*** Significance at the 0.01 level
** Significance at the 0.05 level
* Significance at the 0.10 level
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Economies of output density measure the reciprocal of the percentage increase in to-
tal costs when output increases 1%, holding all other factors constant (the number of
customers, the length of the distribution network and the input prices, namely). This
measure of cost economies is relevant for output increases resulting from a higher de-
















A value greater than one indicates that economies of output density exist, i.e., when the
outputs increase in a given proportion (holding all other factors fixed) the costs increase
in a lower proportion. We would talk about diseconomies of output density for values
less than one. The computed value of 1.027 indicates that for the average water utility,
an increased volume of output for the same number of customers would slightly decrease
the average cost of production, as expected for a natural monopoly. The economies of



















Economies of customer density measure the reciprocal of the percentage increase in
total costs when the number of customers and the volume outputs all increase 1%, holding
all remaining factors fixed (network length, input prices). ECD differs from EOD only
in the fact that increases in output results not from higher per customer demand but
from an increase in the number of customers served. It may be a relevant measure for
areas which are expanding their service coverage levels or with a growing population, but
where the most of the distribution network is developed. From the results in table 6.7
we compute the value of 0.922, meaning that average costs would increase for the average
33See Nauges and Berg (2008a) for a multi-output case or Bottasso and Conti (2009) for a single-output
example.
34The same formula could be used to obtain the returns on spatial density by considering the service
area size in the place of the number of customers (Bottasso and Conti (2009)).
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Portuguese water utility after a proportional increase in the number of customers and the
corresponding outputs (a situation of diseconomies of customer density).





























The formula measures the reciprocal of the percentage increase in costs that would be
associated with an increase of 1% in both outputs, number of customers and the network
length and is especially relevant to analyse the advantages or disadvantages of merging
neighbouring systems. A value of ESWS greater than one would mean the existence of
economies of scale, while a value less than one would signify a situation of diseconomies of
scale. Because the length of the distribution network was not considered in our model, the
economies of scale are given by the the returns on customer density. We conclude that the
average Portuguese water utility is not undersized, which is in contrast with the result from
Martins et al. (2008) which reports positive economies of scale for the industry average in
Portugal. One possible explanation may be the fact that Martins et al. (2008) does not
consider the number of customers given that we do find economies of output density for
the sample average. We must stress that our result not mean that smaller units could not
benefit from increasing their size of operations. Martins et al. (2008) shows that smaller
utilities have larger economies of scale to be seized than larger operators.
In a multiple-output context, product-specific economies of scale can be obtained with



























35See also Kim (1987) or Martins et al. (2008) for an explanation focused on the water industry.
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ICWSq = TC
WS − TCWS−q (6.13)
TCWS−q = TC
WS|Y WSq =0 (6.14)
TCWS−q is the cost of producing all outputs except output q (q = 0) (Fraquelli et al.
(2004)). ICWSq is the incremental cost of producing the output q while keeping the other
outputs constant (for a given level of q it is computed as the difference between the costs
for that level and the costs for q = 0). Product-specific economies of scale measure how
would total costs change, given an increase in one of the outputs (q), keeping the other
ones constant, as well as all other explanatory variables. This measure may be important
because one of the products in our framework is not a real output, but rather a waste of
water resources through leaks in the water distribution network or unmetered and unbilled
water exits from the system. A "desirable" increase in scale could not only be one that
increased proportionally the amount of water delivered and of water losses, but one that
at least contained water losses at their present level while increasing the actual output.
The formula in equation (6.14), however implies the consideration of null values for the
other output, for which the translog function is not defined. We follow the approach
of Kim (1987) and estimate stand alone total costs based on arbitrarily small values of
outputs36. Because the estimation of equation (6.1) implied discarding a significant
number of observations and the calculation of product-specific economies of scale will use
sample averages from the several variables used37, we present in table 6.8 the summary
statistics for the observations actually used in estimating equation (6.1). This are the
values used for the following calculations and not the industry averages from table 6.2.
Because we are dealing with mean-scaled variable, at the sample average values, all









36We use the value of 10% of the industry average as proposed by Kim (1987).
37The mean showned in table 6.2 is for all mainland Portuguese water utilities with available information,
while our estimation only considered those with complete information and most importantly, those which
either had a multimunicipal bulk water provider available or that bought bulk water from a neighbouring
municipality. We must therefore use the average of the sample considered in obtaining the results in table
6.7 and not the entire set of Portuguese water utilities.
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Table 6.8: Summary statistics of the variables used in the water supply cost function -
utilities with complete information
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
TCWS 91 5,325,730 9,086,914 109,443 5.23×107
YWSdelivered 91 3,838,724 5,630,690 109,133 2,31×10
7
YWSlosses 91 1,853,484 2,646,706 5,000 1,38×10
7
CWS 91 29,778 43,030 1,450 182,466
PWSL 91 0.220 0.163 0.006 0.797
PWSB 91 0.396 0.145 0.62 1.12
PK 91 3.993 0.469 3.46 4.45
PWSOT 91 0.548 0.493 0.003 2.402
multimunicipalWS 91 0.868 0.340 0 1
area 91 311.6 308.5 7.9 1,720.6
customerdensityWS 91 221.0 506.6 2.7 3,698.5
SWSL 91 0.163 0.120 0.006 0.608
SWSB 91 0.235 0.228 0.000 0.849
SK 91 0.256 0.180 0.005 0.708
SWSOT 91 0.327 0.192 0.002 0.721



















where YWSqit is 0.1 (10% of the sample average in our case) or other arbitrarily small
value.
The values obtained for the product-specific economies are 4.90 and 8.81, respectively
for water delivered and water losses. The former means that there would be significant
returns to scale to be seized if the amount of water delivered could be increased while
keeping water losses at a constant level. This may however not be a realistic assumption.
The interpretation of the latter is not really useful38.
So far, we have analyzed the situation regarding economies of scale and economies of
output density for the sample average, but it is interesting to look at the results for the
38 It would mean that, holding water delivered constant, water losses could be increased with a much
less than proportional increase in costs, but although the specification of water losses as outputs has some
advantages in the estimation of the cost function, we should be reminded that they are not associated
with a corresponding revenue like water deliveries. The result may mean that it is cheap to let the water
flow from open taps and leaks (probably due to the lack of a price for the resource itself rather than the
provision service), but it certainly does not imply that is an economically good idea!
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various values of water delivered, water losses and number of customers in the sample
range (we continue to evaluate all other variables at the sample mean, including water
losses). The general formulas for cost elasticities now become (continuing to consider
sample averages for the remaining regressors like input prices):
∂ lnTCWS
∂ lnYWSdelivered











































The estimated parameters from table 6.7 can be substituted in the formulas above and
in equations (6.7) and (6.8) recalculated. The result is shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. In
each of the graphics they contain, only one variable is allowed to vary39, while all others
are evaluated at the sample average. It is possible to see that economies of output density
are increasing with the volume of water delivered, but decreasing with the amounts of
water losses and the number of customers. The figures also show the previous result that
for the industry at the sample average there are economies of output density40.
On the contrary, from Figure 6.2 we confirm the result that the sample average utility
is not enjoying economies of scale (proportionally increasing outputs and customers will
increase its total costs more than proportionally). For values outside the sample averages
we see that the a utility is more likely to be in a situation of economies of scale the larger
the utility is, as measured by its customer base. The opposite happens regarding outputs
which show a negative association with scale economies.
39The figures considered variations between one third and three times the sample average values for the
variable, which is within the values used for estimation.
40The sample average of the x-axis variable is one, due to the mean-scaling transformation.
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Figure 6.1: Economies of output density in water supply
Figure 6.2: Economies of scale in water supply
The measure of economies of scale seems to be a more realistic measure than economies
of output density as the volumes of water delivered , water losses and the number of
customers are strongly associated. A simple correlation matrix between the three variables
for all available observations shows this clearly (Table 6.9). It is therefore more useful to
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think of possible expansions based on increasing the three variables simultaneously41. The
overall conclusion seems to be that the utility which would gain the most from increasing
its size would be the one with a large customer base, but providing a smaller amount of
water and with a reduced number of water losses. This seems to favour the expansion of
efficient systems (with low leakage) with water conservation policies.





YWSdelivered 1.0000 - -
YWSlosses 0.9192 1.0000 -
CWS 0.9798 0.8829 1.0000
Because of this strong association between the output and customer variables we can
follow a different approach and recalculate the measures of economies of output density and
scale for different utility sizes, according to proportional variations in all three variables,
water delivered, water losses and the number of customers42. The result is shown in
Figure 6.3 for EODWS and in Figure 6.4 for ESWS. The economies of output density
exist for smaller utilities and persist at the sample average, while the diseconomies of scale
exist for the entire existing range of utility size in Portugal, although they are reduced
with size43. This impact of the size of utilities on the measures of scale elasticities is not
common. It is more usual to find economies of scale which subside as we consider larger
and larger utilities. Nevertheless, this result is not new and several other authors have
reported values for economies of scale that are increasing with the utility size: Mizutani
and Urakami (2001), Aubert and Reynaud (2005) (short-run), Torres and Paul (2006) and
Bottasso and Conti (2009) report it for retail water supply, while Fraquelli et al. (2004)
do it for a study of the joint production of water, gas and electricity.
41This is not incontradiction with the benefits that can be gained from measures to control water losses,
but only to admit that they may have a limited impact.
42The procedure of analysing scale and scope economies for ray expansions and contractions of selected
mean-scaled variables for average values of input prices is also followed by Fraquelli et al. (2004), for
example.
43Because the translog specification used is a second-order Taylor series approximation with reference
to the sample average, the quality of the approximation is naturally better for values closed to the mean.
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Figure 6.3: Economies of output density in water supply for different utility sizes
Figure 6.4: Economies of scale in water supply for different utility sizes
For multi-output cost functions a measure of economies of scope can be calculated,
which, if greater than zero, indicates that costs savings can be made by the joint production
of outputs rather than in separate. Equation (6.20) shows how they can be calculated in













SPWS > 1 ⇔ TCWS |Y WSdelivered=0
+ TCWS |Y WSlosses=0
> TCWS means that the separate
production of the two outputs (YWSdelivered and Y
WS
losses in our case) is associated with greater
costs than would be incurred by their joint production (TCWS), so that economies of scope
could be achieved. SPWS < 1 would represent the presence of diseconomies of scope.
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Garcia and Thomas (2001) and Martins et al. (2008) calculate measures of economies
of scope for the joint production of drinking water and water losses in Bordeaux, France,
and in Portugal respectively. For their sample averages they find significant economies
of scope (0.2367 and 0.327). Our estimations show a different result, −0.338,44 but our
main interest is not so much in the interpretation of our result but in questioning the very
point of estimating economies of scope for water losses. Garcia and Thomas (2001) do
present some arguments and try to make a case for the interpretation of this measure in the
context of water losses as comparing a situation where water supply is provided together
with water losses (because repairing the leaks would be more costly than abstracting more
water to satisfy demand) with a situation where water losses are contained and more water
is "produced" from the investment in a more efficient distribution system. We question
their point of view on two accounts. First, their measure of scope economies, being similar
to our equation (6.20), is not comparing the joint production with producing only tap water
(while keeping water losses at a minimum). It is instead comparing the former situation
with another where the same amounts of tap water and water losses are produced by two
separate utilities, one for each type of output (which is an unreal possibility). To truly
follow their interpretation they would have to remove the TCWS |Y WS
delivered
=0 component
from their measure of economies of scope and the resulting figure would necessarily be
lower. Second, while the interpretation of water losses as an output seems reasonable,
given that it is a result of the water supplying activity that adds to the costs incurred
by the utility, the effect on costs of moving from producing two outputs to a single one
(or vice-versa) is opposite to the traditional interpretation, because producing tap water
without water losses is more expensive than producing it with them45.
For aforementioned reasons we believe the measure of economies of scope to be inade-
quate to analyze the situation regarding water losses and think more information can be
44Because the formula in 6.20 implies the consideration of null values for the output, for which the
translog function is not defined, we follow again the approach of Kim (1987) and estimate stand alone
total costs based on arbitrarily small values of outputs (using the value of 10% of the industry average as
proposed by Kim (1987)).
45Theoretically one can think of a high enough price for bulk water to invert this conclusion, but in
practice, the bulk water is usually underpriced (by not including the scarcity cost of abstracting it) and
retail operators often have alternative sources of surface and groundwater.
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provided from the analysis of the third graphic in Figures 6.7 and 6.9, which show that for
given values of water delivered and customers, economies of output density and economies
of scale are more likely to happen the lower the level of water losses. In the end, the
determination of the efficient amount of water losses requires cost-benefit analysis beyond
the scope of this paper.
6.6 Empirical results - Economies of scale for wastewater
drainage and treatment
We turn now to the analysis of the sewerage part of the Portuguese water industry. Table
6.10 presents the results from the estimation of equation (6.2). All the first-order coef-
ficients for the outputs and input prices have the expected positive sign. The coefficient
for customers has an unexpected negative sign, but it is not significantly different from
zero46. The price per m3 paid to bulk wastewater collectors, also does not appear to be
a relevant explanatory factor for costs. Customer density does not seem to have a signifi-
cant impact on costs. On the other hand, the existence of a bulk wastewater collector is
strongly associated with larger costs, probably reflecting a greater compliance with legal
standards for wastewater treatment.
Like in the case for water supply, the estimation results presented in table 6.10 had
to be obtained with a number of available observations which is significantly lower than
the total number of wastewater utilities, due to missing data and the inclusion of the bulk
wastewater price. Table 6.11 presents the summary statistics for the used sample:
46One hypothesis could be that a smaller number of customers, for a given level of output would reflect a
greater presence of large industrial businesses which would impose greater treatment costs on the system.
Nevertheless, the negative sign is robust to the inclusion of the proportion of nonresidential customers,
which turns out not to be a significant regressor as is not included in this final estimation. Other possible
explanation could be that the number of customers would only include those which are connected to the
public sewer network, but that larger costs would be incurred attending households with septic tanks.
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Table 6.10: Translog parameter estimates for the wastewater drainage and treatment cost
function
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate























































































*** Significance at the 0.01 level
** Significance at the 0.05 level
* Significance at the 0.10 level
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Table 6.11: Summary statistics of the variables used in the wastewater drainage and
treatment cost function - utilities with complete information
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
TCWW 66 3,499,454 5,578,848 114,415 2.43×107
YWW 66 3,876,389 7,988,708 36,000 5,27×107
CWW 66 27,652 43,417 693 182,466
PWWL 66 0.280 0.375 0.007 2.150
PWWB 66 0.406 0.117 0.08 0.53
PWWOT 66 0.682 0.852 0.00 4.34
multimunicipalWW 66 0.939 0.240 0 1
area 66 270.3 237.2 26.7 1,438.2
customerdensityWW 66 188.7 412.5 4.1 2,457.8
SWWL 66 0.154 0.111 0.006 0.409
SWWB 66 0.119 0.172 0.000 0.707
SK 66 0.379 0.231 0.011 0.925
SWWOT 66 0.323 0.227 0.001 0.962
The previous formulas for the calculation of economies of output density and economies
of scale (equal to economies of customer density in our framework) are adapted to the














The computed values for the sample averages are 0.84 and 1.06, respectively for the
economies of output density and for the economies of scale. Increasing the volume of
wastewater collected for the same number of customers would bring about a more than
proportional increase in costs, while if the increased activity was the result of an increased
number of customers, the opposite would happen and economies of scale would be achieved.
The result seems to be the opposite to the one obtained for the water supply side of the
industry.
Next we repeat the previous procedure of considering values for the output and the
number of customers other than the sample averages. The general formulas for cost
elasticities in the sewerage industry become (continuing to consider sample averages for
221
the remaining regressors like input prices):
∂ lnTCWW
∂ lnYWW




















The estimated parameters from table 6.10 are substituted in the formulas (6.23), (6.24),
(6.21) and (6.22) are recalculated. The result is shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. For the
sample average values, one can confirm the inexistence of economies of output density.
This type of economies is more likely to appear for utilities with larger customer bases or
with smaller output levels.
Once again, we should remind ourselves that the previous measure considers the
economies to be had if we increase output, while keeping all other factors fixed, which
is not exactly a realistic situation (the correlation between the volumes collected and the
number of customers is 0.8428 for the Portuguese industry). It is better to think of the
effect on costs of a proportional increase in customers and outputs, which would result, for
example, from merging the water/wastewater utilities of two or more neighboring munic-
ipalities. Figure 6.6 shows the existence of economies of scale for the sample average and
the fact that they decrease with the amount of wastewater collected, but increase with the
number of customers. The overall conclusion is similar to the one found for water supply:
the utilities with larger customer bases and lower amounts of wastewater collected are the
ones that enjoy the highest economies of scale. Because the amount of water delivered and
the amount of wastewater collected are strongly associated (the correlation coefficient is
0.97 for our data), we draw the same conclusion that economies of scale seem to be found
in larger and more efficient systems.
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Figure 6.5: Economies of output density in wastewater drainage and treatment
Figure 6.6: Economies of scale in wastewater drainage and treatment
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Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the calculation of EODWW and ESWW for different utility
sizes, considering the more realistic assumption of proportional variations in both the
volume of sewage collected and the number of customers. They confirm the result that
diseconomies of output density do exist for the virtually all the significant range of possible
actual utility sizes, but that economies of scale can be seized up to a size which is about
five times larger than the sample average.
Figure 6.7: Economies of output density in wastewater drainage and treatment for different
utility sizes
Figure 6.8: Economies of scale in wastewater drainage and treatment for different utility
sizes
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6.7 Economies of scale and scope with a multi-output cost
function for water supply and wastewater drainage and
treatment
For mainland Portugal, for 260 out of 278 municipalities there is a single utility combining
the services of water supply and wastewater drainage and treatment. The analysis of
the industry’s costs for the retail level would not be complete without an analysis of the
economies of scope between these two different but so often associated activities. This is
accomplished through the estimation of model (6.3) with the same methodology described
for the previous estimations. A complete specification of outputs would include not only
the amount of water delivered and wastewater collected but also the volume of water
losses in the same way as we did in section 6.5. However, the limited number of available
observations with complete information, prevented us from using all three outputs, as the
number of parameters to be estimated tends to increase exponentially with the translog
and would overcome the number of available observations. Our choice is to discard the
water losses variable and keep a symmetrical situation between both activities47. Table
6.12 presents the estimation results. The coefficients for outputs, customers and input
prices are positive as expected with the exception of the volume of wastewater collected
which comes up with a negative sign, but which is not significantly different from zero.
The impact of the number of customers is also not significantly different from zero as in
the previous estimations, the same happening with the coefficient for the price for bulk
transactions48.
47Because combined sewer systems (conveying both storm water and sanitary sewage) or only partially
separated sewer systems represent between 65% and 75% of all collecting systems (Roseta-Palma et al.
(2006)), leaving out water losses from the estimation is equivalent to the disregarding of storm water
(or groundwater) infiltrations and its consequences on the costs of wastewater treatment. Although the
consideration of water losses has been slowly making its way into the estimation of the water supply cost
function (see Fraquelli and Moiso (2005), Lin (2005) and Garcia and Thomas (2001) for three different
ways to consider water losses), no study so far was able to use a measure of infiltration in the sewer system.
48 In the previous estimations, bulk water price proved to have a significant impact on the costs of water
supply while the price for bulk wastewater collection did not. Due to the limitation in the number of
available obsevations we choose to average both prices here.
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Table 6.12: Translog parameter estimates for the multi-output water supply and waste-
water drainage and treatment cost function
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate







































































































































*** Significance at the 0.01 level
** Significance at the 0.05 level
* Significance at the 0.10 level
226
Like the previous estimations, the estimation results presented in table 6.12 were
obtained with a limited sample of observations with complete information. Table 6.13
presents the summary statistics for the used sample.
Table 6.13: Summary statistics of the variables used in the multi-output water supply and
wastewater drainage and treatment cost function - utilities with complete information
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
TC 51 8,274,942 1.39×107 354,916 5,94×107
YWS 51 3,630,971 5,749,652 149,608 2.31×107
YWW 51 2,997,787 4,985,804 36,000 2.48×107
CWS 51 28,501 43,500 2,007 182,466
CWW 51 25,308 43,994 693 182,466
PL 51 0.235 0.169 0.027 0.834
PB 51 0.412 0.119 0.170 0.788
PK 51 3.926 0.499 3.46 4.45
POT 51 0.532 0.421 0.006 1.763
multimunicipalWS 51 0.941 0.238 0 1
multimunicipalWW 51 0.961 0.196 0 1
popdensity 51 345.0 765.5 11.2 4917.0
SL 51 0.163 0.098 0.026 0.436
SB 51 0.182 0.193 0.000 0.733
SK 51 0.295 0.180 0.013 0.724
SOT 51 0.344 0.194 0.003 0.807
The formulas for the economies of output/production density and for the economies of





+ ∂ lnTC∂ lnYcollected
(6.25)











The computed values at the sample average are 1.22 for the economies of output
density and 0.86 for the economies of scale, implying that average costs would decrease for
increased output volumes for the same number of customers, but they rise for proportional
increases in customers and volumes. This results are shown in Figures 6.9 and 6.10, which
portray them for different utility sizes, as measured by proportional variations in both the
outputs and the customers of both water supply and wastewater drainage and treatment.
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For the existing ranges of utility sizes in our sample we find economies of output density,
which are larger for smaller utilities and diseconomies of scale, which are smaller for larger
utilities.
Figure 6.9: Economies of output density for the multi-output water supply wastewater
drainage and treatment cost function for different utility sizes
Figure 6.10: Economies of scale for the multi-output water supply and wastewater drainage
and treatment cost function for different utility sizes
The major reason for estimating a combined cost function for water supply and waste-
water collection is the analysis of the benefits seized by the joint operation of both activ-
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ities. The measure of the economies of scope is given by49:
SP =
(TC|Ydelivered=0∧Cdelivered=0 + TC|Ycollected=0∧Ccollected=0)− TC
TC
(6.27)
Because the formula in equation (6.14) implies the consideration of null values for the
output, for which the translog function is not defined, we follow again the approach of Kim
(1987) and estimate stand alone total costs based on arbitrarily small values of outputs
and customers50. The value obtained of −0.78 indicates strong diseconomies of scope and
is in contrast with the positive values previously estimated by Martins, Fortunato and
Coelho (2006) for the average of the Portuguese water industry. One other result which is
contrary to the evidence provided by Martins, Fortunato and Coelho (2006) is the fact that
economies of scope seem to be exist for utilities with larger sizes in our results as can be
seen from table 6.14. A positive impact of size on scope economies has also been found by
Torres and Paul (2006) and Fraquelli et al. (2004) which report measures of economies of
scope that decrease with size for smaller utilities, but which increase with size for the larger
ones. There we present the results for the economies of scope measure for different selected
utilities sizes, obtained by simultaneously considering different proportions regarding their
respective sample averages for the outputs and customers’ variables. For utilities with sizes
which are three times or more larger than the sample average the combined management
of the water supply and wastewater drainage and treatment is cheaper than their separate
operation and the opposite happens for the smaller systems.
49The formulas presented by in the literature usually omit the number of customers (Garcia and Thomas
(2001) and Fraquelli et al. (2004)), but the situation of producing a single output necessarily implies having
only one type of customer.
50We use the value of 10% of the industry average as proposed by Kim (1987).
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Table 6.14: Scope economies for different utility sizes









Note: All variables are mean-scaled (1 = sample average size)
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6.8 Conclusion
In this paper we have assessed the cost structure of the Portuguese water industry at
the retail level, testing the existence of economies of scale and scope, at a time when
public water infrastructure investments policies in Portugal seem to be most concerned
with achieving these cost economies. This is the first study to jointly consider the water
and wastewater activities in the Portuguese water industry while accounting for the in-
put prices. It also differs from previous estimations of cost functions for the Portuguese
industry by using the estimation method and functional form most widely applied in the
literature, respectively the estimation of seemingly unrelated regression equation on a
translog specification.
Our results differ from previous research for the Portuguese water industry in that
for the sample average we find diseconomies of scale for water supply and for utilities
combining the water supply and wastewater drainage and treatment activities (even with
evidence of economies of output density for the sample average). For wastewater sewerage
we do find evidence of economies of scale for the sample average. Our results are also
contrasting in that economies of scale are found to increase with the size of the utility,
except for wastewater collection.
Regarding economies of scope, we question previous interpretations of this measure
on multi-output cost functions for water delivered and water losses. We find that the
reduction of water losses favours the existence of economies of scale. Diseconomies of
scope are found for the combined activities of water supply and wastewater drainage and
treatment, but the situation improves with the utility size and for utilities larger than
three times the sample average economies of scope do exist.
Future research should seek to improve the data on the length of the distribution
network and the input price variables in order to be able to distinguish short-run from
long-run cost-elasticities and to improve the efficiency of the estimates. The effects of
ownership on costs and efficiency levels could be tested and the analysis could be extended
to bulk water providers / wastewater collectors. The present findings and methods could
also be applied in combination with the estimation of the demand for water to assess the
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impacts on welfare from adopting distinct water tariff schedules.
Appendix A
Derivation of equation 4.16
This Appendix contains the derivation of equation (4.16). See also (Brown and Sibley
(1986, pp.205-6)).























































where θ indicates the marginal consumer group (θ = θ (Q,P (Q)))
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Formulation and solution to the
dynamic water pricing and
investment model with a financial
constraint
This Appendix describes the formulation and the solution to the dynamic water pric-
ing and investment model with a financial constraint. We formulate the problem as an
isoperimetric one by adding the following budget balancing constraint to the problem 4.28:
∞∫
0
e−rt {D (f (Kt, φt) , φt) f (Kt, φt)−C (f (Kt, φt) , φt)− It − c (It)}dt = 0 (B.1)
We choose to adopt a global constraint for the time horizon to reflect a perfect capital

















K̇ = I − δK (B.3)





















The steady state equilibrium is a stable node if the following expression is greater than








Comparative statics derivatives are less informative for the isoperimetric problem, but






is still an important factor in determining
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